Vitela v. State
| Decision Date | 27 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | s. 04-19-00737-CR,04-19-00738-CR |
| Citation | 649 S.W.3d 649 |
| Parties | Aidan VITELA, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
APPELLANT ATTORNEY: Michael C. Gross, Joseph Adrian Esparza, Gross & Esparza, PLLC, 1524 N. Alamo St., San Antonio, TX 78215.
APPELLEE ATTORNEY: Robert F. Lipo Jr., Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Nicole S. Bishop, Kendall County District Attorney, 201 E. San Antonio St., Boerne, TX 78006.
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice, Luz Elena Chapa, Justice, Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
OPINION ON SECOND MOTION FOR REHEARING
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
On September 29, 2021, we issued an opinion and judgment which affirmed the trial court's judgment. Appellant Aidan Vitela timely filed a motion for rehearing. We denied the motion for rehearing but replaced our opinion with an opinion dated December 22, 2021. Vitela again filed a timely motion for rehearing. For the reasons given below, we deny Vitela's motion for rehearing, but we withdraw our opinion and judgment of December 22, 2021, and we substitute this opinion and judgment in their stead.
On March 12, 2015, Vitela was driving his two friends, Victoria Snell and Sydney Smith, down Scenic Loop in Boerne. He sped around a curve and lost control of his car, crashing into a tree. Smith died due to her injuries in the crash. As part of the police investigation, officers obtained a search warrant to recover Vitela's black box event data recorder from his car. Once officers collected the evidence, they performed a download of the recorder's data to gain information on the car's speed at and before the time of the crash.
In preparation for trial, Vitela challenged the officers’ authority to seize his car's black box and access its information. He also challenged the black box's reliability. But the trial court denied Vitela's pretrial motion to suppress as well as his pretrial request to disqualify the State's expert witnesses or exclude the black box data as unreliable evidence. After the jury heard the State's evidence, the prosecutor argued that Vitela had driven recklessly, which Vitela disputed. The jury convicted Vitela of the lesser offense of criminally negligent homicide and found him guilty of aggravated assault for injuring Snell.
Vitela now appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion 1) by denying his motion to suppress evidence of his car's "black box" event data recorder, 2) by allowing the State's expert witnesses to testify and admitting black box evidence after a Daubert hearing, and 3) committed reversible error by denying a request for a mistrial due to improper closing statements by the prosecutor. He also argues that the evidence against him was legally insufficient to support a conviction for criminally negligent homicide. We affirm.
Vitela argues that the warrant police used to seize his car's black box was not based on probable cause and that the black box was not found in the place where police expected to find it. Consequently, he argues that his motion to suppress the evidence should have been granted. The State responds, inter alia, that Vitela abandoned his car and had no standing to complain of any seizure related to it. Vitela points out that evidence of abandonment was developed during trial, not during the pretrial hearing on his motion to suppress. He objects to its relevance in our appellate review of the trial court's pretrial ruling.
A trial court's ruling refusing to suppress evidence is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Crain v. State , 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). But the appellate court uses a bifurcated standard, reviewing applications of law de novo. State v. Ruiz , 581 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (citing Turrubiate v. State , 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ). This standard gives almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts. Crain , 315 S.W.3d at 48 (citing St. George v. State , 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ).
To collect evidence from a suspect's vehicle, police must obtain a warrant based on probable cause, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. See Gonzales v. State , 190 S.W.3d 125, 134 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (citing Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ). However, if a suspect has abandoned a vehicle, he may have no standing to challenge any evidence collected from it. See Gonzales , 190 S.W.3d at 135 (citing Swearingen v. State , 101 S.W.3d 89, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ).1 Therefore, "[b]efore challenging a search or seizure on constitutional grounds, a defendant must establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search or seizure occurred." Mejia v. State , 761 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd) ; accord Handy v. State , 189 S.W.3d 296, 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ; Lewis v. State , No. 2-09-319-CR, 2010 WL 3304205, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 19, 2010, no pet.). The test to determine whether a suspect has abandoned his vehicle turns on whether the suspect showed intent to abandon it and whether the suspect's intent was based on any police misconduct. Gonzales , 190 S.W.3d at 135 ().
"When a hearing on the motion to suppress evidence is granted, the court may determine the merits of said motion on the motions themselves, or upon opposing affidavits, or upon oral testimony, subject to the discretion of the court." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.01 ; accord Hahn v. State , 852 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd). A trial court may also revisit its determination at any time during a trial. See Black v. State , 362 S.W.3d 626, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Vitela has cited Black v. State , and O'Hara v. State , 27 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), to argue that "[i]t is clear in Texas that a trial judge may not base findings of fact on evidence that was not before the trial judge during the suppression hearing or during any relitigation of the suppression hearing during trial." We disagree with this summary of the law. See Montalvo v. State , 846 S.W.2d 133, 138 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993). Rather, "[t]he trial court ha[s] continuing jurisdiction over the case and [i]s free to reconsider its own earlier suppression ruling." Id. (). It is the reviewing court that is generally limited to what was before the trial court when it made its ultimate decision. See Black ,2 362 S.W.3d at 636 ; O'Hara , 27 S.W.3d at 551.3 But even so, Fourth Amendment standing may require a broader review. See Wilson v. State , 692 S.W.2d 661, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Combs v. United States , 408 U.S. 224, 92 S.Ct. 2284, 33 L.Ed.2d 308 (1972) (per curiam)).
In Supreme Court case Combs v. United States , for example, after the State raised the defendant's Fourth Amendment standing for the first time on appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the petitioner's case to the district court because there had been no "factual determination of whether petitioner had an interest in the searched premises that was protectible." Wilson , 692 S.W.2d at 669 (quoting Combs , 408 U.S. at 228, 92 S.Ct. 2284 ).
Later, in Texas Court of Criminal Appeals case Wilson v. State , the State similarly raised the defendant's Fourth Amendment standing for the first time on appeal. Id. In an opinion on rehearing, the Wilson court referred to Combs as its closest analog as it turned to "the record" to find "the facts necessary to determine whether the appellant had standing." Id. The Wilson court noted that the defendant testified at the suppression hearing but not at trial, and therefore analyzed evidence from the suppression hearing to determine whether Wilson had sufficiently established his Fourth Amendment standing, which the court concluded that he had. See id. We read this analysis of the suppression hearing evidence as a function of where the defendant's testimony appeared in the record, and not due to the Court of Criminal Appeals limiting its review. See id.4
Directly before trial, the trial court ruled against Vitela's Fourth Amendment motion to suppress. The trial court did not explain its denial at the time, but it had received a copy of the search warrant as evidence and taken arguments from the parties.5 Vitela did not assert a reasonable expectation of privacy. Contra Wilson , 692 S.W.2d at 671. Furthermore, the search warrant admitted by the State could not account for whether Vitela retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched at the time law enforcement executed their warrant. See Gonzales , 190 S.W.3d at 135.
During trial, Vitela developed evidence about his car: Vitela's car was towed to a wrecker's lot following the crash. The wrecker's lot notified Vitela he could collect his car after he paid the towing and storage fees. Vitela made no effort to collect the car, and his insurer sent it to an auto auction. Law enforcement officers went to the auto auction lot to execute their warrant. That location is where officers discovered and ultimately collected the black box evidence.
After trial, the trial court provided Findings of Fact and...
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