Vodila v. Clelland
Decision Date | 28 December 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 85-3461,85-3461 |
Citation | 836 F.2d 231 |
Parties | John D. VODILA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roderick CLELLAND, Dorothy Demharter, Jim Ghersi, Dr. Donald Cotton, Jr., Dorothy Cooper, William Spiker, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Jay F. McKirahan (argued), Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.
David J. Kovach (argued), Asst. Ohio Atty. Gen., Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.
Before KEITH, NELSON and BOGGS, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiff in this case, John D. Vodila, was employed as a dentist in a mental hospital operated by the State of Ohio. As an employee in the "unclassified" service Dr. Vodila had no vested property interest in his job and no contractual right to continued public employment.
On July 20, 1980, Dr. Vodila was discharged for alleged neglect of duty and incompetence. The discharge order was accompanied by a 15-page "Bill of Particulars" accusing him of such things as extracting teeth without first taking x-rays and without administering anesthesia.
On April 6, 1983--approximately two years and nine months after his discharge--Dr. Vodila filed suit against the hospital superintendent and others under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The complaint alleged that Dr. Vodila had been discharged in a manner that violated various constitutional rights. After review by a magistrate, the district court dismissed the complaint on the defendants' motion. We affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that under Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), the timelessness of all Sec. 1983 actions is now governed by the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions; that under Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174, 106 S.Ct. 2902, 90 L.Ed.2d 988 (1986), the statute of limitations to which courts must look in determining the timeliness of Sec. 1983 actions in an Ohio forum is O.R.C. Sec. 2305.11, which establishes a one-year limitation period; and that Mulligan required us to apply the current law to Sec. 1983 actions filed prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia, as well as to actions filed after it.
Our decision affirming the judgment of the district court was rendered in 1986. In two subsequent decisions arising under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987), and Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the retroactive application of statutes of limitations adopted under Wilson v. Garcia is to be determined in accordance with the principles set forth in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). The latter case teaches that under certain circumstances statutes of limitations decisions are not to be applied retroactively.
On June 26, 1987, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3255, 97 L.Ed.2d 754, the Supreme Court vacated our judgment in the case at bar and remanded the cause for further consideration in the light of Goodman and St. Francis College. The Supreme Court's action, as our court recently had occasion to observe in another case, "compels the conclusion that the one-year statute of limitations adopted in Mulligan for all Sec. 1983 claims brought in Ohio is not to be automatically applied retroactively and that the decision as to retroactivity must be made on a case-by-case basis." Thomas v. Shipka, 829 F.2d 570, 572 (6th Cir.1987) (footnote omitted).
In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson the Supreme Court noted that the first factor generally considered in cases dealing with the "nonretroactivity question" is this: "the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ..., or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed...." 404 U.S. at 106, 92 S.Ct. at 355 (citations omitted). This is the most important of the Chevron factors for purposes of analyzing a case such as that before us here. See Thomas, 829 F.2d at 573.
The most significant question presented in this case, as Thomas teaches, is whether the precedents that were available for inspection by Dr. Vodila during the one-year period following his discharge established that he had at least two years and nine months (the length of time he actually waited) in which to file his Sec. 1983 action. Thus if clear past precedent showed that he was entitled to defer the filing of his complaint for up to six years by reason of O.R.C. Sec. 2305.07 ( ), or up to four years by reason of O.R.C. Sec. 2305.09 ( ), it would be inequitable for the courts to tell Dr. Vodila, after the fact, that an action commenced within two years and nine months was not timely filed.
The inequity imposed by a decision's retroactive application is the third factor listed in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, and in cases such as the one before us the third factor is essentially a reciprocal of the first. The second Chevron factor--whether retrospective application of the new rule "will further or retard its operation"--is neutral in the present context. Thomas v. Shipka, 829 F.2d at 574.
In a supplemental brief filed after the remand of this case, Dr. Vodila contends that under clear circuit precedent in effect both during the one-year period immediately following his discharge and at the time his suit was actually filed, a Sec. 1983 action involving employment status could be brought in an Ohio forum anytime within a period of six years following the alleged misconduct. If the caselaw supported that contention, we are satisfied that Dr. Vodila's action would not be barred by the one-year statute of limitations despite Wilson v. Garcia and Mulligan v. Hazard. As we read the pertinent caselaw, however, it does not establish that Dr. Vodila's Sec. 1983 claim was ever subject to a six-year statute of limitations. What it clearly shows, rather, is that the one-year statute of limitations was the one that was applicable.
Dr. Vodila cites three cases in support of his argument: Schorle v. City of Greenhills, 524 F.Supp. 821 (S.D.Ohio 1981); Campbell v. Sirak, 476 F.Supp. 21 (S.D.Ohio 1979), aff'd, 705 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.1982); and Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520 (6th Cir.1975). None, in our view, carries the day for the doctor.
The earliest decision in Dr. Vodila's trilogy, Mason v. Owens-Illinois, was a race discrimination case brought against a private employer under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. The parties agreed that because Congress had failed to provide a statute of limitations for Sec. 1981 actions, the federal court "must apply the statute of limitations of the state where it sits which would be applicable in the most closely analogous state action...." Mason, 517 F.2d at 521. Plaintiff Mason's action was founded upon a federal statute that created a racial discrimination claim unknown at common law, and this court therefore concluded that the most closely analogous action under state law would be "an action upon a liability created by statute"--which meant, under O.R.C. Sec. 2305.07, that the limitations period would be six years.
Hines v. Bd. of Education of Covington, 492 F.Supp. 469 (E.D. Ky. 1980), aff'd, 667 F.2d 564 (6th Cir.1982)--a case decided by a district court in this circuit approximately two weeks before Dr. Vodila's discharge--presents a strikingly close parallel. Hines was a Sec. 1983 action brought by an untenured school teacher whose contract was not renewed after accusations of sexual misconduct and illegal drug use had been made against her. The teacher did not file suit until three and a half years after her discharge. The teacher argued that because her claim "involves an employment situation," her action was analogous to one based on a contract not in writing; therefore, she maintained, it ought to be subject to the state statute of limitations applicable to such contract actions. In the alternative, she argued that the limitations period for "an action upon a liability created by a statute" ought to be applicable. Both arguments were rejected by the district court, in an opinion that included these highly pertinent passages:
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