Vista Financial Corp. v. Tucker

• Decision Date: 16 September 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74--565,74--565
• Citation: 36 Colo.App. 412,544 P.2d 643
• Parties: VISTA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Herbert E. TUCKER, Defendant, and Judith L. Tucker, Defendant-Appellee. . I
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 643

544 P.2d 643

36 Colo.App. 412

VISTA FINANCIAL CORPORATION, a corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Herbert E. TUCKER, Defendant and Judith L. Tucker, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 74--565.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

Sept. 16, 1975.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Oct. 23, 1975.

Certiorari Granted Feb. 2, 1976.

Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, James E. Hautzinger, James F. Wood, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.

Simon, Eason, Hoyt & Malone, P.C., Richard L. Eason, Stephen G. Everall, Englewood, for defendant-appellee.

ENOCH, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment vacating the registration of a foreign judgment filed in Colorado by Vista Financial Corporation (Vista). We reverse.

The foreign judgment was rendered in California, In personam jjrisdiction over defendant Judith Tucker allegedly arose under California's Long Arm Statute. The basis of the California lawsuit was the alleged default on two promissory notes. Judith Tucker, a resident of Colorado, co-signed in Colorado at least one of the notes and an authorization of disbursal of funds. This note, payable to a California bank, and the authorization to the California bank to disburse the funds were mailed to Judith Tucker by her husband, Herbert Tucker, the other co-signer. From the affidavits and documents it would appear that the note, admittedly signed by Judith Tucker, was a renewal of a prior note to which Judith Tucker had also signed the disbursal authorization, having the loan proceeds credited to Herbert Tucker's account in the California bank. Judith Tucker attacks the exercise of In personam jurisdiction over her by California and that is the sole issue on appeal.

The California Long Arm Statute extends jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Cal.Civ.Pro. § 410.10 (West 1973). Thus, this court must decide whether the exercise of In personam jurisdiction over Judith Tucker was permissible under the due process clause. The United States Supreme Court has established the general standards of due process for jurisdiction over a non-resident not present within the state in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95:

'(D)ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment In personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

Within these standards a single transaction may create sufficient minimum contacts. In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223, an insurance company mailed a re-insurance contract into California; the California resident accepted this contract and paid premiums by mail to the Texas office of the insurance company. Although the insurance company had never solicited or done any other insurance business in California, the Supreme Court found that these contracts met the requirements of International Shoe, supra, in that 'the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that state.'

A refinement of the test was made in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, when the court stated that:

'The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefit and protection of its laws.'

A recent interpretation of these general guidelines laid down by the United States Supreme Court is found in Van Schaack & Co. v. District Court, Colo., 538 P.2d 425, (1975). That case involved a letter of credit extended by a Kansas bank in connection with a Colorado real estate contract. The letter of credit was issued on behalf of the purchaser, a Kansas corporation, to extend the contract for 30 days. When the letter was later revoked, litigation was instituted and one of the defendants sought to bring in the Kansas bank as a third-party defendant. The court utilized the analysis found in White Lumber Sales Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Or. 121, 448 P.2d 571, and quoted from that decision:

'From the McGee and Hanson cases, three criteria can be said to define the present outer...