Village of Park Forest v. Bragg

• Decision Date: 29 September 1967
• Docket Number: No. 40193,40193
• Citation: 38 Ill.2d 225,230 N.E.2d 868
• Parties: The VILLAGE OF PARK FOREST, Appellant, v. Jay D. BRAGG, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 868

230 N.E.2d 868

38 Ill.2d 225

The VILLAGE OF PARK FOREST, Appellant, v. Jay D. BRAGG, Appellee.

No. 40193.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 29, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 27, 1967.

Richard W. Hall, Village Pros., and Henry X. Dietch, Village Atty., Park Forest (Richard W. Hall, Park Forest, of counsel), for appellant.

Sydney R. Drebin and Marvin E. Aspen, Chicago, pro se, amici curiae.

Harry G. Fins, Matthew L. Salita, and Sidney Z. Karasik, Chicago, for other amici curiae.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

This case raises a question of first impression in this court--whether a judge has the power to suspend a penalty he has assessed for the violation of a municipal ordinance. A magistrate of the circuit court of Cook County found the defendant, Jay D. Bragg, guilty of violating two traffic ordinances of the village of Park Forest, one involving driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and the other relating to careless driving. Fines were assessed in accordance with the ordinances, and five dollars costs were added for each offense. The magistrate then suspended the penalties, making no provision for the duration of the suspension; the village appealed. The First District Appellate Court upheld the suspension (74 Ill.App.2d 87, 220 N.E.2d 61), and we granted leave to appeal. Defendant has not participated in any of the appellate proceedings herein, and Amici curiae appointed by the appellate court and this court have presented the arguments in opposition to the appeal and in favor of the magistrate's action before both that court and us.

Before reaching the merits of the appellate court's ruling, it must first be determined whether the village could properly seek review of the magistrate's decision. If violation of a municipal ordinance is subject to Supreme Court Rule 604 (formerly Rule 27(4)), Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, c. 110A, § 604, no appeal from the order of suspension could properly be taken. In Village of Maywood v. Houston, 10 Ill.2d 117, 139 N.E.2d 233, we passed on this precise question and also on the question of whether a double jeopardy problem is created if municipalities may appeal adverse decisions in ordinance cases as in ordinary civil suits. We there held that the village, without violating the defendant's constitutional rights, could properly appeal from a judgment acquitting him, adhering to the classification of an ordinance violation prosecution as being quasi-criminal in character, but civil in form. In passing on the constitutional question, we held that double jeopardy does not bar an appeal by the municipality. Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288.

Subsequent to this decision, the definition of 'offense' in the Code of Criminal Procedure was expanded to include 'a violation of * * * any penal ordinance of (the) political subdivisions' of this State. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, par. 102--15.) In light of this broadened definition, and without even citing Maywood, the Fourth District Appellate Court recently held that a municipality could not appeal from a decision to which Rule 27(4) (the present Rule 604) did not apply. (City of Gibson City v. McClellan, 61 Ill.App.2d 218, 209 N.E.2d 363. See, also, Town of Bloomington v. Murphy, 73 Ill.App.2d 417, 419, 218 N.E.2d 817.) In considering these decisions, we express no opinion as to the applicability to ordinance cases of provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure other than that which deals with appealability. Compare City of Highland Park v. Curtis, 83 Ill.App.2d 218, 226 N.E.2d 870.

Supreme Court Rule 604 enumerates the decisions from which 'the State' may appeal in 'criminal cases' and was adopted pursuant to section 120--1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, par. 120--1), which also speaks in terms of appeals by 'the State' in 'a criminal case'. The second of the quoted phrases is also employed in section 7 of article VI of the Illinois constitution, S.H.A., which provides that 'after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, no appeal shall lie from a judgment of acquittal.' In our opinion, the correctness of the appellate court's decision in Gibson City depends on the meaning of these phrases. Only if 'a criminal case' was intended to be synonymous with 'offense' and 'State' was intended to include the political subdivisions thereof did the appellate court reach the right result; and we do not believe this can fairly be said to represent the legislative intent. Included as 'offenses' in the present Code of Criminal Procedure are both what would ordinarily be thought of as 'a criminal case'--a case involving violation of 'any penal statute of this State'--and what had, prior to the expansion of the definition of 'offense' been referred to as quasi-criminal cases--those involving violation of 'any penal ordinance of its political subdivisions.' Thus the term 'offense', as presently defined, is clearly intended to be broader in scope than the phrase 'a criminal case'. Consequently, the statute delimiting the areas of appeal in 'a criminal case' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 28, par. 120--1) and our Rule 604, which uses the same phraseology, necessarily encompass a substantially smaller category of cases--only those which involve violations of the general criminal laws--than would be true had the term 'offense' been used in the statute and rule. We therefore conclude that expansion of the definition of 'offense' in section 102--15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in no way detracted from the continued...