Vinson v. Hamilton

• Citation: 854 P.2d 733
• Decision Date: 11 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. S-4857,S-4857
• Parties: Jack VINSON, Petitioner, v. Robert J. HAMILTON, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alaska (US)

Page 733

854 P.2d 733

Jack VINSON, Petitioner, v. Robert J. HAMILTON, Respondent.

No. S-4857.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

June 11, 1993.

Rehearing Denied July 23, 1993.

Barbara J. Hood and Carol Daniel, Alaska Legal Services Corp., and Richard F. Illgen, Preston Thorgrimson Shidler Gates & Ellis, Anchorage, for petitioner.

Albert Maffei, Anchorage, for respondent.

Before MOORE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, BURKE, MATTHEWS and COMPTON, JJ.

OPINION

MOORE, Chief Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Jack Vinson appeals a decision of the superior court affirming the district court's judgment against him in a proceeding for forcible entry and detainer. Vinson's landlord, Robert J. Hamilton, instituted the action after terminating Vinson's month-to-month tenancy. Vinson challenges the denial of both his motion for a continuance and his request for a jury trial. We reverse the denial of the continuance, and affirm the denial of a jury trial.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In December 1989 Vinson rented a house from Hamilton under an oral month-to-month agreement. When Vinson moved into the house, it was in significant disrepair. Vinson performed some of the needed repairs in exchange for rent credit. Vinson was willing to do more extensive repairs on the house, but in return for his labor he wanted a one-year lease plus rent credit. Vinson claims that Hamilton agreed to this arrangement. Hamilton denies it. Based upon Vinson's understanding of this oral agreement, he continued his repair work, i.e. replacing a broken living room window, clearing out the cluttered yard, and painting the exterior of the house.

By September 1990 the relationship between Vinson and Hamilton had deteriorated. Although Hamilton gave a rent credit for the repairs made, he now disputed the accuracy of Vinson's bill for repair work. Soon afterwards, Vinson received a 30-day notice to quit, which terminated the month-to-month tenancy as of November 1. ¹ Vinson received a summons and complaint for forcible entry and detainer on November 7.

The forcible entry and detainer (hereinafter FED) hearing took place on November 14 in the district court. Vinson appeared pro se but submitted a written motion for a 30-day continuance. ² In the motion, Vinson raised several counterclaims--including retaliatory eviction and breach of a one-year lease--and offered to post an undertaking as required under Alaska Civil Rule 85. ³ Vinson also made an oral request for a jury trial. Judge Wolverton denied Vinson's motion for a continuance, concluding that the counterclaims related solely to damage claims and not to the issue of possession. Then, after holding a hearing, and listening to the arguments advanced by both sides, Judge Wolverton found that a month-to-month tenancy existed, that Vinson had received proper notice of its termination, and that he had to vacate the premises by November 24. Vinson appealed the district court decision to the superior court.

On October 7, 1991, the superior court affirmed that decision because it concluded that Judge Wolverton had not abused his discretion. Judge Johnstone further commented that because Vinson's motion contained matters inapplicable to the FED proceedings, Judge Wolverton could have decided that it was not filed in good faith. Judge Johnstone also held that Vinson was not entitled to a jury trial, on the ground that an action for possession does not involve an amount in controversy in excess of $250. We reverse in part, and affirm in part.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Vinson's Motion for a Continuance

Vinson argues that the district court erred in concluding that Vinson's defenses were unrelated to the issue of possession. Vinson also argues that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion, because he had no time to obtain counsel, prepare his defenses, or perform discovery.

When a tenant occupies a property after the termination of his lease, in defiance of a notice to quit, the landlord may institute an FED action to regain possession. See AS 09.45.070, .090. This action is summary in nature, and traditionally the court will recognize almost no affirmative defense or counterclaim. See McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535, 537 (Alaska 1976). The sole issue to address is that of possession. See McDowell v. Lenarduzzi, 546 P.2d 1315, 1317-18 (Alaska 1976).

In Alaska, statutory provisions assure quick FED procedures, permitting only a few days to pass between service of process and the hearing itself. ⁴ Accordingly, a judge cannot grant a continuance of more than two days, unless the defendant who moves for one provides an undertaking equal to the rent that will accrue during the proceedings. Alaska R.Civ.P. 85(a)(3); see also AS 09.45.120. Furthermore, under Alaska's version of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (hereinafter URLTA), the party seeking a continuance must also show good cause. ⁵ A grant or denial of a continuance shall be overturned only if the trial court abused its discretion. Siggelkow v. Siggelkow, 643 P.2d 985, 986 (Alaska 1982). This court has found an abuse of discretion when the trial court's ruling either substantially prejudices a party or denies the party a substantial right. Id. at 986-87.

In an FED hearing, a tenant does not show good cause for a continuance if the need for one arose from his own delays or lack of diligence. See Taylor v. Gill St. Invs., 743 P.2d 345, 349 (Alaska 1987). ⁶ On the other hand, where a party's original counsel had withdrawn on the eve of trial, and the party had made a diligent effort to obtain new counsel, we overturned the trial court's denial of a continuance. Barrett v. Gagnon, 516 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Alaska 1973). Therefore, good cause exists to grant a continuance when to do otherwise would hinder a party's ability to prepare her case in good faith.

Citing McCall, Hamilton argues that Vinson did not show good cause. In McCall, we held that because month-to-month tenancies, unlike longer fixed-term leases, were terminable at will for any reason not all provisions of the URLTA applied to them. Id. at 539. Hamilton reads this opinion to mean that termination of a month-to-month tenancy is automatic, and that a tenant can raise no meaningful defenses. Accordingly, Hamilton finds no good cause for a continuance.

Although McCall may deprive month-to-month tenants of some defenses, ⁷ it does not eliminate all of them. In fact, we expressly made only one defense unavailable to a month-to-month tenant: that of the landlord's waiver through acceptance of late rent. McCall, 556 P.2d at 540. In comparison, in any action for possession, a tenant may raise the defense that the landlord has terminated the lease in retaliation for the tenant's assertion of his rights under the law or under the rental agreement. AS 34.03.310(a), (b). Even month-to-month tenants may raise a defense of retaliatory eviction. McCall, 556 P.2d at 539-40; see also Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C.Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); Barela v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.3d 244, 178 Cal.Rptr. 618, 636 P.2d 582 (1981). Otherwise, these tenants would not assert their rights under their leases and under the law, rightfully fearful that landlords would evict them in consequence. Such a result would frustrate public policy. See, e.g., Edwards, 397 F.2d at 699-702; Barela, 636 P.2d at 586-87.

In this case, Vinson's motion for a continuance stated two valid defenses to an action for possession: retaliatory eviction and the existence of an oral one-year lease. The issue of the one-year lease, of course, goes to the heart of the question of possession. Moreover, Vinson adequately stated a claim for retaliatory eviction by arguing that he received eviction notices soon after Hamilton challenged Vinson's bill for repairs performed. Vinson indicated his willingness to post an undertaking as Civil Rule 85 requires. Finally, there is no indication that Vinson did not act diligently in his efforts to obtain the assistance of counsel and prepare himself for trial. Therefore, Vinson has shown good cause for a continuance, and the district court abused its discretion in denying him one. ⁸

B. Vinson's Right to a Jury Trial

Vinson also argues that Judge Wolverton improperly denied him a trial by jury. In particular, Vinson challenges the superior court's conclusion that because Hamilton's claim was not one for rent, there was no amount in controversy and thus no right to a jury trial.

In Alaska, the right to a jury in civil cases "is preserved to the same extent as it existed at common law," in suits where the amount in controversy is more than $250. Alaska Const. art. I, § 16. If a party seeks only equitable relief, then there is no right to a jury trial. State v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 660 P.2d 406, 423-24 (Alaska 1982) (denying a jury trial where the plaintiff sought only restitution and injunctive relief, rather than damages at law).

To support his argument, Vinson cites to Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 94 S.Ct. 1723, 40 L.Ed.2d 198 (1974). In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court, interpreting the Seventh Amendment, ⁹ found that a right to a jury trial attached to FED hearings in the District of Columbia. Id. However, we are not bound to the Pernell decision, because the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not apply to state court proceedings. E.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217, 36 S.Ct 595, 60 L.Ed. 961 (1916); Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 335 A.2d 670, 673 (1975), application for stay denied, 421 U.S. 983, 95 S.Ct. 1986, 44 L.Ed.2d 475 (1975).

We decline to follow Pernell. Pernell holds that despite being a creature of statute, an FED action is still one at law, similar to a common-law ejectment action. 416 U.S. at 374-75, 94 S.Ct. at 1729-30. On the other hand, many actions for possession of real property, such as an action to quiet title or one seeking a prescriptive easement, are equitable in nature and thus demand no...