Villarreal v. Harris County

• Citation: 226 S.W.3d 537
• Decision Date: 21 December 2006
• Docket Number: No. 01-05-00993-CV.,01-05-00993-CV.
• Parties: Lupe VILLARREAL, Appellant v. HARRIS COUNTY, Texas; Paul Betten-court, Tax-Assessor Collector for Harris County, Texas; Houston Independent School District; City of Houston; and Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson, L.L.P., Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

226 S.W.3d 537

Lupe VILLARREAL, Appellant v. HARRIS COUNTY, Texas; Paul Betten-court, Tax-Assessor Collector for Harris County, Texas; Houston Independent School District; City of Houston; and Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson, L.L.P., Appellees.

No. 01-05-00993-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

December 21, 2006.

Bernard E. Brooks, Stafford, TX, Mary Elizabeth Stow, Crosby, TX, for Appellant.

Kent M. Rider, Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson, LLP, Austin, TX, Michael R. Hull, Assistant County Attorney, Lana R. Dieringer, Dieringer Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Appellees.

Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices ALCALA and BLAND.

OPINION

JANE BLAND, Justice.

Lupe Villarreal appeals a trial court order granting Harris County's, Paul Betten-court's (collectively, "Harris County"), the City of Houston's, Houston Independent School District's, and Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson, L.L.P.'s (collectively, the "City of Houston") pleas to the jurisdiction. Villarreal contends the trial court erred: (1) in granting the jurisdictional pleas because Villarreal's article I, section 17 "takings" claim is not an inverse condemnation claim involving the government's use of eminent domain power, (2) in granting the pleas because the Harris County Civil Courts at Law do not have exclusive jurisdiction over all alleged violations of article I, section 17, (3) in granting Harris County's plea because Villarreal's home was taken for a public use without just compensation in violation of article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution, and (4) in granting Harris County's plea because, although the Texas Tort Claims Act does not apply in this case to waive the governmental immunity of Harris County, Villarreal has pleaded other grounds for waiver. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17. We conclude that Villarreal's pleadings state a cause of action for inverse condemnation and the trial court properly granted the jurisdictional pleas because the Harris County Civil Courts at Law have exclusive jurisdiction over Villarreal's article I, section 17 claim pursuant to Texas Government Code section 25.1032(c). Id.; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.1032(c) (Vernon 2004). We therefore affirm.

Background

In October 2001, Linebarger, Goggan, Blair & Sampson, L.L.P. filed a tax suit against Villarreal on behalf of Harris County, Houston Independent School District, the City of Houston, the Harris County Education Department, the Port of Houston, the Harris County Flood Control District, and Houston Community College (collectively, the "taxing jurisdictions") to collect delinquent taxes on Villarreal's home. The court awarded the taxing jurisdictions a judgment against Villarreal for the delinquent taxes and ordered the sale of Villarreal's home to satisfy the judgment. Villarreal then obtained a tax loan from CGI Financial, Inc. ("CGI"). CGI paid the amount due under the judgment to the taxing jurisdictions before the scheduled date of the tax sale, thereby extinguishing the debt. The taxing jurisdictions nevertheless proceeded with the tax sale eight days later and sold Villarreal's home to a private entity, which subsequently evicted Villarreal. The taxing jurisdictions applied $15,158.15 of the sale proceeds to satisfy the judgment, and deposited the remainder of $25,941.85 into the registry of the court. The taxing jurisdictions later returned the money they had received from CGI.

Villarreal then brought this action against Harris County and the City of Houston in the 281st District Court of Harris County, alleging that (1) the tax sale violated article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution because Harris County and the City of Houston took Villarreal's property for a public use without providing just compensation, (2) the tax sale violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because Harris County and the City of Houston took Villarreal's property for a public use without providing just compensation, and without providing due process of law, and (3) the tax sale violated Villarreal's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Harris County filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending that (1) the Harris County District Court lacks jurisdiction over the article I, section 17 claim because the Harris County Civil Courts at Law have exclusive jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings, including inverse condemnation claims, regardless of the amount in controversy, (2) Villarreal's article I, section 17 claim is barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity because Villarreal's property was not taken for public use, but was sold to a private entity for private use, and (3) Villarreal's article I, section 17 claim is barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity because the Texas Tort Claims Act does not provide a waiver of governmental immunity for a claim arising in connection with the assessment or collection of taxes by a governmental unit. The City of Houston also filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that the Harris County District Court lacks jurisdiction over the article I, section 17 claim because the Harris County Civil Courts at Law have exclusive jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings, including inverse condemnation claims, regardless of the amount in controversy.

The trial court granted Harris County's and the City of Houston's pleas to the jurisdiction. Villarreal brings this interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp.2006).

Plea to the Jurisdiction

A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex.2004). We review a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo because the question of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law. Hoff v. Nueces County, 153 S.W.3d 45, 48 (Tex.2004); Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004). Governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.¹ Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225-26. When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. Id. We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader's intent. Id. If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to demonstrate affirmatively the trial court's jurisdiction, but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency, and the trial court should afford the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id. at 226-27. If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then the trial court may grant a plea to the jurisdiction without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227.

In this case, the trial court did not state the grounds upon which it granted Harris County's and the City of Houston's pleas to the jurisdiction. As required, Villarreal has attacked all independent grounds that fully support the adverse ruling. See Britton v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). We will sustain the trial court's order granting the pleas to the jurisdiction if any ground alleged by Harris County and the City of Houston is meritorious.

Inverse Condemnation

Villarreal first contends that the trial court erred in granting Harris County's and the City of Houston's pleas to the jurisdiction because Villarreal's article I, section 17 takings claim is not an inverse condemnation claim, and therefore not subject to Texas Government Code section 25.1032(c). See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.1032(c). Texas Government Code section 25.1032(c) provides: "A county civil court at law has exclusive jurisdiction in Harris County of eminent domain proceedings, both statutory and inverse, regardless of the amount in controversy." Id. Harris County and the City of Houston respond that Villarreal's article I, section 17 claim is an inverse condemnation claim as a matter of law.

A municipality exercises its power of eminent domain through the process referred to as condemnation. City of Houston v. Boyle, 148 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Condemnation is the procedure by which the sovereign exercises its right to take property of a private owner for public use, without consent, upon the payment of just compensation. Id.; A.C. Aukerman Co. v. State, 902 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). "Inverse condemnation occurs when (1) a property owner seeks (2) compensation for (3) property taken for public use (4) without process or a proper condemnation proceeding." Boyle, 148 S.W.3d at 178; A.C. Aukerman Co., 902 S.W.2d at 577.

A landowner whose property has been taken, damaged, destroyed for, or applied to public use without adequate compensation may bring an inverse condemnation claim pursuant to article I, section 17 of the Texas Constitution. Boyle, 148 S.W.3d at 177. The constitution provides in part, "No person's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent of such person ...." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; Boyle, 148 S.W.3d at 177; Tex. Parks Wildlife Dep't v. Callaway, 971 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex.App.Austin 1998, no pet.) ("An `inverse condemnation' proceeding is the avenue of relief available when property has been taken or damaged for public use without compensation or a proper condemnation proceeding, and the property owner wishes to recover compensation for his loss."). The Texas...