Vines v. University of Louisiana at Monroe

• Decision Date: 28 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-31172.,03-31172.
• Parties: Dwight VINES; Van McGraw, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA AT MONROE; Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

398 F.3d 700

Dwight VINES; Van McGraw, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA AT MONROE; Board of Supervisors of the University of Louisiana System, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 03-31172.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 28, 2005.

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Dwan S. Hilferty (argued), Metairie, LA, Johnny E. Dollar, Dollar Laird, Monroe, LA, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

H. Mark Adams, Pauline F. Hardin, Virginia W. Gundlach, Jennifer Lynn Anderson (argued), Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, New Orleans, LA, for University of Louisiana at Monroe.

Winston G. DeCuir, Linda L. Clark, DeCuir & Clark, Baton Rouge, LA, for Bd. of Supervisors of University of Louisiana System.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before KING, Chief Judge, and SMITH and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

The University of Louisiana at Monroe¹ and the Board of Trustees, University of Louisiana System (hereinafter collectively "ULM") appeal the district court's denial of their motion for permanent injunction under the "relitigation exception" to the Anti-Injunction Act claiming that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude Dwight Vines' and Van McGraw's age discrimination suit filed in state court. We find that all of the elements of ULM's collateral estoppel claim have been satisfied and that the instant case falls within the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. We therefore REVERSE and REMAND to the district court to enter an injunction preventing Vines and McGraw from proceeding with their state age discrimination claims against ULM.

I

Vines and McGraw are former administrators and faculty members of ULM. After serving a sufficient number of years to qualify for retirement benefits under the Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana ("TRSL"), Vines voluntarily elected to retire in 1991 and McGraw elected to retire in 1989. Pursuant to the TRSL, they each received retirement benefits for life and one-hundred percent of their average compensation during their previous three years. Vines and McGraw were simultaneously rehired on a year-to-year basis and each worked for five years, receiving retirement benefits in addition to a salary for work performed. In January 1996, the University of Louisiana System adopted a policy prohibiting the re-employment of retirees on a regular full-time basis and Vines and McGraw were notified that they would not be rehired for the 1996-97 academic year.

Vines and McGraw filed identical suits in federal and state court, claiming ULM violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") (29 U.S.C. § 621 (2004) et. seq.) and Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law ("LAEDL") (La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 23:301 (2004) et seq.) by prohibiting re-employment of retirees, paying the plaintiffs less than younger professors, and increasing their workloads. ULM removed the state court suit under federal question jurisdiction and the cases were consolidated. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") then instituted a separate action in federal court, naming Vines and McGraw as aggrieved parties, alleging violations of the ADEA by ULM. The EEOC action was also consolidated with Vines' and McGraw's cases.

ULM filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all the remaining ADEA claims based upon Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000). The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Vines' and McGraw's ADEA claims, but that the EEOC was not barred from asserting those claims on their behalf. Vines' and McGraw's state law claims were remanded to state court. The district court then granted ULM's motion for summary judgment dismissing the EEOC lawsuit, finding that ULM's policy did not violate the ADEA. The EEOC sought to appeal the judgment, but then voluntarily dismissed the appeal.

ULM filed a peremptory exception of res judicata/collateral estoppel in the present case in state court, arguing that Vines and McGraw asserted the same claims and issues previously litigated and decided adversely to them in federal court. The Louisiana trial court granted the exception, dismissing the state claims with prejudice after finding that the federal principles of res judicata applied to bar the suit. The court noted that the federal court decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, the decision was final and on the merits, the EEOC and the plaintiffs were in privity, and the causes of action arose from the same nucleus of operative facts. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Louisiana reversed the trial court judgment, which had granted an exception of res judicata in favor of ULM, and reinstated the state court action, concluding that privity did not exist between Vines and McGraw and the EEOC. Vines v. Northeast La. Univ., 839 So.2d 979, 987 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/5/03). ULM's request for en banc rehearing in the Second Circuit and their application for writ to the Louisiana Supreme Court were denied. Vines v. Northeast La. Univ., 853 So.2d 638, 638 (La.9/19/03).

ULM filed a motion under the "relitigation exception" of the Anti-Injunction Act with the Western District of Louisiana seeking to enjoin Vines and McGraw's lawsuit in state court based on the federal court's decision in favor of ULM against the EEOC. The district court denied the permanent injunction and ULM appealed to this court.

II

We generally review a district court's denial of a motion for a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 332 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir.2003). The application of the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, however, is a question of law and therefore we review the district court's denial of ULM's motion for a permanent injunction de novo. Id.

The Anti-Injunction Act generally prohibits federal courts from interfering with proceedings in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2004). There are only three specific circumstances in which a federal court can enjoin a state court proceeding, when it is: (1) expressly authorized by a federal statute; (2) necessary to assert jurisdiction; or (3) necessary to protect or effectuate a prior judgment by a federal court. Id.; St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 332 F.3d at 308-09. The third exception is referred to as the "relitigation" exception. "The relitigation exception was designed to permit a federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue that previously was presented to and decided by the federal court. It is founded in the well-recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel." Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 147, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988).

There are two related doctrines of preclusion: (1) claim preclusion, commonly referred to as res judicata, and (2) issue preclusion, known as collateral estoppel. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). In order to determine if the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act is applicable to preclude litigation of a claim in state court under the doctrine of res judicata, this court applies a four-part test. "First, the parties in a later action must be identical to (or at least in privity with) the parties in a prior action. Second, the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Third, the prior action must have concluded with a final judgment on the merits. Fourth, the same claim or cause of action must be involved in both suits." N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Gillispie, 203 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir.1994)). The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to prevent issues of ultimate fact from being relitigated between the same parties in a future lawsuit if those issues have once been determined by a valid and final judgment. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982) ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between parties, whether on the same or a different claim.") (cited in Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991)). While complete identity of all parties is not required, the party against whom the collateral estoppel would be applied generally must either have been a party, or privy to a party, in the prior litigation. See Terrell v. DeConna., 877 F.2d 1267, 1270 (5th Cir.1989).

Vines and McGraw concede that there was a judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction in the ADEA claim brought by the EEOC and that it was a final judgment on the merits.

III

The issue this court must decide initially is whether, even if the state court mistakenly rejected ULM's res judicata claim, a federal court injunction is permitted against enforcement of the state court judgment. The Supreme Court has stated that "[o]nce the state court has finally rejected a claim of res judicata, then the Full Faith and Credit Act becomes applicable and federal courts must turn to state law to determine the preclusive effect of the state court's decision." Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 524, 106 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986) (emphasis added). The Full Faith and Credit Act requires federal courts as well as state courts to give state judicial proceedings "the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2004).

This court must determine whether the Louisiana state court decision, that the prior federal...