Vincent v. City of Sulphur

Decision Date21 October 2014
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 2:13–CV–189.
PartiesCarol J. VINCENT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SULPHUR, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

Carol J. Vincent, Sulphur, LA, pro se.

Robin J. Magee, Stephen J. Oats, Oats & Marino, Lafayette, LA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM RULING

PATRICIA MINALDI, District Judge.

Before the court is the Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity [Doc. 23], filed by the City of Sulphur; Lewis Coats, Chief of Police for the City of Sulphur; Officer Chester Gremillion; and Officer Glenn Martin (defendants), to which the pro se1 plaintiff has filed an Opposition [Doc. 25], and the defendants have filed a Reply [Doc. 26]. At the request of the court, the defendants have filed the Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity Regarding the First Amendment Claims [Doc. 31], and the plaintiff has also filed Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Based, on Qualified Immunity Regarding Plaintiff's First Amendment Claims [Doc. 34]. For the following reasons, the Motion [Doc. 23] is hereby GRANTED, IN PART, and DENIED, IN PART, as to the plaintiff's claims under the First Amendment.

FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

On August 8, 2012, the plaintiff, Carol J. Vincent (Vincent), was questioned by police concerning an allegation that he had threatened to get a gun and kill Mayor Christopher Duncan and city councilman Mike Koonce.3 Vincent denied making such a statement.4 On August 9, 2012, Vincent was pulled over in a traffic stop by Officer Chester Gremillion, who informed Vincent of a “no trespass order” against him5 Officer Chester Gremillion also informed Vincent that he was henceforth forbidden to set forth upon all public property in the City of Sulphur.6

The Official Notification of Trespass Warning encompassed [a]ll city of Sulphur owned property,” and listed the warning as emanating from “Sgt. C. Gremillion, an officer of the Sulphur Police Department.”7 In response to a series of letters from Vincent, Sulphur Police Chief Lewis Coats stated that the no trespass warning was issued “in an attempt to prevent [Vincent] from entering any city owned property where [he] could have come in contact” with those he allegedly threatened.8 When the District Attorney advised Chief Coats that there was insufficient evidence to pursue any charges against Vincent, Chief Coats—after discussing the matter with Mayor Duncan9 —sent a letter to Vincent that informed him that the trespass warning had been terminated.10

Vincent filed suit against the defendants in the Fourteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Calcasieu on December 10, 2012, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, initially seeking compensatory and exemplary damages for alleged violations of the plaintiff's rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.11 On January 24, 2013, the defendants removed the case to federal court pursuant to the court's federal question subject matter jurisdiction.12 On September 10, 2013, the defendants filed the Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity [Doc. 23] that is presently before the court.13 Summary judgment was granted on the basis of qualified immunity for all claims except for the plaintiff's procedural due process claims, the plaintiff's municipal liability claims, and the plaintiff's First Amendment claims.14 Summary judgment was denied for the due process and municipal liability claims, and stayed for the First Amendment claims.15 After briefing from both parties, the court now rules on the First Amendment claims.

LAW & ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment Standard

A grant of summary judgment is appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is said to be “genuine” only where a “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Dizer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 3:10–cv–699, 2012 WL 626201, at *6, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24025, at *16 (W.D.La. Jan. 12, 2012) (citing Fordoche, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 463 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir.2006) ). Rule 56 [ (a) ] mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Webber v. Christus Schumpert Health Sys., No. 10–1177, 2011 WL 3880398, at *5, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99235, at *14 (W.D.La. Sept. 2, 2011) (citing Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.2004) ).

In ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, the district court shall draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at *3 n. 1 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (additional citation omitted)). However, the court will not, in the absence of proof, “assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) ).

II. Qualified Immunity for Plaintiff's First Amendment Claims

42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action against an individual who, acting under color of state law, has deprived a person of a federally protected statutory or constitutional right.” Whittington v. Maxwell, 455 Fed.Appx. 450, 455–56 (5th Cir.2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ). [Q]ualified immunity—which shields Government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights'—is both a defense to liability and a limited ‘entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted).

“Qualified immunity serves to ensure government employees are not impeded from their public work to defend frivolous actions.” Porter v. Valdez, 424 Fed.Appx. 382, 386 (5th Cir.2011) (citing Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.1994) ). “When an officer argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit, [the court] first view[s] the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury’ and decide[s] if ‘the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right.’ Mesa v. Prejean, 543 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ). In order to overcome a claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must plead facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). The district court, in its discretion, may consider either of the two prongs first. Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ).

A. Did the Defendants' Actions Violate a Constitutional Right?

The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. S.E.I.U., Local 5 v. City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588, 595 (5th Cir.2010) (citation omitted). The government does not have unlimited power to regulate private speech on government property. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009).

Claims under the First Amendment undergo a forum-based analysis. See, e.g., Fairchild v. Liberty Indep. Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 747, 757–58 (5th Cir.2010). There are three recognized types of forums: (1) traditional and designated public forums; (2) limited public forums; and (3) nonpublic forums. Id. In traditional and designated public forums, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are allowed; however, any content-based restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 469–70, 129 S.Ct. 1125 (citations omitted). In limited public and nonpublic forums, a government entity may impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Id. at 470, 129 S.Ct. 1125 ; and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (citation omitted).

The interior of a police station is a nonpublic forum. First Def. Legal Aid v. City of Chicago, 319 F.3d 967, 968 (7th Cir.2003) ; see also Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 231 (2nd Cir.1996). Courthouses are similarly nonpublic forums. Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 90–91 (2nd Cir.2005) (citing U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983) ); see also Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.1997) ; Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir.2005) ; and U.S. v. Vosburgh, 59 F.3d 177 (9th Cir.1995) (unpublished) (citations omitted). City Hall is typically a nonpublic forum. See Hansen v. Williamson, 440 F.Supp.2d 663, 679 (E.D.Mich.2006) (citing Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir.2002) ). However, case law supports that city council meetings are limited public forums. Wenthold v. City of Farmers Branch, Texas, No. 3:11–CV–0748–B, 2012 WL 467325, *8 (N.D.Tex. Feb. 14, 2012) (citing Christian Legal Soc'y Ch. of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings C. of the L. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 130 S.Ct. 2971, 2984 n. 11, 177 L.Ed.2d 838 (2010) (additional citations omitted)). Whether limited or nonpublic, the...

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  • Vincent v. City of Sulphur
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
    • October 21, 2014
    ...28 F.Supp.3d 651Carol J. VINCENT, Plaintiff,v.CITY OF SULPHUR, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 2:13–CV–189.United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Lake Charles Division.Signed Oct. 21, Motion granted in part and denied in part. [28 F.Supp.3d 653] Carol J. Vincent, Sulphur, LA, pro......

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