Volk v. International Harvester Co.

• Decision Date: 13 December 1960
• Docket Number: No. 50081,50081
• Citation: 106 N.W.2d 649,252 Iowa 298
• Parties: Neva VOLK, Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 649

106 N.W.2d 649

252 Iowa 298

Neva VOLK, Appellant, v. INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 50081.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 13, 1960.

Lambach, Shorey & Plath, Davenport, for appellant.

Betty, Neuman, Heninger, Van Der Kamp & McMahon, Davenport, for appellee.

GARRETT, Justice.

Elwood Joseph Volk was an employee of International Harvester Company on April 27, 1956 when he lost his life in an automobile accident. About five o'clock in the afternoon he ended his formal duties in behalf of the company and registered at the Chautau Motel, at or near Washington, Iowa, which was to provide a meeting place for Volk, a parts zone supervisor and other International Harvester employees. The scheduled meeting was not held because one of the men was called home on account of a personal matter.

Volk and the remaining employee, Johnson, met with another employee by the name of Archer, and they went to Archer's home in Washington, staying about an hour. After martinis, they went to the Epicurean Club located on Highway No. 92 between Washington and Ainsworth--where they had drinks, played a bowling game and ate dinner.

About 9:30 P.M. they decided to drive to Muscatine which was not in the territory of Volk or Archer. They went in Archer's father's car. It is not claimed the trip to Muscatine was for anything other than the personal pleasure of the three employees. While in Muscatine, Archer, Volk and Johnson visited three taverns, drinking beer. About twelve o'clock, midnight the three started their return trip to Washington, and after they had passed the Epicurean Club a one-car accident took place resulting in Volk's death.

I. In her argument claimant-appellant states: 'The question presented by this appeal is, did the Commissioner err in finding that the injury and death of Volk did not 'arise out of' and 'in the course of' his employment. It is conceded that these findings must be made conjunctively, and if either fails, then claimant must fail.'

Our statute Section 85.3, Iowa Code, 1954, I.C.A., defines compensable injuries as those 'arising out of and in the course of the employment.' The phrase 'arising out of' is universally held to require causal relationship between the employment and the injury. In Bulman v. Sanitary Farm Dairies, 247 Iowa 488, 73 N.W.2d 27, 29, we said: 'Ordinarily, the phrase 'in the course of the employment,' as used in our own and most workmen's compensation statutes, means within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duties and while he is fulfilling those duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto. 58 Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 212; Pace v. Appanoose County, 184 Iowa 498, 503, 504, 168 N.W. 916, 918, citing with evident approval In re Employers' Liability Assur., Corp. (In re McNicol; In re Patterson Wild & Co.), 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697, L.R.A.1916A, 306: "An injury is received 'in the course of' the employment when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform"; and citing also Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N.J.L. 72, (86 A. 458): "the words 'in the course of,' [relate] to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place." We think that a fair statement of the basis of allowing compensation under our statute respecting the phrase in question.'

The material parts of pertinent statutes (1954) Code of Iowa, I.C.A., are set out: '86.29 Record on appeal-findings of fact conclusive. The transcript as certified and filed by the industrial commissioner shall be the record on which the appeal shall be heard, and no additional evidence shall be heard. In the absence of fraud the findings of fact made by the industrial commissioner within his powers shall be conclusive.' '86.30 Decision on appeal. Any order or decision of the industrial commissioner may be modified, reversed, or set aside on one or more of the following grounds and on no other: * * * 3. If the facts found by the commissioner do not support the order or decree. 4. If there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order or decision.'

In determining the correctness of the commissioner's decision we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to claimant. Pohler v. T. W. Snow Const. Co., 239 Iowa 1018, 33 N.W.2d 416; Griffith v. Norwood White Coal Co., 229 Iowa 496, 498, 294 N.W. 741; Bousfield v. Sisters of Mercy, 249 Iowa 64, 86 N.W.2d 109.

We have repeatedly held that where the evidence in a case of this kind is in conflict, the finding of the industrial commissioner upon disputed facts is binding upon us. Lamb v. Standard Oil Co., 250 Iowa 911, 96 N.W.2d 730; Reddick v. Grand Union Tea Co., 230 Iowa 108, 296 N.W. 800. There is no dispute as to the evidence introduced but a dispute arises as to the inferences to be drawn therefrom.

In Bushing v. Iowa Railway and Light Co., 208 Iowa 1010, 226 N.W. 719, 722, we said: 'In cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the burden of proof rests on the claimant to establish that the injury sustained by the employee was one arising out of and in the course of the employment. Sparks v. Consolidated Ind. Coal Co., 195 Iowa 334, 190 N.W. 593; Flint v. City of Eldon, 191 Iowa 845, 183 N.W. 344. This burden is not discharged by creating an equipoise. Griffith v. Cole Bros., 183 Iowa 415, 165 N.W. 577, L.R.A.1918F, 923. The finding of the commissioner must be based on evidence, either direct or circumstantial, and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. It cannot, however, be predicated upon conjecture, speculation, or mere surmise. Sparks v. Coal Co., supra.'

Appellant, in argument, states: 'There is no conflict in the evidence. * * * This Court, appellant submits may review the facts to determine if there is sufficient competent evidence to support the commissioner's findings. On the other hand, this Court by virtue of Davis and Marley (cited cases) may take the uncontroverted facts as established by the record and determine as a question of law (as in Marley) that Volk's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.'

Appellee takes a different view and contends it is a disputed question of fact whether Volk's injury and death arose out of and in the course of his employment and that it may be reviewed by the court only to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the decision of the commissioner.

In Bocian v. Armour & Co., 244 Iowa 304, 308, 56 N.W.2d 900, 903, we said: 'Under the Record here the cause could only be ascertained by inference from the facts shown. That means, not a process of legal reasoning or conclusion, but one by which a fact is sought to be established or deduced as a logical consequence from other facts. 43 C.J.S. Inference page 373 et seq.' Schofield v. White, 250 Iowa 571, 95 N.W.2d 40; Lamb v. Standard Oil Co., supra.

Whether decedent was, at the time of his death, acting within the scope of his employment or was on a frolic of his own is a fact question the determination of which, by the commissioner, is binding upon...