Voorhies v. Town of Hollywood Park
| Docket Number | 04-22-00658-CV |
| Decision Date | 01 November 2023 |
| Parties | Michael R. VOORHIES and Norelle Voorhies, Appellants v. TOWN OF HOLLYWOOD PARK, TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022-CI-02380 Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Beth Watkins Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Appellants Michael R. Voorhies and Norelle Voorhies (collectively, the Voorhies parties) appeal the trial court's order granting appellee Town of Hollywood Park, Texas's plea to the jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court's order.
In 1969, the Hollywood Park Recreation Club, Inc. conveyed a tract of land to the Town. The deed conveying the land required the Town to name the property "the E.E. Voigt Park" and use it for "recreational purposes only[.]" The Town contends-and the Voorhies parties do not dispute-that the land now known as Voigt Park includes a "swimming pool, tennis courts, and other park facilities." In May of 2017, the Town opened a publicly financed facility called the Voigt Center in Voigt Park. In September of the same year, the Voorhies parties purchased a home near the Voigt Center.
In 2022, the Voorhies parties sued the Town, alleging it did not use the Voigt Center for "recreational purposes only" because it generated revenue by leasing the facility to private individuals for weddings, parties, and other events. The Voorhies parties further alleged that noise caused by these events and the Town's maintenance of the Voigt Center constituted a nuisance that diminished their property value and "resulted in [the Voorhies parties] being constantly disturbed in their home." They sought monetary damages, a declaration that the Town had violated its noise ordinances and the "recreational purposes only" deed restriction, and temporary and permanent injunctive relief. The Voorhies parties argued the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over their claims because the Town's operation of the Voigt Center was a proprietary function.
The Town filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing the Voorhies parties did not allege a valid waiver of governmental immunity. Specifically, the Town argued: (1) its operation of the Voigt Center fell within the statutorily defined governmental functions of operating a park, civic or community center, or recreational facility; and (2) its challenged actions did not constitute a cognizable taking of the Voorhies parties' property. The Town also argued the Voorhies parties did not establish they were "persons interested" under the deed who were entitled to seek a declaration of that instrument. Finally, the Town argued the Voorhies parties lacked standing because they did not present evidence that they owned property near the Voigt Center.
During the hearing on the Town's plea to the jurisdiction, the Town acknowledged that the Voorhies parties owned residential property near the Voigt Center, and it abandoned the standing argument it had asserted based on that ownership issue. The Town did not abandon any of its other arguments. The trial court subsequently signed an order granting the Town's plea and dismissing the Voorhies parties' claims with prejudice. The Voorhies parties timely filed this appeal.
We review a trial court's order on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. San Antonio Water Sys. v. Smith, 451 S.W.3d 442, 445 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014, no pet.). "When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause." Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). We liberally construe the pleadings in favor of the pleader. Id. If the pleaded facts do not affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction but also do not affirmatively negate jurisdiction, we remand to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. Id. at 226-27. However, "[i]f the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend." Id. at 227.
Where the jurisdictional issue implicates the merits of the parties' claims, "we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties to determine if a fact issue exists." Suarez v. City of Tex. City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 632-33 (Tex. 2015). "We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable inference, and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor." Id. at 633. If the evidence is undisputed or does not raise a fact question, the trial court rules on the plea as a matter of law. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Just. v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. 2020). However, if the evidence raises a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, "then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder." Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28. In reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction, "[o]ur ultimate inquiry is whether the particular facts presented affirmatively demonstrate a claim within the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction." City of San Antonio by & Through City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio v. Smith, 562 S.W.3d 75, 79 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2018, pet. denied).
In their first issue, the Voorhies parties argue the trial court erred by granting the Town's plea to the jurisdiction because the Town's operation of the Voigt Center was a proprietary function.
A municipality is a governmental entity that "is generally immune from suit and liability for torts arising from the exercise of its governmental functions, except for the limited waiver provided by the Texas Tort Claims Act." Tex. Bay Cherry Hill, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 257 S.W.3d 379, 388-89 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). However, "[a] municipality is liable for torts arising from the exercise of its proprietary functions[.]" Id. at 389.
Acting under authority granted by the Texas Constitution, "the Legislature has defined and enumerated governmental and proprietary functions for the purposes of determining whether immunity applies to tort claims against a municipality." Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 559 S.W.3d 142, 147 (Tex. 2018) (Wasson II); see also Tex. Const. art. XI, § 13(a) (). A municipality's operation of parks, civic centers, community centers, and recreational facilities falls within the legislature's list of governmental functions. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.0215(a)(13), (16), (17), (23). Section 101.0215(a) does not define "park," "civic center," "community center," or "recreational facility." See id. We may therefore consider dictionary definitions to discern their common meaning. Sunstate Equip. Co., LLC v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d 685, 697-98 (Tex. 2020).
"The proprietary functions of a municipality do not include those governmental activities listed under" section 101.0215(a). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.0215(c). "If a function is included in the nonexclusive list of governmental functions, it has been deemed governmental in nature by the legislature and we have no discretion or authority to hold otherwise." Rogers v. City of Houston, 627 S.W.3d 777, 795 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.).[1]
In its plea to the jurisdiction, the Town argued it operates the Voigt Center as a park, civic or community center, or recreational facility. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.0215(a)(13), (16), (17), (23). When a governmental entity asserts a jurisdictional fact that implicates the merits of the action, it must support that assertion with evidence that "meet[s] the summary-judgment standard of proof." See City of Lake Jackson v. Adaway, No. 01-22-00033-CV, 2023 WL 3588383, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 23, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228). Proper summary judgment proof may include "the pleadings, admissions . . . [and] stipulations of the parties" if those matters show "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[.]" Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); see also Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
In their live petition, the Voorhies parties alleged the Town built the Voigt Center with funds "bonded . . . from San Antonio to upgrade park facilities[.]" They further alleged that the Voigt Center is located on municipally owned park land dedicated to public use; that the facility is used "for parties, music and weddings, etc."; and that the Town's grounds crews maintained the facility. These factual allegations support a conclusion that the Voigt Center is "a place where people from a particular community can meet for social, educational, or recreational activities" or "a municipal building or building complex, often publicly financed, with space for conventions, sports events, and theatrical entertainment." See Community Center, New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010); Civic Center, New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed. 2010). Additionally, during the hearing on the Town's plea to the jurisdiction, the Voorhies parties described the Voigt Center as "a park and recreation center" and "the Voigt Community Center." Finally, the Voorhies parties' brief explicitly states that the Town has designated the Voigt Center for "recreational use . . . during the daytime hours." We conclude these...
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