Vitela v. State
| Docket Number | 04-19-00737-CR,04-19-00738-CR |
| Decision Date | 22 December 2021 |
| Parties | Aidan VITELA, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 5942 &6023 Honorable Kirsten B. Cohoon Judge Presiding
AFFIRMED
On September 29, 2021, we issued an opinion and judgment which affirmed the trial court's judgment. Appellant Aidan Vitela timely filed a motion for rehearing. For the reasons given below, we deny Vitela's motion for rehearing, but we withdraw our opinion and judgment of September 29, 2021, and we substitute this opinion and judgment in their stead.
On March 12, 2015, Vitela was driving his two friends, Victoria Snell and Sydney Smith, down Scenic Loop in Boerne. He sped around a curve and lost control of his car, crashing into a tree. Smith died due to her injuries in the crash. As part of the police investigation, officers obtained a search warrant to recover Vitela's black box event data recorder from his car. Once officers collected the evidence, they performed a download of the recorder's data to gain information on the car's speed at and before the time of the crash.
In preparation for trial, Vitela challenged the officers' authority to seize his car's black box and access its information. He also challenged the black box's reliability. But the trial court denied Vitela's pretrial motion to suppress as well as his pretrial request to disqualify the State's expert witnesses or exclude the black box data as unreliable evidence. After the jury heard the State's evidence, the prosecutor argued that Vitela had driven recklessly, which Vitela disputed. The jury convicted Vitela of the lesser offense of criminally negligent homicide and found him guilty of aggravated assault for injuring Snell.
Vitela now appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion 1) by denying his motion to suppress evidence of his car's "black box" event data recorder, 2) by allowing the State's expert witnesses to testify and admitting black box evidence after a Daubert hearing, and 3) committed reversible error by denying a request for a mistrial due to improper closing statements by the prosecutor. He also argues that the evidence against him was legally insufficient to support a conviction for criminally negligent homicide. We affirm.
Vitela argues that the warrant police used to seize his car's black box was not based on probable cause and that the black box was not found in the place where police expected to find it.
Consequently, he argues that his motion to suppress the evidence should have been granted. The State responds, inter alia, that Vitela abandoned his car and had no standing to complain of any seizure related to it. Vitela points out that evidence of abandonment was developed during trial, not during the pretrial hearing on his motion to suppress. He objects to its relevance in our appellate review of the trial court's pretrial ruling.
A trial court's ruling refusing to suppress evidence is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). But the appellate court uses a bifurcated standard, reviewing applications of law de novo. State v. Ruiz, 581 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (citing Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). This standard gives almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts. Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48 (citing St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
To collect evidence from a suspect's vehicle, police must obtain a warrant based on probable cause, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. See Gonzales v. State, 190 S.W.3d 125, 134 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). However, if a suspect has abandoned a vehicle, he may have no standing to challenge any evidence collected from it. See Gonzales, 190 S.W.3d at 135 (citing Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). The test to determine whether a suspect has abandoned his vehicle turns on whether the suspect showed intent to abandon it and whether the suspect's intent was based on any police misconduct. Gonzales, 190 S.W.3d at 135 ().
Standing is a preliminary element of a Fourth Amendment challenge, and the burden is on the defendant to establish it. State v. Klima, 934 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661, 667-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)); accordRakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Standing may be challenged and analyzed for the first time on appeal. See Flores v. State, 871 S.W.2d 714, 720 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d at 671.
Directly before trial, the trial court ruled against Vitela's Fourth Amendment motion to suppress. The trial court did not explain its pretrial denial of Vitela's motion to suppress at the time, but the trial court had received a copy of the search warrant and taken arguments from the parties.[1]
During trial, Vitela developed evidence about his car: Vitela's car was towed to a wrecker's lot following the crash. The wrecker's lot notified Vitela he could collect his car after he paid the towing and storage fees. Vitela made no effort to collect the car, and his insurer sent it to an auto auction. Law enforcement officers went to the auto auction lot to execute their warrant. That location is where officers discovered and ultimately collected the black box evidence.
After trial, the trial court provided Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support of its pretrial ruling denying Vitela's motion to suppress. The trial court included facts related to Vitela's standing that were established during trial. The trial court concluded that Vitela lacked standing to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge against the State's black box evidence.
Vitela argues that we should not consider trial evidence in our review. See Black v. State, 362 S.W.3d 626, 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). However, the issue of standing is a substantive element of a Fourth Amendment challenge, which may be considered for the first time on appeal. Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d at 671. Accordingly, we do not exclude it from our appellate review.
The State is correct that the record reflects Vitela's apparent intent to abandon his car by his lack of effort to collect it or to communicate with anyone about whether he planned to collect it. When the police obtained evidence from the car, it was about to be sold by Geico.
Vitela did not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in his totaled vehicle, which meant that he maintained no standing to challenge the evidence collected. See Gonzales, 190 S.W.3d at 135. We overrule his argument regarding the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress the black box evidence.
Vitela argues that the State's expert witnesses lacked adequate expertise and should not have been permitted to testify. He also argues that the black box evidence associated with his car was unreliable because the black box police discovered on the passenger seat of his car was not of the same make as his car, [2] the data itself showed many errors, and it was unclear how the data related to Vitela's crash, if it corresponded at all. At trial, he challenged the admissibility of this evidence under Daubert, but the trial court overruled his objection.
The State argues that Vitela waived his argument in part by not objecting to the science underlying the black box evidence at trial. The State further argues that its expert witnesses were qualified to assist the jury in deciding the case, and that Vitela suffered no prejudice from the evidence admitted through the State's expert witnesses because Vitela offered and admitted similar evidence.
An appellate court reviews a trial court's admission of evidence and expert testimony for an abuse of discretion, i.e., whether the trial court's ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
"A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Tex. R. Evid. 702; Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); Wooten v. State, 267 S.W.3d 289, 297 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref'd). In other words, to testify as an expert, a witness must be qualified in their area of testimony, the area of testimony must be appropriate for an expert witness, and the anticipated testimony should help the jury decide the case. Rhomer, 569 S.W.3d at 669 (citing Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). But "[t]his is not...
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