Vinson v. State

• Decision Date: 15 July 2020
• Docket Number: S-19-0273
• Citation: 467 P.3d 1009
• Parties: Michael Delwin VINSON, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

467 P.3d 1009

Michael Delwin VINSON, Appellant (Defendant),

v.The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

S-19-0273

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

July 15, 2020

Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Desiree Wilson, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee: Bridget L. Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Catherine M. Mercer, Assistant Attorney General; Kelly D. Mullen, Assistant Attorney General.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] A jury convicted Michael D. Vinson of aggravated assault and battery. Mr. Vinson argues his conviction should be reversed because the district court improperly admitted W.R.E. 404(b) evidence. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] Was Mr. Vinson prejudiced by the admission of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence without the required Gleason analysis?

FACTS

[¶3] In March 2018, the State charged Mr. Vinson with one count of aggravated assault and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i). The felony information alleged that on February 1, 2018, Mr. Vinson "caused or attempted to cause serious bodily injury to another, [ ] intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]" More specifically, it alleged Mr. Vinson kicked SK in the head with his foot, causing serious bodily injury.

[¶4] In the supporting affidavit, Greybull Police Department Chief Bill Brenner summarized his investigation, which began when he received a phone call from SK informing him that her fiancé, Mr. Vinson, assaulted her in Greybull on February 1, 2018. According to SK, she had been visiting Mr. Vinson at the residence his employer rented for him. They got into an argument after returning home from a bar. SK slapped Mr. Vinson in the face and, in response, he kicked her in the face, knocking her unconscious. SK woke up later to find Mr. Vinson washing the blood out of her hair and having sexual intercourse with her without her consent. She passed out, woke up sometime later, and again found Mr. Vinson having sexual intercourse with her without her consent. SK advised Mr. Vinson she needed medical attention, but he told her to rest and expressed concern about going to jail. After Mr. Vinson left for work in Billings, Montana later that morning, SK drove herself to the South Big Horn County Hospital, where she told medical staff she got into a fight with a friend. She did not report the sexual assault because she thought it could not be a crime given her relationship with Mr. Vinson. She had to be flown to the hospital in Billings for further treatment.

[¶5] Chief Brenner received written statements from SK and her sister, who SK contacted before going to the hospital. Hospital records reflected SK had several fractures to her skull

, a busted ear drum, a fractured nose, and bruises on her chest, thighs, and arms. Chief Brenner spoke with Darren Berlinger, who gave Mr. Vinson and SK a ride home from a local bar on the night of the assault. Mr. Berlinger remembered Mr. Vinson and SK getting into a verbal altercation. Mr. Vinson later denied having an altercation with SK when Chief Brenner telephoned him on March 23.

[¶6] In preparation for trial, Mr. Vinson filed a standard demand for disclosure of the State's intent to introduce W.R.E. 404(b) evidence. The State did not file a responsive pleading, thus suggesting it did not intend to introduce any 404(b) evidence. Concerned the State may present evidence that Mr. Vinson had sexual intercourse with SK twice without her consent on the evening of the altercation, Mr. Vinson filed a motion in limine to prevent the State from referencing the nonconsensual sexual encounters.¹ The motion did not mention Rule 404(b).

[¶7] Instead, Mr. Vinson's motion in limine argued all testimony and documentary evidence referencing a sexual assault must be excluded as irrelevant and highly prejudicial because Mr. Vinson had not been charged with sexual assault. The State agreed not to reference a "sexual assault," but maintained the sexual intercourse evidence was necessary to prove an element of aggravated assault and battery. According to the State, SK made statements to the effect that while Mr. Vinson was beating her, he was also engaging in sexual intercourse with her, and such evidence was relevant to show Mr. Vinson's extreme indifference to human life.

[¶8] The court denied Mr. Vinson's motion in limine on the grounds raised in his motion. In doing so, the court expressly noted it had not determined when the sexual intercourse occurred or its relationship to the alleged assault. But to the extent the sexual intercourse was part of the circumstances in the case, the court would allow it. The court noted it would "see how further evidence bears out for further objections[.]"

[¶9] In immediate response to this ruling, defense counsel expressed concern that the sexual intercourse evidence was uncharged misconduct evidence. The court pointed out the motion in limine had not mentioned Rule 404(b). Defense counsel agreed but countered that he had filed a pretrial demand for notice of the State's intent to introduce 404(b) evidence and received no response from the State. The court declined to alter its ruling.

[¶10] The case proceeded to a five-day trial. We summarize the alleged 404(b) evidence here, reserving further discussion for the prejudice analysis below.

[¶11] The prosecutor focused on SK's testimony and how other evidence corroborated it. In opening statements, the prosecutor mentioned that SK would recount that Mr. Vinson had sexual intercourse with her after the physical assault. On direct examination, SK's testimony reflected the first instance occurred well after the physical assault. SK admitted that she slapped Mr. Vinson once in the face during their argument. The next thing she remembered was waking up in a puddle of blood on the floor between the kitchen and living room. On regaining consciousness, she knocked on the locked master bedroom door and asked Mr. Vinson for help. He opened the door, led her to the master bathroom, put her in the shower, and cleaned the blood off her. He assured her she was fine and did not need medical attention. Mr. Vinson then helped her out of the shower, put a robe on her, led her to the bed, and had sex with her. She did not participate, just laid there, "couldn't hear anything," and "was in so much pain" from her injuries.

[¶12] The second instance occurred the following morning when Mr. Vinson was getting ready for work. SK testified they had not made up and she just wanted him to leave. Mr. Vinson came into the bedroom and started touching her. He licked his hand and forced it between her legs; he penetrated her and had sex with her. She did not participate, just laid there, and did not move her head.

[¶13] Two additional witnesses mentioned the sexual intercourse evidence. SK's sister testified that SK "mentioned that [Mr. Vinson] had sex with her two different times when she was in and out of consciousness." Chief Brenner testified that during his investigation SK "remember[ed] at least two occasions where [Mr. Vinson] had sexual intercourse with her." Chief Brenner "asked her if she consented to that and she said she did not, but she felt because ... he was her fiancé [ ] she could not report that as rape." Chief Brenner "advised her that is not accurate, but she felt there would be no way to substantiate evidence for that claim."

[¶14] Before closing argument, the court instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated assault and battery. It further instructed the jury the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Vinson had not acted in self-defense. Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel mentioned sexual intercourse in closing argument.

[¶15] The jury convicted Mr. Vinson of aggravated assault and battery, finding he caused serious bodily injury to SK recklessly, under circumstances which showed an extreme indifference to the value of human life. The court sentenced him to six to eight years imprisonment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶16] Mr. Vinson's pretrial demand for notice of the State's intent to introduce 404(b) evidence directs that we review the district court's admission of the State's evidence that Mr. Vinson had sexual intercourse with SK twice without her consent for an abuse of discretion. Broberg v. State , 2018 WY 113, ¶ 15, 428 P.3d 167, 171 (Wyo. 2018) ("We review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion when an objection has been lodged" and a pretrial demand is treated as a timely objection. (quoting Cardenas v. State , 2014 WY 92, ¶ 7, 330 P.3d 808, 810 (Wyo. 2014) )). "If we determine the court abused its discretion in admitting 404(b) evidence, ‘we must also determine whether the error was prejudicial.’ " Id. (quoting Mersereau v. State , 2012 WY 125, ¶ 17, 286 P.3d 97, 106 (Wyo. 2012) ).

DISCUSSION

[¶17] A core principle of Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(b) "is that the defendant in a criminal case ‘should not be convicted because he is an unsavory person, nor because of past misdeeds, but only because of his guilt of the particular crime charged.’ " Leyva v. State , 2007 WY 136, ¶ 19, 165 P.3d 446, 452 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 4:21, at 691–92 (3d ed. 2007)). The rule states:

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts .—Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in

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