Von Neumann v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 05 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-3761,79-3761
• Citation: 660 F.2d 1319
• Parties: John VON NEUMANN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America; Secretary of the Treasury; Commissioner of Customs; and District Director of Customs for the Port of Seattle, District 30.01, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1319

660 F.2d 1319

John VON NEUMANN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America; Secretary of the Treasury;

Commissioner of Customs; and District Director of

Customs for the Port of Seattle,

District 30.01, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 79-3761.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 3, 1981.

Decided Nov. 2, 1981.

As Corrected Nov. 5, 1981.

Richard V. Sandler, Sandler & Rosen, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

Stephen D. Petersen, Howard D. Gest, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., argued, for defendants-appellees; Andrea Sheridan Ordin, U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., on brief.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before TANG and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges, and PRICE, ^* District Judge.

BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judge.

This appeal presents the issue of whether the procedures followed by the United States Bureau of Customs (Customs) in processing an administrative petition for remission or mitigation of the forfeiture of an automobile seized at the border for failure of the owner to make the required declaration, were consistent with due process. John von Neumann's foreign-bought car was seized by Customs officials at the Canadian-United States border after he failed to declare the car upon entering the United States. On the day of the seizure, von Neumann filed an administrative claim for remission or mitigation, and later recovered the car after posting a bond as security. Over a month after the petition was filed, Customs remitted $20,900 to von Neumann, but retained $3,600 as a penalty.

Von Neumann filed a complaint in district court, challenging the penalty and the procedures used to assess it. The district court found that von Neumann violated 19 U.S.C. § 1497 by failing to declare the car and thus the seizure was proper. Additionally, the court found that the remission procedure was proper. We agree that seizure was proper under section 1497, but

find fatal due process violations in the remission procedure.

FACTS

In 1974, von Neumann purchased a 1974 Jaguar Panther automobile in Switzerland and shipped it to Vancouver, Canada. Prior to shipment, von Neumann registered the car in California and obtained California license plates. On January 20, 1975, von Neumann picked up the car in Vancouver and obtained a release from Canadian Customs to take possession. Canadian Customs officials gave von Neumann form A8A, which authorized transportation of the car to the border, and instructed him to deliver the form to the Canadian Customs border station before leaving the country.

Von Neumann and a friend arrived at the United States border checkpoint at Blaine, Washington at 5:00 p. m. on January 20. The Blaine checkpoint is across the highway and slightly south of the Canadian border station. The highway approaching the Blaine Station is a multi-lane highway with several turnoffs for the Canadian Customs building. Von Neumann testified that he inadvertently passed the Canadian station because of poor visibility and inadequate directions. For whatever reasons, von Neumann arrived at the Blaine checkpoint without having delivered form A8A to Canadian Customs.

At the Blaine checkpoint, von Neumann and his passenger were briefly questioned by United States Immigration Officer Perkins. ¹ Canadian Customs officials had earlier alerted United States Customs that von Neumann's car would be crossing the border, and Perkins matched the description to the car before questioning the occupants. Perkins asked questions relating to citizenship, and specifically asked von Neumann whether he had anything to declare. When von Neumann failed to declare the automobile, Perkins asked him into the checkpoint station and referred the case to Customs Inspector Morrison. Upon being asked why he had not declared the car, von Neumann explained that he did not think he was required to declare it. Morrison then seized the vehicle pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1497. ²

Immediately after the car was seized, von Neumann prepared a "Petition for Remission or Mitigation of Forfeiture and Penalties Incurred," see 19 U.S.C. § 1618, ³ explaining that he had intended to deliver the Canadian Customs papers to Canadian Customs but had mistakenly arrived at United States Customs instead. After filing the petition, von Neumann arranged for other transportation into the United States, and left his car with Customs.

On February 3, 1975, von Neumann posted a bond for $24,500, the value of his car Having exhausted his administrative remedies, von Neumann filed a complaint in district court on October 14, 1975, seeking: (a) return of the $3,600; (b) injunctive relief to prevent Customs from placing his name on a computer list of violators; (c) a declaration that the seizure and penalty were unlawful. ⁶ The district court found that von Neumann violated 19 U.S.C. § 1497, and therefore seizure of the car was proper. The court also found that the remission and mitigation procedures were proper, and entered judgment for the government. Von Neumann appeals, challenging the imposition of the penalty as well as the procedures followed by Customs.

                and Customs returned the vehicle.  4  On February 25, 1975, the Seattle Director of the Bureau of Customs 5 informed von Neumann that the penalty for failing to declare the car was being reduced to $3,600, and therefore $20,900 would be refunded.  Von Neumann requested administrative review of this determination, and on April 14, 1975, the Regional Commissioner of Customs in San Francisco upheld the $3,600 penalty assessment
                

DISCUSSION

I. Violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1497

Von Neumann contends that the district court erred in finding that he violated section 1497, because he was never given an adequate opportunity to declare the car. The district court's determination that von Neumann was given an adequate opportunity to declare and yet failed to declare his car is a factual one, which we will not overturn unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Wagner, 434 F.2d 627, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1970). See Vesey v. United States, 626 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1980). The record fully supports the district court's conclusion that von Neumann attempted to introduce his car into United States commerce without declaring it, despite an opportunity to do so.

Officer Perkins testified that he asked von Neumann if he had purchased or acquired anything outside of the United States that he was bringing back into the country, ⁷ and then asked if he had anything to declare. Von Neumann thus had two opportunities to declare the car, yet failed to do so. ⁸ It is irrelevant whether von Neumann was looking for the Canadian Customs building and did not intend to enter the United States without declaring the car. As the Supreme Court has held,

"(t)o succeed in a forfeiture action under § 1497 ... the Government need only One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234, 93 S.Ct. 489, 491, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972). In demonstrating that von Neumann failed to declare the car, Customs has shown that the car was subject to forfeiture and that its owner is "liable to a penalty equal to the value of such article (the undeclared car)." 19 U.S.C. § 1497.

prove that the property was brought into the United States without the required declaration; the Government bears no burden with respect to intent."

Von Neumann argues that because Customs regulations required a written declaration for articles exceeding $25 in value, his oral statement failing to declare the car did not constitute a violation of section 1497. 19 C.F.R. § 148.12(b)(2) (1980). This argument is without merit. Perkins was not under any obligation to request a written declaration until von Neumann had orally declared the car, nor did von Neumann ever attempt to submit a written declaration.

Von Neumann's final argument is that he was entitled to amend his declaration up until the time his baggage was searched. Although an amendment is proper under Customs regulations, the undeclared item must be "brought to the attention of the examining officer by the passenger." 19 C.F.R. § 148.16(a) (1980). Von Neumann failed to do this. Moreover, Customs was not required to search his baggage. The statute states that customs officers "may cause an examination to be made of the baggage ...." 19 U.S.C. § 1496 (emphasis added). Section 1496 does not provide protection from seizure up until the time a formal baggage search is conducted. The "search" took place when Officer Perkins observed the car and matched it to the description provided by Canadian Customs.

The district court's finding that von Neumann failed to declare his car, after an adequate opportunity to do so, is not clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the district court determinations that von Neumann violated section 1497 and that seizure of the vehicle was proper. ⁹

II. Due Process Challenge to the Administrative Procedure under 19 U.S.C. § 1618

A. Petition for Remission or Mitigation

Under 19 U.S.C. § 1618, a person whose property is seized and subject to forfeiture may file an administrative petition for remission or mitigation of the penalty. See note 3, supra. In cases where the forfeiture value does not exceed $25,000, the district director may remit or mitigate the penalty "under the law and in view of the circumstances, (as) he shall deem appropriate ...." 19 C.F.R. § 171.21 (1980). The administrative remission process is independent of a judicial action for forfeiture, which must be initiated promptly. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-04; Seguin v. Eide, 645 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. One 1970 Ford Pickup, 564 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 1977). In this case, judicial forfeiture proceedings were never initiated; we are only concerned with the propriety of the administrative procedures followed by Customs.

The substantive disposition of remission petitions is committed to the Customs Bureau's discretion, and we...