Von Schack v. Von Schack
| Decision Date | 30 March 2006 |
| Citation | 2006 ME 30,893 A.2d 1004 |
| Parties | Wesley W. VON SCHACK v. Mary Mulhearn VON SCHACK. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Michael P. Asen (orally), Mittel Asen, L.L.C., Portland, for plaintiff.
Elizabeth J. Scheffee (orally), Givertz, Hambley, Scheffee & Lavoie, P.A., Portland, for defendant.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, LEVY, and SILVER, JJ.
[¶ 1] Mary Mulhearn Von Schack appeals from a divorce judgment entered in the District Court (West Bath, Field, J.). She raises a single question: When considering a complaint for divorce in which only the plaintiff is a Maine resident, does the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, require a Maine court to have personal jurisdiction over the defendant in order to render a divorce judgment that dissolves the parties' marriage without determining the collateral issues of property division, parental rights, or support? We conclude that personal jurisdiction is not required in these limited circumstances, and we affirm the judgment of divorce.
[¶ 2] For purposes of this appeal, the parties do not dispute the following facts. Mary Mulhearn Von Schack and Wesley W. Von Schack were married in New York State in 1976 and have one daughter who was born on November 1, 1991. The parties lived in Pennsylvania and New York when they were a couple. Wesley moved to Maine in May 2004 to take a position as an executive in a corporation with offices in Maine. Mary has no contacts with Maine whatsoever. Wesley was unable to proceed with a divorce complaint in Pennsylvania or New York because he is not a resident and has failed to meet other statutory grounds.1
[¶ 3] Wesley filed a divorce complaint in the Maine District Court on November 5, 2004, after living in Maine for six months. In January 2005, Wesley had the complaint served on Mary personally in New York. Mary moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Maine was not a convenient forum and the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her and lacked in rem jurisdiction over the parties' property.
[¶ 4] The court denied her motion to dismiss. In so doing, the court concluded first, that it could not grant any relief regarding parental rights and responsibilities because Maine was not the home state of the parties' child for purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1731-1742 (2005), and second, that because it lacked personal jurisdiction over Mary, it could not award support or divide property. It reasoned, however, that "the District Court has original jurisdiction over the dissolution of the parties' marriage and can enter an order regarding any real property in Maine." The court divorced the parties and left all property, spousal support, and parental issues to be litigated in a jurisdiction "that might have personal jurisdiction over both the parties and jurisdiction over the minor child." Mary timely appealed from the judgment.
[¶ 5] We begin our analysis with the District Court's conclusion, undisputed by the parties, that Mary "has no contacts with this state whatsoever," and that the court "lack[s] ... personal jurisdiction over [Mary]." If the court erred in concluding that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Mary, it had the authority to enter a divorce judgment. If the court correctly concluded that it lacks personal jurisdiction, however, we must determine whether a court may grant a divorce when one party is not within the reach of the court's personal jurisdiction.
[¶ 6] Although Maine's divorce statute permits a plaintiff to file a complaint for divorce if "[t]he plaintiff has resided in good faith in this State for 6 months prior to the commencement of the action," 19-A M.R.S. § 901(1)(A) (2005), it does not speak to jurisdiction. To determine whether Maine has personal jurisdiction over a defendant, we apply Maine's long arm statute, 14 M.R.S. § 704-A (2005):
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated in this section, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such acts:
. . .
G. Maintaining a domicile in this State while subject to a marital or family relationship out of which arises a claim for divorce, alimony, separate maintenance, property settlement, child support or child custody; or the commission in this State of any act giving rise to such a claim; or
. . .
I. Maintain any other relation to the State or to persons or property which affords a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this State consistent with the Constitution of the United States.
[¶ 7] Pursuant to this long arm statute, the court could have obtained personal jurisdiction over Mary in three possible ways: (1) if she "[m]aintain[ed] a domicile in this State while subject to a marital or family relationship out of which arises a claim for divorce," id. § 704-A(2)(G); (2) if she "commi[tted] in this State ... any act giving rise to such a claim," id.; or (3) if she "[m]aintain[ed] any other relation to the State or to persons or property which affords a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this State consistent with the Constitution of the United States," id. § 704-A(2)(I). See Levy, Maine Family Law § 2.3 (5th ed. 2006).
[¶ 8] The parties agree that Mary never lived in Maine and never committed any acts in Maine related to the divorce. Accordingly, personal jurisdiction could not be asserted pursuant to section 704-A(2)(G). See also Jackson v. Weaver, 678 A.2d 1036, 1039 (Me.1996) ().
[¶ 9] Similarly, section 704-A(2)(I) does not confer personal jurisdiction over Mary. Paragraph I permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction as long as a person has a relationship with the State of Maine, any Maine citizens, or Maine property that would afford a basis for jurisdiction consistent with the United States Constitution. 14 M.R.S. § 704-A(2)(I). Consistency with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that: "'(1) Maine ha[s] a legitimate interest in the subject matter of this litigation; (2) the defendant, by his conduct, reasonably could have anticipated litigation in Maine; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction by Maine's courts comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Jackson, 678 A.2d at 1039 (alteration in original) (quoting Murphy v. Keenan, 667 A.2d 591, 593 (Me.1995)).
[¶ 10] We agree with the trial court that Mary lacks any relation to the State that would permit the court to exercise personal jurisdiction consistent with this test. See id. The unilateral decision of one spouse to move to Maine does not result in the other spouse "[m]aintain[ing] any other relation to ... persons ... which affords a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this State consistent with the Constitution of the United States." 14 M.R.S. § 704-A(2)(I). In such circumstances, the nonresident spouse did not engage in any conduct that would make it reasonable for her to have anticipated litigation in Maine. See Jackson, 678 A.2d at 1039. Accordingly, section 704-A(2)(I) does not confer jurisdiction in the present case.
[¶ 11] Because the court correctly concluded that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Mary, the question raised by Mary's appeal is whether the court could enter a valid judgment of divorce without obtaining personal jurisdiction over her. To answer this question, we begin by reviewing the evolution of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding jurisdiction. In the late nineteenth century, the Court did not require personal jurisdiction for a state to determine the status of its citizen toward a nonresident. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733-35, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877). In Pennoyer, the Court addressed a dispute over the ownership of land allegedly sold to satisfy a debt on a personal judgment. Id. at 720. The Court held that a state's jurisdiction to render judgments in personam required personal service and that service by publication would not suffice. Id. at 733-34. It took pains, however, to limit the scope of its holding and to clarify that the then current state of the law, allowing a state to determine the marital status of its own citizens, did not fall under this requirement. Id. at 734-35. A state possessed the "absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created and the causes for which it may be dissolved." Id.
[¶ 12] Following the reasoning of Pennoyer, the Court later stated, "each state, by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99, 63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942). Such a decree of marital status was entitled to full faith and credit in a sister state. Id. at 303-04, 63 S.Ct. 207. In its second opinion in the Williams case, the Court reiterated that "one State can grant a divorce of validity in other States ... if the applicant has a bona fide domicil in the State of the court purporting to dissolve a prior legal marriage." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577 (1945).
[¶ 13] In 1945, the Supreme Court shifted its approach to jurisdictional...
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