Wilkerson v. Stalder
| Decision Date | 11 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 00-304-C. |
| Parties | Robert King WILKERSON, et al. v. Richard STALDER, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
George H. Kendall, Harmony Loube, Samuel Spital, Holland & Knight, LLP, New York, NY, Nicholas J. Trenticosta, William Patrick Quigley, Loyola Law School, New Orleans, LA, for Robert King Wilkerson, et al.
Michael Brent Hicks, Richard A. Curry, McGlinchey Stafford, Baton Rouge, LA, for Richard Stalder, et al.
RULING
The court has carefully considered the petition, the record, the law applicable to this action, and the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Docia L. Dalby dated August 11, 2007. Defendants have filed an objection which the court has considered.
The court hereby approves the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and adopts it as the court's opinion herein.
Accordingly, the defendant's Re-Urged Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing All Eight Amendment Claims will be denied in part and granted in part dismissing the claims against defendant, Richard Stalder, and denying the remaining requests for relief.
This matter is before the court on referral from the District Judge for a report and recommendation on defendants' Re-Urged Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing All Eighth Amendment Claims (rec. doc. 164). In their motion, defendants' seek dismissal of plaintiffs' claims of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which arise from their approximately 28 to 35 year confinements in the Closed Cell Restriction Unit ("CCR" or "lockdown") at the Louisiana State Penitentiary ("LSP") at Angola, Louisiana. Defendants also assert qualified immunity for their alleged actions, and res judicata, or claim preclusion.1 The motion is opposed.
For purposes of this motion, neither plaintiffs nor defendants dispute the fact of plaintiffs' incarceration or, indeed, many of the particulars of their incarceration in what LSP refers to as "closed cell restriction" or "extended lockdown." What they dispute is the reason for their extended lockdown, its significance, both legally and factually, and its effects on these three plaintiffs.
When Herman Wallace and Albert Woodfox arrived at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in 1969 and 1971, respectively, they initially were classified as medium custody inmates and housed with the general prison population. They were placed in extended lockdown on April 18, 1972, immediately following a prison riot which resulted in the death of a guard. Both men were later charged with and convicted of murdering LSP correctional officer Brent Miller during the riot. Wallace has continuously remained in extended lockdown since April 18, 1972. With the exception of a three-year period he spent in a parish prison awaiting trial, Woodfox also has been continuously confined in the extended lockdown unit.
Plaintiff Robert King Wilkerson, on the other hand, began his stay in LSP's extended lockdown on May 15, 1972. Wilkerson was initially incarcerated in Orleans Parish Prison following his conviction for armed robbery. After pleading guilty to aggravated battery on a prison deputy while in parish prison, Wilkerson was transferred to LSP some time around May 1972. Two weeks later he was placed in extended lockdown, which was then known as Controlled Cell Reserve ("CCR"). See Wilkerson v. Maggio, 703 F.2d 909, 910 (5th Cir.1983). In June of 1973, he was accused and later convicted of killing a fellow inmate, and he remained in extended lockdown until his conviction was overturned in early 2001, after which he was fully released from state custody.2
It has now been 35 years since plaintiffs' original confinement to lockdown. The parties agree that during these last three decades, plaintiffs have remained alone in individual cells approximately 55 to 60 square feet for 23 hours of each day. During the other hour, each plaintiff may shower and walk alone along the tier on which his cell is located. Three times a week, each plaintiff may instead choose to use this hour to exercise alone in a fenced yard, if the weather permits. The plaintiffs also faced additional restrictions on privileges generally available to inmates such as personal property, reading materials, access to legal resources, work, and visitation rights. These conditions represent the current conditions they face. They are the least restrictive conditions that they have lived under over the last 35 years.
Each man's cell has an open front with bars, but vision is restricted to what is directly in front of the cell door by side walls. The cell is self-contained inasmuch as it has a toilet, mattress, sheets, blanket pillow, at least one storage locker and sometimes two, and a small desk attached to the wall which can be used for eating and for writing. A very small window in the rear allows some natural light into the cell.
Beyond these initial facts, however, plaintiffs and defendants begin to part ways. Defendants contend in their Statement of Uncontested Facts3 that each plaintiff was kept in extended lockdown because they each "presented a serious threat to the safety of the staff, other inmates, the general public, and a threat to the safety, security, and good order of the facility."4 Plaintiffs respond as follows:
1) since his release from LSP, plaintiff Wilkerson has had an incident free (and arrest free) transition to general society;5
2) Wilkerson's involvement in the tier disturbance was in 1975, and his conduct report, encompassing a time period from April 1972 through his release in February, 2001, reflects a single act of violence for fighting in 1986;6
3) plaintiff Woodfox was transferred to the custody of the West Feliciana Sheriff's Department on March 26, 1996, and moved to the City Jail of Amite, Tangipahoa Parish. After six months at the Amite city jail, Woodfox was transferred to the general population. Woodfox stayed at the Amite city jail until March 15, 1999. The defendants' corrections expert, Mr. Angelone, stated that Woodfox "functioned well" while at the Amite city jail7; plaintiff Woodfox was charged with possession of what appeared to be a firing pin for a zip gun in his cell on November 1, 1978. Since 1972, Woodfox has only been charged with a single act of violence in 1985, which was an inmate fight, for which he received a suspended sentence based on his good conduct record. Woodfox has not had any disciplinary infractions in over four years, and Warden Cain stated that "in the last five years, [Woodfox] could almost be described as a model prisoner."8;
4) Wallace was transferred to the custody of the Orleans Parish Facility on February 11, 1998, and remained at Orleans Parish Prison in a communal cell until March 31, 1998, when he was moved to Hunt Correctional Center. On April 27, 1998, Wallace was moved back to LSP and placed on lockdown, where he remains. Mr. Wallace demonstrated good behavior while at Orleans Parish Prison in 1998.9
In addition to disagreeing over the defendants' motivations for keeping the plaintiffs in extended lockdown, the parties also disagree over the impact, both physically and mentally, of their decades long isolation in a single cell, all of which will be discussed in the context of the parties' arguments.
The defendants contend that the plaintiffs' approximately 28 to 35 years in extended lockdown under the facts of this case could never constitute cruel and unusual punishment under prevailing Eighth Amendment law, regardless of defendants' motives in keeping them there. They also seek dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity, and further argue that the Eighth Amendment claims are subject to res judicata or claim preclusion.
The defendants argue that in order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation in a conditions of confinement case, the plaintiffs must satisfy a two-pronged test, which has an objective and a subjective component. Under the objective component, "an inmate must show that he was subjected to `conditions so serious as to deprive [the prisoner of] some basic human need'",10 which, they insist, the Fifth Circuit has defined as only food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.11
Secondly, defendants argue, under the subjective component, the plaintiffs must show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference in subjecting the plaintiffs to the serious condition of the objective prong.12
Were the plaintiffs' subjected to a condition(s) so serious as to deprive them of a basic human need?
The defendants argue that the duration of an inmate's confinement in extended lockdown can never form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation, absent deprivation of a basic human need such as "adequate food, sleep, clothing, shelter or medical attention," and cite several cases that they argue stand for that proposition.13 The Complaint, defendants argue, "failed to allege a deprivation of minimal basic human needs, and therefore fails to assert a violation of the Eighth Amendment."14
In opposition, plaintiffs argue that their Complaint clearly alleged that 30 years of confinement in extended lockdown deprived them of at least the following four basic human needs: (1) exercise, (2) sleep, (3) social contact, and (4) environmental stimulation.15 Plaintiffs contend that the "list" of human needs cited by the defendants is not exhaustive, but rather is illustrative; in any case, exercise and sleep have been expressly recognized by jurisprudence as basic needs.16 Additionally, plaintiffs emphasize that the conditions of extended lockdown must be considered both cumulatively and durationally in determining whether a...
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