Burrus, In re, 15

• Decision Date: 16 October 1969
• Docket Number: No. 15,15
• Citation: 169 S.E.2d 879,275 N.C. 517
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: In re Barbara BURRUS (and 45 other cases).

Page 879

169 S.E.2d 879

275 N.C. 517

In re Barbara BURRUS (and 45 other cases).

No. 15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 16, 1969.

Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Lanning, by James E. Ferguson, II, Charlotte, for respondent appellants.

Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen., and Ralph Moody, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

HUSKINS, Justice.

Four questions, preserved and brought forward, will be discussed in chronological order.

1. Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 17, of the Constitution of North Carolina, is a juvenile entitled to a jury trial in a juvenile court proceeding on the issue of his delinquency?

The Constitution of the United States, Article III, Section 2, reads in pertinent part as follows: 'The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury * * *.' The Sixth Amendment thereto provides, Inter alia: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a * * * trial, by an impartial jury * * *.'

The Constitution of North Carolina, Article I, Section 13, reads as follows: 'No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury * * *. The Legislature may, however, provide other means of trial, for petty misdemeanors, with the right of appeal.'

Absent a statute providing for a jury trial, it is almost universally held that in juvenile court delinquency proceedings the alleged delinquent has no right under the pertinent State or Federal Constitution to demand that the issue of his delinquency be determined by a jury. See Annotation: Right to Jury Trial in Juvenile Court Delinquency Proceedings, 100 A.L.R.2d 1241, where cases are collected from twenty-five states and the District of Columbia. 'The view has generally been taken that statutes providing for the custody or commitment of delinquent or incorrigible children are not unconstitutional by reason of failure to provide for a jury trial, where the investigation is into the status and needs of the child, and the institution to which the child is committed is not of a penal character. Thus it is held that a constitutional guaranty of trial by jury has no application to a proceeding under the juvenile court act.' 31 Am.Jur., Juvenile Courts, etc. § 67; 50 C.J.S. Juries § 80. North Carolina follows the general rule. In re Watson, 157 N.C. 340, 72 S.E. 1049; State v. Burnett, 179 N.C. 735, 102 S.E. 711; State v. Frazier, 254 N.C. 226, 118 S.E.2d 556. Federal decisions to date have not changed it. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491; In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341, 88 S.Ct. 1507, 20 L.Ed.2d 625. These cases enumerate the basic requirements of due process that must be satisfied in juvenile proceedings; however, the right to jury trial is not listed among them. We have not found and counsel has not cited any case supporting the right to jury trials in juvenile proceedings. We therefore adhere to our former decisions and hold that a juvenile is not entitled to a jury trial in a juvenile court proceeding on the issue of his delinquency.

2. Is a juvenile entitled to a public trial in a juvenile court proceeding on the issue of his delinquency?

The Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides, among other things, that '(i)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public trial * * *.' Article I, Section 13, of the Constitution of North Carolina prohibits conviction of any crime except by jury verdict in 'open court.' This right to a public trial is now applicable in both state and federal courts by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 'In view of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their inherent dangers to freedom, and the universal requirement of our federal and state governments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that no one shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law means at least that an accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison.' In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). The right of an adult charged with crime to be publicly tried is thus firmly established as a matter of constitutional law. See Annotation: Right to Public Trial in Criminal Case--Federal Cases, 4 L.Ed.2d 2128.

Juvenile proceedings, however, stand in a different light. Whatever may be their proper classification, they certainly are not 'criminal prosecutions.' Nor is a finding of delinquency in a juvenile proceeding synonymous with 'conviction of a crime.' It has never been the practice in such proceedings, here or elsewhere, wholly to exclude parents, relatives or friends, or to refuse juveniles the benefit of counsel. Even so, such proceedings are usually conducted without admitting the public generally. See In re Oliver, supra (333 U.S. 257, 266, 68 S.Ct. 499, note 12). So long as proceedings in the juvenile court meet the requirements of due process, they are constitutionally sound and must be upheld. This means that: (1) The basic requirements of due process and fairness must be satisfied in a juvenile court adjudication of delinquency. Kent v. United States, supra (383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966)); In re Gault, supra (387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)). (2) The Fourteenth Amendment applies to prohibit the use of a coerced confession of a juvenile. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325, 87 A.L.R.2d 614 (1962). (3) Notice must be given in juvenile proceedings which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding; that is, notice must be given the juvenile and his parents sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings to afford them reasonable opportunity to prepare, and the notice must set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity. In re Gault, supra. (4) In juvenile proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to counsel and, if unable to afford counsel, to the appointment of same. In re Gault, supra. (5) Juvenile proceedings to determine delinquency, as a result of which the juvenile may be committed to a state institution, must be regarded as 'criminal' for Fifth Amendment purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege applies in juvenile proceedings the same as in adult criminal cases. In re Gault, supra.

We have been unable to find, and counsel has not cited, any case holding that a public hearing in juvenile proceedings is a constitutional requirement of due process. North Carolina has determined by statutory enactment that a public hearing is neither required nor in the best interest of the youthful offender. We adhere to that view. This assignment of error is therefore overruled.

3. Is the North Carolina Juvenile Court Act (Article 2 of Chapter 110 of the General Statutes) unconstitutional? Brief historical reference seems necessary and appropriate.

The District Court Division of the General Court of Justice was created by Chapter 310 of the 1965 Session Laws, effective in the First Judicial District (embracing Hyde County) on the first Monday in December 1966. G.S. §§ 7A--130, 7A--131. As thus created the district court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over cases involving juveniles, 'as such jurisdiction is set forth in chapter 110, article 2, of the General Statutes. This jurisdiction shall be exercised solely by the district judge.' G.S. § 7A--277.

Chapter 110, Article 2, of the General Statutes delineates the practices and procedures to be followed in juvenile cases. G.S. § 110--21 provides in pertinent part that the superior court (now the district court by virtue of G.S. § 7A--277) 'shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of any case of a child less than sixteen years of age residing in * * * their respective districts: (1) Who is delinquent or who violates any * * * State law * * * or who is truant, unruly, wayward, or misdirected, or who is disobedient to parents or beyond their control, or who is in danger of becoming so * * *.' This statute makes it the constant duty of the court to give each child subject to its jurisdiction such oversight and control as will conduce to the welfare of the child and to the best interest of the State. In re Morris, 224 N.C. 487, 31 S.E.2d 539. It deals with delinquent children as wards of the State and not as criminals. State v. Burnett, 179 N.C. 735, 102 S.E. 711; State v. Frazier, 254 N.C. 226, 118 S.E.2d 556.

Appellants argue that the statute fails to define any of the operative terms such as 'delinquent', 'unruly', 'wayward', 'misdirected' and 'disobedient' and contend that the statute is therefore void for vagueness and uncertainty.

It is settled law that a statute may be void for vagueness and uncertainty. 'A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.' 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law § 552; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 82 S.Ct. 275, 7 L.Ed.2d 285; State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768, 90 A.L.R.2d 804. Even so, impossible standards of statutory clarity are not required by the constitution. When the language of a statute provides an adequate warning as to the conduct it condemns and prescribes boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to interpret and administer it uniformly, constitutional requirements are fully met. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed. 1877.

Here, James...