Adesokan v. Town of Bloomfield

• Docket Number: SC 20753
• Decision Date: 01 August 2023
• Parties: MARLINE ADESOKAN ET AL. v. TOWN OF BLOOMFIELD ET AL.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

1

MARLINE ADESOKAN ET AL. v. TOWN OF BLOOMFIELD ET AL.

No. SC 20753

Supreme Court of Connecticut

August 1, 2023

Argued January 13, 2023

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defendants' alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford where the court, Noble, J., granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed. Reversed; further proceedings.

John A. Sodipo, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Dennis M. Durao, with whom was Andrew J. Glass, for the appellees (defendants).

Thomas R. Gerarde filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities as amicus curiae.

Aaron S. Bayer and Nathan Guevremont filed a brief for the Connecticut Defense Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

James J. Healy filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js. ^[*]

OPINION

ROBINSON, C. J.

We now take up the issue, left open by our recent decisions in Daley v. Kashmanian, 344 Conn. 464, 280 A.3d 68 (2022), and Borelli v. Renaldi, 336 Conn. 1,243 A.3d 1064 (2020), of whether the special defense of governmental immunity for discretionary acts; see General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) (B);^[1] bars claims of negligence against drivers operating an "emergency vehicle" pursuant to the privileges provided by the emergency vehicle statute, General Statutes § 14-283.^[2] The plaintiff, Marline Adesokan, individually and on behalf of her two minor children, appeals^[3] from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendants, the town of Bloomfield (town), the Bloomfield Police Department, and one of its police officers, Jonathan W. Sykes. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, in part because the court misapplied Borelli in determining that Sykes' "duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons and property" in accordance with § 14-283 (d) was discretionary in nature for purposes of governmental immunity under § 52-557n (a) (2) (B). We conclude that the defense of discretionary act immunity provided by § 52-557n (a) (2) (B) does not apply to claims arising from the manner in which an emergency vehicle is operated under the privileges provided by § 14-283. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. On August 10, 2017, Sykes responded to a dispatch call for a possible abduction in progress and headed southbound on Tunxis Avenue in Bloomfield, with his police cruiser's emergency lights and siren activated. The plaintiff also was traveling southbound on Tunxis Avenue, heading to daycare and summer camp, but was positioned several cars ahead of Sykes as he approached from behind. As Sykes approached in his cruiser, the three cars directly behind the plaintiffs vehicle yielded to the right. At the intersection of Tunxis Avenue and Mills Lane, where there was nearby road construction, Sykes attempted to pass the plaintiffs vehicle on the left side in the northbound lane. Traveling at 71.8 miles per hour on a roadway with posted speed limits of 30 and 40 miles per hour, Sykes' cruiser collided with the driver's side of the plaintiff's vehicle when the plaintiff made a left turn at the same time Sykes attempted to pass her in the northbound lane. The plaintiff and her children sustained personal injuries as a result of the collision.

The plaintiff brought this action against the defendants, claiming negligence, negligent supervision, and respondeat superior. The defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment, claiming that discretionary act immunity under § 52-557n (a) (2) (B) barred the plaintiffs claims. Relying on this court's interpretation of the phrase "due regard," as contained in § 14-283 (d), in Borelli v. Renaldi, supra, 336 Conn. 14-15, the trial court concluded that, "because no ordinance, regulation, rule, policy, or any other directive compelled Sykes in a prescribed manner, the operation of his police cruiser . . . constituted a governmentally immune discretionary act." The court, therefore, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment accordingly. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff principally claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that discretionary act immunity barred her claims. The plaintiff argues that § 14-283 (d) imposes a ministerial rather than a discretionary duty on emergency vehicle operators "to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons and property." Relying on Daley v. Kashmanian, supra, 344 Conn. 464, the plaintiff further contends that our trial courts uniformly have concluded that the operation of an emergency vehicle, at least in a manner beyond the privileges provided by § 14-283 (b) (1), is a ministerial function, and she urges us to conclude the same for emergency operation within the privileges provided by that statute. The plaintiff argues that our decision in Borelli v. Renaldi, supra, 336 Conn. 1, is distinguishable because the present case concerns only the manner in which Sykes operated his emergency vehicle, whereas Borelli concerned a police officer's decision to engage in pursuit. The plaintiff also relies on public policy and argues that our more recent decision in Daley recognized that conferring blanket immunity on the operation of an emergency vehicle would lead to unworkable results and essentially give municipal police officers "a blank check, without repayment, to act unreasonably without regard to the safety of the public."

The defendants argue in response that the driving maneuvers taken by a municipal employee who operates an emergency vehicle, so long as he or she is authorized by § 14-283, are discretionary, judgment based decisions to which governmental immunity applies. They view the privileges provided by § 14-283 (b) as vesting the emergency operator with discretion, and the limiting language in subsection (d) as demonstrating only that reckless conduct is not permitted in the operator's exercise of the privileges provided by subsection (b). The defendants argue that it would illog-ically contravene fundamental tenets of statutory interpretation to conclude that the "due regard" language of § 14-283 (d), as interpreted in Borelli, affords discretion to a police officer in deciding whether to engage in a pursuit, but also imposes a ministerial duty with respect to the operation of the vehicle "when answering an emergency call." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Furthermore, they maintain that, because the defense of discretionary act immunity is subject to three exceptions,^[4] including the identifiable person, imminent harm exception, the plaintiffs "blank check" argument has no merit. We, however, disagree with the defendants and conclude that the defense of discretionary act immunity provided by § 52-557n (a) (2) (B) does not apply as a matter of law to claims arising from the manner in which an emergency vehicle is operated under the privileges provided by § 14-283.^[5]

As a preliminary matter, although § 52-557n (a) (1) was the subject of an amendment in 2023; see Public Acts 2023, No. 23-83, § 1 (P.A. 23-83);^[6] the legislature did not expressly provide that P.A. 23-83 should apply retroactively, and we presume that statutory amendments affecting substantive rights apply prospectively. See, e.g., Maghfour v. Waterbury, 340 Conn. 41, 47-49, 262 A.3d 692 (2021); see also General Statutes § 55-3. Accordingly, we refer to the operative version of § 52-557n (a) (1), which does not expressly limit governmental immunity for emergency operators, for purposes of this appeal.

We begin by setting forth the standard of review and background legal principles. It is well established that whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on governmental immunity grounds is a question of law over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Daley v. Kashmanian, supra, 344 Conn. 478 ("the ultimate determination as to whether the defendants are entitled to governmental immunity is a question of law" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ventura v. East Haven, 330 Conn. 613, 634, 199 A.3d 1 (2019) (issue of governmental immunity is question of existence of duty of care). To the extent this appeal requires us to consider whether the legislature contemplated that municipalities would be immune from liability under § 52-557n (a) (2) (B) for negligence in the operation of an emergency vehicle pursuant to the privileges provided by § 14-283, that inquiry presents a question of statutory interpretation governed by well established principles under General Statutes § l-2z.^[7] See, e.g., Daley v. Kashmanian, supra, 478.

"The [common-law] doctrines that determine the tort liability of municipal employees are well established. . . . Generally, a municipal employee is liable for the misperformance of ministerial acts, but has a qualified immunity in the performance of governmental acts. . . . Governmental acts are performed wholly for the direct benefit of the public and are supervisory or discretionary in nature. . . . The hallmark of a discretionary act is that it requires the exercise of judgment. . . . In contrast, [a ministerial act] refers to a duty [that] is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion. . . .

"Municipal officials are immunized from liability for negligence arising out of their discretionary acts in part because of the danger that a more expansive exposure to liability would cramp the exercise...