Vinson v. Medley

• Decision Date: 19 May 1987
• Docket Number: 64775,Nos. 64894,s. 64894
• Citation: 1987 OK 41,737 P.2d 932
• Parties: Bridget VINSON, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Merrell H. MEDLEY, Director, Community Development Department, Defendant/Appellant, and Ratliff Exploration Company, Intervenor/Appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 932

737 P.2d 932

1987 OK 41

Bridget VINSON, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Merrell H. MEDLEY, Director, Community Development Department, Defendant/Appellant and Ratliff Exploration Company, Intervenor/Appellant.

Nos. 64894, 64775.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 19, 1987.

Robert D. Allen, Municipal Counselor, Kenneth D. Jordan, Asst. Mun. Counselor, Oklahoma City, for appellant/defendant.

Michael J. Blaschke, Martha Martin, Mahaffey & Gore, Oklahoma City, for appellant/intervenor.

Robert J. Emery, Emery, Smith & Emery, Oklahoma City, for appellee/plaintiff.

Thomas G. Ferguson, Jr., Kimball, Wilson & Walker, Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae Hadson Petroleum Corp. and Trineha, Inc.

Richard K. Books, Patricia A. Watts, Watson & McKenzie, Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae Tenneco Oil Co.

Dale E. Cottingham, Moricoli, Wilson, Harris & Dubberstein, Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae Pogo Producing Co., Canadian Exploration Corp., Lario Oil & Gas Co. and An-Son Corp.

Richard J. Gore, J. Jayne Jarnigan, Mahaffey & Gore, Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae Oexco, Inc.

Gregory L. Mahaffey, J. Jayne Jarnigan, Mahaffey & Gore, Oklahoma City, for amicus curiae Donald C. Slawson.

OPALA, Justice.

Two questions are presented for review: Does the Oklahoma City Board of Adjustment have the power to grant a variance for an oil-and-gas well to be drilled outside the U-7 zone? If this be answered in the affirmative, did the applicant meet the prerequisites for a variance? We answer both questions in the affirmative.

Ratliff Exploration Company [Ratliff], ¹ intervenor-appellant, filed an application with Merrell H. Medley, Director of the Community Development Department [Director], appellant, to drill an oil-and-gas well within the corporate limits of Oklahoma City [City] upon a tract that is located in the "I-2 Moderate Industrial District" and lies within an area compulsorily pooled by a Corporation Commission order. The permit was denied because it would have violated certain Oklahoma City Code ordinances that prohibit the drilling of wells outside a U-7 drilling zone. Ratliff sought relief from the Oklahoma City Board of Adjustment [Board]. The Board granted Ratliff the requested variance and ordered the Director to issue the permit. ²

Bridget Vinson [homeowner] appealed to the district court from the Board's order and challenged the Board's authority to grant a variance for drilling an oil-and-gas well. The trial court allowed Ratliff to intervene in order to protect its interests. At trial it was established that the proposed well site was situated adjacent to the Hardy Acres housing addition where the homeowner resided. Both the Hardy Acres development and the drill site were located within an I-2 Moderate Industrial District where many industrial uses are currently found. The well site is approximately 300 feet south of the housing development and 1,380 feet from the homeowner's house. Following a de novo trial the district court found that Ratliff did not meet its burden of proof and denied it the right to drill the proposed well. At first the court below upheld the Board's power to grant a variance but, upon a timely motion for new trial, this ruling was amended. By its modified decision the trial court held that Article XII ³ of the City Charter prohibited the Board from granting any variance for oil-and-gas wells to be drilled outside an established U-7 zone. Both Ratliff and the Director brought separate appeals which stand consolidated for our disposition by a single opinion.

I

THE POWER OF THE BOARD TO GRANT VARIANCES FOR OIL-AND-GAS

WELLS TO BE DRILLED OUTSIDE THE U-7 ZONE

The homeowner contends that Article XII of the Oklahoma City Charter ⁴ and 11 O.S.1981 § 44-104 ⁵ are in conflict insofar as they affect the drilling of oil-and-gas wells within the city limits outside a U-7 zone. The homeowner argues that, when the Board grants a drilling variance, the Board is committing an ultra vires act because it is ignoring the charter's restriction. Under the home-rule doctrine, ⁶ the homeowner urges, the City Charter supersedes conflicting state law on matters of purely municipal concern. ⁷ Ratliff and the Director contend there is no conflict and the Board does have the power to grant oil-and-gas variances. ⁸

This court has addressed itself to the issue of conflicts between municipal ordinances or charter provisions and state law. ⁹ A city charter draws its legal vitality from Art. 18, § 3(a), Okl. Const. ¹⁰ and from the implementing provisions of 11 O.S.1981 § 13-101. ¹¹ It has the force of a city's fundamental law. ¹² Municipal ordinances are legislative acts of the city's governing body and have the same effect within the corporate limits as a state statute. A city charter supersedes state law only when it affects a subject that is deemed to lie exclusively within municipal concern. ¹³ A conflict between a state enactment and a municipal charter or ordinance may be found to exist when both contain either express or implied conditions that are inconsistent and irreconcilable with one another. If one is silent on the issue and the other speaks to it, there can be no conflict. ¹⁴

Oklahoma jurisprudence recognizes the legislative authority of a city to enact zoning ordinances ¹⁵ and the adjudicative power of its board of adjustment to grant variances from city ordinances. ¹⁶ A city is empowered to enact zoning laws to regulate the drilling of oil-and-gas wells with a view to safeguarding public welfare. ¹⁷ Without these regulations residents would be exposed to multiple dangers and unnecessary inconveniences. ¹⁸ A city that exercises zoning powers is statutorily mandated to establish a board of adjustment ¹⁹ whose function is to determine whether a variance should be granted to permit an owner to use his property in a manner prohibited by the ordinance. ²⁰ In a proper case the board is empowered to make an adjustment and grant a variance from a city zoning ordinance where its literal enforcement would create unnecessary hardship or prevent a constitutionally permissible use of property. The board is an administrative agency which acts in an adjudicative capacity to determine whether the criteria for a variance have been met. ²¹ The effect of a variance relaxes the generally applied rules of the ordinance to alleviate conditions that are peculiar to a particular tract of land. ²² On a case-by-case basis agency review of a zoning ordinance's validity affords elasticity in the application of a city's regulatory measures to prevent them from operating in an arbitrary or confiscatory manner. The mechanism provided by this approach assures protection for an owner's fundamental right to use and enjoy his property. ²³ In sum, upon a proper showing the board is empowered to make an adjustment and to grant a variance from the city zoning ordinance where its literal enforcement would work either unnecessary hardship or result in constitutional deprivation.

The City Charter, Art. XII, requires a vote of the electors to enlarge or to create U-7 drilling zones. ²⁴ It limits the city's legislative powers but does not address itself to the adjudicative powers of the Board to grant variances in the manner provided by 11 O.S.1981 §§ 44-104 ²⁵ and 44-107. ²⁶ The Board is not empowered to pass legislative acts like those of the City's governing body. Rather, its powers are purely adjudicative. ²⁷ It may only determine whether a variance should be granted after applying pertinent statutory criteria to the existing physical facts in the locus in quo. ²⁸ The board cannot create new zones through variances. We hence conclude that no conflict exists between the invoked provisions of the City Charter and the challenged state law. Moreover, even if the charter could be read as a limitation on the City's exercise of adjudicative power, it could not pass constitutional muster when tested by the minimum standards of due process, state or federal. ²⁹

II THE CRITERIA NECESSARY TO GRANT A VARIANCE

A. The Presumption of Validity of the Board's Decision

Ratliff argues that it is entitled to the presumption of validity that attaches in favor of the Board's decisions. ³⁰ We agree that in variance cases a presumption does exist in favor of the correctness of the Board's rulings. A granted variance will be accorded great weight and will not be disturbed when it has been affirmed on appeal by a district court unless it is clearly arbitrary or erroneous. Because in this case the Board's decision was reversed, the presumption that initially attached to its validity is to be regarded as having been overcome by the adverse ruling of the trial court.

B. Burden of Proof

Ratliff contends that on appeal to the district court the petitioner (homeowner) has the burden of proof to show that the elements of a variance were not met.

A proceeding to review a board's decision either to grant or to deny a variance is equitable in nature. ³¹ Unless clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence, the district court's decree will not be disturbed. ³² The trial court must conduct a de novo inquiry ³³ and it has the same power as the Board to grant or to deny a variance. ³⁴ There must be a complete examination of all issues, both of fact and law. The cause stands as if it has never been resolved before. Thus the burden of proof does not shift but rests on the same party as in the lower tribunal. ³⁵ Since Ratliff had the burden to prove before the Board that the elements necessary for a variance had been met, it also bore the same responsibility in the district court.

C. Elements Necessary for a Variance

The Board may grant a variance to a landowner if the landowner can show that: a variance would not be contrary to public interest; an unnecessary hardship would arise if the ordinance were literally enforced; the spirit of the ordinance would be upheld; and substantial justice would be done by granting the variance. ³⁶ A variance is contrary to the public...