Vodinelich v. State
| Decision Date | 10 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | A14-1907 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Crystal Marie Vodinelich, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent. |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Affirmed
Dakota County District Court
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Katie M. Conners, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Chip Granger, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Johnson, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this appeal from the denial of her petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues that she is entitled to withdraw her guilty plea to fifth-degree controlled-substancecrime, or, at the very least, she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to resolve the material facts and issues presented in the petition. We affirm.
In a pat-down search conducted during a traffic stop, a police officer discovered a pipe that contained charred residue in appellant Crystal Marie Vodinelich's jacket pocket. A preliminary test of the pipe by the Dakota County Drug Task Force (DCDTF) detected methamphetamine. A later test of the pipe by the St. Paul Police Department Crime Lab (SPPDCL) also detected methamphetamine.
Appellant was charged with fifth-degree controlled-substance crime and two counts of fourth-degree driving while impaired (DWI). Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pleaded guilty to the controlled-substance charge and to one DWI count.
At the plea hearing, appellant confirmed that she understood the trial rights that she was giving up and that she was not claiming that she was innocent of the charges to which she was pleading guilty. When establishing the factual basis for the controlled-substance offense, appellant affirmed that the police officer "found in [her] possession or control, a pipe . . . that was determined to contain a trace amount of methamphetamine." The district court accepted appellant's plea, and she was convicted and sentenced.
Appellant later learned about deficient controlled-substance testing procedures used at the SPPDCL and petitioned for postconviction relief. In her petition, she requested that she be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea, or, at the very least, that there be an evidentiary hearing to resolve the material fact issues presented in the petition. Thedistrict court determined that appellant was entitled to no relief and denied her petition without a hearing. This appeal follows.
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2014). The petitioner has the burden to prove the facts alleged in the postconviction petition by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2014). "To meet that burden, a petitioner's allegations must be supported by more than mere argumentative assertions that lack factual support." Powers v. State, 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005).
In an appeal from a postconviction court's decision to grant or deny relief, we review issues of law de novo and issues of fact for sufficiency of the evidence. Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. 2007); see also Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Minn. 2003) ().
We review a denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well as a request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion. A postconviction court abuses its discretion whenits decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.
Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted).
In her petition for postconviction relief, appellant asserted that (a) her guilty plea was invalid; (b) newly discovered evidence of deficiencies at the SPPDCL rendered her guilty plea insufficient; (c) the state's suppression of the evidence of the deficiencies violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); and (d) she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her counsel failed to discover the deficiencies at the SPPDCL.
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing must show "that withdrawal is necessary to correct a 'manifest injustice.'" Carey v. State, 765 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. App. 2009) (quoting Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1), review denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2009). Under this standard, plea withdrawal must be permitted if the guilty plea is not valid, which depends on whether the plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. The defendant has the burden of establishing the grounds for permitting a plea withdrawal, and the validity of a plea is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Id. This court must affirm a postconviction court's decision unless the postconviction court abused its discretion. Bruestle v. State, 719 N.W.2d 698, 704 (Minn. 2006).
Appellant argues that her guilty plea was not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent.
To be accurate, a plea must be supported by a proper factual basis. Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012). A proper factual basis is established when there are sufficient facts in the record to support a conclusion that the defendant's conduct falls within the charge to which she is pleading guilty. Munger v. State, 749 N.W.2d 335, 337-38 (Minn. 2008) (). "The factual basis requirement is usually satisfied when the court asks the defendant to express in his own words what happened." State v. Lyle, 409 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Minn. App. 1987). "The court should not accept the plea unless the record supports the conclusion that the defendant actually committed an offense at least as serious as the crime to which he is pleading guilty." State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251-52 (Minn. 1983).
Appellant argues that her plea was not supported by a proper factual basis because the state did not prove the identity of the substance in her possession. Appellant contends that relying solely on a defendant's belief that something is a controlled substance is insufficient to prove the identity of a substance. But the factual basis for appellant's plea that was established during the plea hearing was not based solely on appellant's belief that the substance in the pipe was methamphetamine. During her testimony at the plea hearing, appellant did not simply state that she believed the charred substance in her pipe was methamphetamine; she agreed that a police officer "found in [her] possession or control, a pipe . . . that was determined to contain a trace amount of methamphetamine."(Emphasis added.) The determination that the substance was methamphetamine was not based on appellant's belief. This evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that appellant's conduct fell within the controlled-substance charge to which she pleaded guilty.
The requirement that a plea be voluntary "ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to improper pressure or coercion." Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Appellant argues that, in light of what we now know about testing deficiencies at the SPPDCL, information "that a credible scientific lab had tested the substance [in her pipe], and it tested positive as a controlled substance" was an improper pressure that induced her to plead guilty. But no evidence suggests that the state made any representations to appellant about the scientific credibility of the SPPDCL, and providing test results to appellant was neither improper pressure nor coercive.
The requirement that a plea be intelligent "ensures that a defendant understands the charges against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of his plea." Id. Appellant argues that her plea was not intelligent because she was not aware of the SPPDCL's deficiencies when she pleaded and did not know how, or understand her right, to challenge the test result. But during the plea hearing, appellant affirmed that she (1) reviewed the plea petition with her attorney, (2) understood and was giving up her right to a trial where she "would be presumed innocent and the burden would be upon [the state] to prove [her] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," and (3) understood and wasgiving up her rights to (a) "cross examine [the state's] witnesses and ask them questions" and (b) call witnesses to testify on her behalf.
These statements demonstrate that appellant and her attorney had discussed her right to challenge the state's case against her and that appellant understood that, by pleading guilty, she gave up her right to do so. Appellant has not shown that when she gave up her right to challenge the state's case, she did not understand that she could use the discovery procedures available under the rules of criminal procedure to challenge the SPPDCL test result.
Appellant did not...
To continue reading
Request your trial