Vinson, Matter of

• Decision Date: 04 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 30,30
• Citation: 260 S.E.2d 591,298 N.C. 640
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: In the Matter of Jerry Wayne VINSON.

Page 591

260 S.E.2d 591

298 N.C. 640

In the Matter of Jerry Wayne VINSON.

No. 30.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 4, 1979.

[298 N.C. 648] Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Associate Atty. Steven Mansfield Shaber, Raleigh, for the State.

Public Defender Wallace C. Harrelson, Greensboro, for respondent.

CARLTON, Justice.

Respondent attacks both the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of his proceedings. With respect to the adjudicatory hearing, respondent presents essentially three issues: (1) Did the trial court err in allowing testimony at Voir dire about identification of respondent by photograph? (2) Did the trial court err in denying his motion for nonsuit? (3) Did the trial court err in adjudicating respondent as a delinquent child?

With respect to the dispositional hearing, respondent presents again essentially three issues: (1) Did the trial court err in immediately proceeding to the dispositional stage over respondent's objection? (2) Did the trial court err in hearing evidence about acts of respondent which had not been adjudicated delinquent acts? (3) Did the trial court fail to make sufficient findings of fact to support its commitment order?

We discuss these issues in order and, for the reasons stated, reverse the Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the proceedings in the trial court.

I.

The issues raised by respondent's appeal strike at the heart of our juvenile justice laws. To address these contentions with the gravity they merit, it is first necessary to investigate the history and policy behind North Carolina's Juvenile Code. The present Juvenile Code is codified at G.S. 7A-277 through G.S. 7A-289.34. We note at the outset that these and other statutes pertaining to juveniles have been repealed by the 1979 General Assembly effective 1 January 1980 at which time they will be replaced by a new North Carolina Juvenile Code codified as G.S. 7A-516 through G.S. 7A-732. ¹ 1979 N.C. Advanced Legislative Service, Chapter 815 at 7A-506 through 7A-641. Realizing that our decision will be filed shortly before implementation of the new Juvenile Code, this opinion will, at times, discuss both present law and the implications of the new Code on the issues raised.

The predecessor to our Juvenile Code was enacted into our law in 1919, following a prototype begun in Cook County, Illinois. That prototype introduced an innovation into juvenile law at the time juveniles were to be separated from adult criminals and dealt with in a separate, more flexible system. M. Thomas, Juvenile Corrections: A Brief History and Juvenile Jurisdiction: North Carolina's Laws and Related Cases 6-8 (1972). See also, State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21 (1954); 48 A.L.R.2d 663, 665.

The reason for this separation was clear to courts of the time. Reviewing our own Juvenile Code statutes in 1920, Justice Hoke stated:

(S)uch legislation deals, and purports to deal, with delinquent children not as criminals, But as wards, and undertakes rather to give them the control and environment that May lead to their reformation, and enable them to become law- State v. Burnett, 179 N.C. 735, 742, 102 S.E. 711, 714 (1920).

abiding and useful citizens . . . . (Emphasis added.)

This view of the state as Parens patriae to a delinquent child has continued for the most part unabated in the 60 years since those words were first written. Thus, in 1969, Justice Huskins speaking for this Court, wrote in In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), Aff'd sub nom., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971), that under the Juvenile Code, the court owed "the constant duty . . . to give each child subject to its jurisdiction such oversight and control as will Conduce to the welfare of the child and to the best interest of the State (Citation omitted)." (Emphasis added.) Id. 275 N.C. at 531, 169 S.E.2d at 887-88.

The once innovative and idealistic spirit of Juvenile Codes, however, has been strongly criticized in its application. In 1970, while reviewing In re Burrus, supra, and upholding the decision of this Court, the United States Supreme Court wrote:

(T)he fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early reformers of three generations ago have not been realized. The devastating commentary upon the system's failure as a whole . . . reveals the depth of disappointment in what has been accomplished.

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, supra, 403 U.S. at 543-44, 91 S.Ct. at 1985, 29 L.Ed.2d at 660.

And in a footnote it quoted a juvenile justice task force report of the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement:

"In fact (the juvenile justice system) frequently does nothing more nor less than deprive a child of liberty without due process of the law knowing not what else to do and needing, whether admittedly or not, to act in the community's interest even more imperatively than the child's. In theory it was to exercise its protective powers to bring an errant child back into the fold. In fact there is increasing reason to believe that its intervention reinforces the juvenile's unlawful impulses. . . ."

403 U.S. at 544, 91 S.Ct. at 1986, 29 L.Ed.2d at 660, note 5. See also, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1054, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 94 (1966).

To correct these abuses, the Supreme Court in a series of decisions has introduced a far more formal element in juvenile proceedings and has held that due process mandates that a juvenile must be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); that a juvenile has the right to counsel, the right to be properly notified of the charges against him or her, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and the privilege against self-incrimination. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); and that a juvenile has the right not to be subjected to double jeopardy. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975).

The trend of our courts in insisting on more stringent due process requirements for juveniles has not resulted, as is sometimes argued, from a softened attitude that children cannot commit violent acts. Indeed, we believe this trend has resulted from an increasing awareness that youth crime is serious and widespread and that society demands that courts deal strictly with violent youth offenders. It has been stated that the juvenile crime rate is the most serious problem confronting the juvenile justice system today. Of all those arrested in North Carolina for crimes committed in 1978, 58.4% Were 29 years of age and under, 41.8% Were 24 and under, 32.9% Were 21 years of age and younger, and 8.89% Were 16 and under. N.C. Department of Justice, Police Information Network, Crime in North Carolina : 1978 Uniform Crime Report 110-111 (1979). National statistics reveal that while young offenders from ages 15 to 18 comprise 7% Of the total population, they account for 16% Of all violent crime arrests and 46% Of arrests for major crimes against property. North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, A Crime Control Agenda for North Carolina 338 (1978).

Our own General Assembly has responded to these alarming statistics. A new Juvenile Code was enacted by the 1979 General Assembly providing stricter measures for dealing with serious youth crime. For example, as discussed below, the fingerprinting and photographing of serious youth offenders under specified procedures will be permissible effective 1 January 1980. This will allow our criminal justice system to more easily identify and track serious youth offenders. 1979 Advanced Legislative Service, Chapter 815, Section 1, to be codified as new G.S. 7A-596 through 602.

Commensurate with this toughened attitude towards youth crime, is the court system's responsibility to assure due process proceedings for youthful offenders. Court decisions in recent years have recognized the gap between the original conception of the system "and its realities." "With the exception of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, (Supra,) the Court's response to that perception has been to make applicable in juvenile proceedings constitutional guarantees associated with traditional criminal prosecutions." ² Breed v. Jones, supra, at 528-29, 95 S.Ct. at 1785, 44 L.Ed.2d at 355. Thus, in In re Gault, supra, the Court concluded that a delinquency proceeding subjecting a juvenile to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution, stating that the term delinquent had "come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term 'criminal' applied to adults." 387 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 1441, 18 L.Ed.2d at 544.

There is very little to distinguish a hearing such as that held in the case at bar from a traditional criminal prosecution. Indeed, in view of the seriousness of the acts allegedly committed by this respondent and the possibility of long term institutionalization, society should demand a formal adversarial proceeding. In such a case, it becomes incumbent upon the court system to safeguard the rights of those alleged to be delinquent just as much as it would protect the rights of any adult person facing a possible prison sentence. Those who cry for harsher treatment of youthful offenders can surely not argue that accused children should have fewer rights than adult offenders when they risk much the same penalties.

We address the issues raised by this appeal with these factors in mind. Our attempt is to carefully balance the State's police power interest in preserving order and its Parens patriae interest in a delinquent child's welfare with the child's constitutional right to due process.

II

ADJUDICATORY HEARING

A.

Respondent first contends that the trial court erred in allowing testimony of a photographic lineup in which his photograph was displayed. He relies on G.S. 15A-502 which, at that time, provided:

§ 15A-502. Photographs and fingerprints. (a) A...