Villines v. Szczepanski

• Decision Date: 20 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. 100,274.,100,274.
• Citation: 122 P.3d 466,2005 OK 63
• Parties: In the Matter of the Estate of Jefferson Kenneth VILLINES, II, Deceased, Appellee, v. Gerald R. SZCZEPANSKI, Appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

122 P.3d 466

2005 OK 63

In the Matter of the Estate of Jefferson Kenneth VILLINES, II, Deceased, Appellee, v. Gerald R. SZCZEPANSKI, Appellant.

No. 100,274.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

September 20, 2005.

On Certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals, Div. III.

¶ 0 Judgment creditor notified decedent's personal representative of his claim against the estate before the latter mailed a notice to decedent's creditors apprizing them of the deadline upon which claims are due. Personal representative neither sent this notice to judgment creditor nor did he notify him that his claim was rejected. The trial judge, following personal representative's application to determine valid creditor claims, disallowed the claim from payment. The Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) affirmed the trial court's decision. On certiorari granted upon claimant's petition,

THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' DECISION AND THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER ARE REVERSED; THE CAUSE IS REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT.

Laurence K. Donahoe, Oklahoma City, OK, and Beverley Q. Watts, Oklahoma City, OK, for appellant.

Russell L Mulinix and Sally Ketchum Edwards, Oklahoma City, OK, for appellee.¹

OPALA, J.

¶ 1 The question presented on certiorari is whether COCA erred when it affirmed the trial judge's order that disallowed creditor's claim against decedent's estate in probate proceedings. We answer in the affirmative.

I. ANATOMY OF THE LITIGATION

¶ 2 Gerald R. Szczepanski (Szczepanski or creditor) obtained a judgment in Texas against Jefferson Kenneth Villines, II, (Villines) in May of 2001. The judgment was entered prior to Villines' death which occurred approximately one month later. Both parties were Texas residents. Proceedings to probate Villines' will were initiated in the Okfuskee County District Court in September of the same year. In November of 2001 local counsel, whose services were obtained by creditor's Texas lawyer, filed the foreign judgment against Villines (filed a notice of filing a foreign judgment) in Oklahoma county.² Notice of this filing was mailed to counsel for the special administrator of decedent's estate, Ron Carter (Carter or personal representative).³ Szczepanski's current address was provided in this notice of filing.

¶ 3 On 4 November 2002 counsel for personal representative filed in the Okfuskee County District Court a notice to creditors. The deadline for claims against decedent's estate was 9 January 2003. Notice was twice published in the local newspaper, the Okemah News Leader. Personal representative mailed notice to creditors on 14 November 2002. Neither Szczepanski nor his in-state counsel was provided with a notice to creditors, although personal representative's counsel knew their most recent mailing addresses. He did send a copy to the Texas attorney who was representing Szczepanski in the Villines Texas probate proceeding.⁴

¶ 4 On 5 May 2003 personal representative filed his application to determine valid creditors' claims against decedent's estate. He deemed Szczepanski's claim to be rejected.⁵ Creditor was not notified his claim was rejected. Szczepanski resubmitted his claim on 22 May 2003, four months after the deadline for filing. Following a hearing on the personal representative's application, the trial court disallowed Szczepanski's claim. It found he neither filed his claim by the deadline nor did he bring a separate action against the personal representative to perfect his claim in accordance with the provisions of 58 O.S. § 331 et seq.⁶ Creditor appealed.

¶ 5 Szczepanski urges on appeal that personal representative failed to give him notice in accordance with the terms of § 331⁷ and § 331.2.⁸ According to Szczepanski, he was a known creditor⁹ at the time personal representative mailed notice of the deadline for filing claims to decedent's creditors. Personal representative's counsel knew of Szczepanski's judgment lien against the decedent and was in possession of his address (as well as of that of his local counsel). Further, the notice of the filing of the foreign judgment (a public record) makes Szczepanski a reasonably ascertainable creditor.¹⁰ Personal representative, according to Szczepanski, simply failed in his state-law duty to give actual notice to Szczepanski. His actions were not in accord with the probate statutes and violated creditor's due process rights.

¶ 6 Szczepanski contends that his claim was timely filed with Villines' estate. The terms of 12 O.S. § 1081(c)¹¹ — that deal with the death of a party after a judgment — provide that a judgment filed with decedent's representative within the time allowed for other claims "shall be treated as if it has been allowed."¹² Hence creditor's claim was validly submitted when he notified personal representative's counsel of this judgment.

¶ 7 COCA, in a split opinion, affirmed the trial judge's decision.¹³ Szczepanski's petition for rehearing was denied. He sought certiorari.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 The issue decided by the trial judge and COCA is one of statutory interpretation. It calls for a legal conclusion which is subject to a de novo standard on appellate review.¹⁴ When reexamining a trial court's legal rulings, an appellate court exercises plenary, independent and non-deferential authority.¹⁵

III. TODAY'S CAUSE IS SETTLED BY EMPLOYING RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

¶ 9 The goal of inquiry into the meaning of a statutory enactment is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.¹⁶ It is presumed that the law-making body has expressed its intent in a statute's language and that it intended what it so expressed.¹⁷ If the meaning of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it will not be subjected to rules of judicial construction but will receive the effect its language dictates.¹⁸ Only where legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the language of a statute, as in cases of ambiguity, are rules of statutory interpretation employed.¹⁹ The determination of legislative intent controls statutory interpretation by the judiciary.²⁰ When possible, different provisions must be construed together to effect an harmonious whole.²¹

IV. THE § 337 TERMS REQUIRE DECEDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO GIVE ACTUAL NOTICE OF A CLAIM'S REJECTION — WHETHER IT IS REJECTED IN WHOLE OR IN PART — TO CREDITORS WHO SUBMIT A CLAIM PRIOR TO THE FIRST PUBLICATION OF NOTICE AND WHO ARE NOT SENT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S NOTICE TO CREDITORS

¶ 10 Section 337 deals with the allowance or rejection of a claim against a decedent's estate by a personal representative or judge.²² A review of its terms compels us to agree with the statutory analysis pressed by the dissenting judge below. A thorough reading of the enactment reveals its terms are ambiguous. Although § 337 covers one long paragraph, its provisions encompass two distinct classes of creditor claims: 1) those presented in response to personal representative's notice to creditors and 2) those presented prior to the first publication of notice. How the § 337 terms impact each class of claims differs.

¶ 11 The text of § 337 begins, "[w]hen a claim is presented to the personal representative . . ." Its terms describe the procedure to be followed by personal representative and judge in their approval or disapproval of a submitted claim.²³ Although it does not here distinguish between claims presented before the deadline for filing a claim against an estate from those presented in response to personal representative's notice to creditors, it becomes clear that it is referring to the latter. This is so because this portion of the statute provides that if the personal representative or judge "refuses" or "neglects" to allow or reject a claim, "such refusal is equivalent to a rejection" thirty days after the claim was presented. Clearly, this language contemplates claims that have been filed subsequent to provision of notice to creditors.

¶ 12 The final sentence in the paragraph (what we refer to as the second portion) addresses, for the first time, a claim presented prior to the first publication of the notice.²⁴ The requirements to be followed by an estate's representative are different from the procedure set forth for creditors who present a claim in response to a received notice. Its terms provide that early-presented claims "shall be considered validly presented, shall be deemed to have been presented on the date of first publication of the notice and shall not be acted upon . . . prior to such date, and the personal representative shall not be required to give notice to such creditor by mail, other than notice of rejection if the claim is rejected in whole or in part to the creditor who presented the claim."²⁵

¶ 13 Creditors who present a claim subsequent to a received notice are provided definite time-frame information within which subsequent legal actions, if necessary, must be filed. They received a notice to creditors and hence are aware of the deadline for filing claims. More importantly, such creditors, even if not given further notice, are able to determine 1) when their claim may be deemed denied by silence and 2) the forty-five day period in which they must bring an ancillary proceeding.²⁶

¶ 14 Creditors who, on the other hand, submit their claim early (rather than in response to personal representative's notice) and who do not receive notification that their claim is rejected have no way to determine the time limit for filing an ancillary proceeding. Indeed, they have no way of knowing that the event triggering the running of the forty-five day period for filing an ancillary proceeding has even begun. The inclusion of "other than notice of rejection"²⁷ and the absence of the "deemed rejected" or "equivalent to a rejection" language in the latter portion of § 337, hence, logically implies a requirement of actual notification of rejection to a creditor who presented his claim early. To interpret the paragraph's final sentence in...