Viscuso v. Quicken Loans Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:21-cv-01924-JMC |
| Parties | Suzanne Viscuso, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Quicken Loans, Inc., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Plaintiff Suzanne Viscuso, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed the instant putative class action against Defendant Quicken Loans, Inc., seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages for Defendant's alleged failure to protect Plaintiff's confidential and/or private information. (See ECF No. 1-3.) Plaintiff alleges state law claims for breach of confidentiality negligence, and invasion of privacy. (Id. at 7 ¶ 29-9 ¶ 49.)
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff opposes the Motion to Dismiss in its entirety. (ECF No. 12.) For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Defendant “is a nationwide online mortgage lender that provides among other things, residential mortgage loan refinances.” Boone v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 803 S.E.2d 707, 709 (S.C. 2017). “Under [Defendant's] refinance procedure, the borrowers have already purchased the property and are simply seeking a new mortgage loan (presumably with more favorable terms) to replace the existing loan.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that she has a mortgage loan with Defendant and on May 8, 2021, Defendant sent the following e-mail (the “E-mail”) to Plaintiff conveying that she was delinquent on her loan (ECF No. 1-3 at 4 ¶¶ 7, 8):
(Image Omitted)
(ECF Nos. 11-1 at 2, 12-1 at 8-9.) Moreover, from her review of the carbon copy (“CC”) file of the e-mail, Plaintiff alleges that she was able to discern hundreds or thousands of other customers of Defendant as also having delinquent accounts.[1] (Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has in no way acknowledged either a data breach or the publication of private customer account date/personal information. (Id. at 5 ¶ 17.)
Thereafter, on March 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas (South Carolina) alleging state law claims for breach of confidentiality, negligence, and invasion of privacy. (ECF No. 1-3 at 7 ¶ 29-9 ¶ 49.) On June 25, 2021, Quicken Loans removed the matter to this court (ECF No. 1) and filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 2.) The parties then responded and replied to this Motion. (See ECF Nos. 11, 12, 14.)
The court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy herein exceeds the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand ($75, 000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs. (See ECF No. 24 at 8.) For jurisdictional purposes, Plaintiff alleges that her “State of Residence . . . is South Carolina”; and Quicken Loans is “a foreign corporation with its nerve center in Michigan.” (ECF No. 1-3 at 3 ¶¶ 1, 2.) In the Notice of Removal, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff admits that (1) her claims exceed the general diversity jurisdiction amount of $75, 000.00, exclusive of interests and costs, and (2) that “the aggregate amount in controversy for the claims of the putative class exceed[s] $5 million, ” thus satisfying the amount in controversy of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). (ECF No. 1 at 3, 6.)
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the consideration of “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction, and as such there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction.” Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Fredrick, Md., 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction raises the fundamental question of whether a court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter before it. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the court is to “regard the pleadings' allegations as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)). “The moving party should prevail only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on questions of subject matter jurisdiction. See Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted “challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (). “In considering a 12(b)(6) challenge to the sufficiency of a complaint, this Rule must be applied in conjunction with the liberal pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).” Jenkins v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, C/A No. 3:10-1968-CMC-JRM, 2011 WL 4482074, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 2011). Rule 8(a) provides that to be legally sufficient, a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears certain that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support her claim and would entitle her to relief. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1999); Mylan Labs., Inc., 7 F.3d at 1134. “In so doing, a court may consider documents attached to the complaint or the motion to dismiss ‘so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.'” Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., Md., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case due to Plaintiff's lack of standing. (ECF No. 2 at 5.) In this regard, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate any of the three (3) recognized “types of standing: (1) statutory standing; (2) constitutional standing; and (3) public importance standing.” (Id. ).)
However, even if Plaintiff had standing, Defendant argues dismissal is warranted because Plaintiff did not suffer any damages (id. at 4) and the allegations supporting her claims are deficient. More specifically, Defendant asserts that it is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff's claim alleging breach of confidentiality because the claim has only been recognized in the context of a doctor-patient relationship. (ECF No. 2 at 2 (citing McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 437 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)).) Defendant further asserts that an invasion of privacy claim as alleged by Plaintiff is also not recognized as a valid cause of action under South Carolina law. (Id. at 3 (citing Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, ACA, 514 S.E.2d 126, 130 (S.C. 1999); Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 5 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989)).) Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's cause of action for negligence fails to state a claim because she “failed to allege facts establishing the elements of such a claim, including the existence of a duty owed to Plaintiff, the breach of such duty, that any alleged breach actually and proximately caused Plaintiff injury, and that Plaintiff actually suffered injury or damage.” (Id. at 2-3.)
Plaintiff opposes Defendant's Motion to Dismiss arguing that “breach of confidentiality is not solely limited to the physician-patient relationship, and courts analyze the particular facts of each case to determine the applicability of a breach of confidentiality claim.” (ECF No. 12 at 8 (citing Hotel & Motel Holdings, LLC v. BJC Enters LLC, 780 S.E.2d 263, 273 (S.C. Ct. App. 2015)).) In support of this claim, Plaintiff asserts that she has sufficiently alleged a confidential relationship with Defendant “which required Defendant to protect Plaintiff's account information, including the status of the account, and personal...
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