Vos v. Albany Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 16 March 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 29459.,29459. |
| Citation | 253 N.W. 549,191 Minn. 197 |
| Parties | VOS v. ALBANY MUT. FIRE INS. CO. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Stearns County; John A. Roeser, Judge.
Action by George Vos against the Albany Mutual Fire Insurance Company. From an order denying its alternative motion for judgment or for a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed, with directions.
R. B. Brower and J. B. Himsl, both of St. Cloud, for appellant.
Henry H. Sullivan, of St. Cloud, for respondent.
Action upon a fire insurance policy issued by defendant, Albany Mutual Fire Insurance Company, to plaintiff, George Vos. Defendant is a township mutual fire insurance company, organized in 1895 and doing business in townships in Stearns county. Its authority is limited, in the main, to the insurance of farm buildings and farm property used for farming purposes as specifically enumerated in 1 Mason, Minn. St. 1927, § 3659, as amended Laws 1933, chaps. 52, 421. The policy covered certain farm buildings, including a barn and the personal property such as hay, machinery, cattle, etc., contained therein. The barn and personalty were destroyed by fire, and plaintiff now seeks indemnity under the policy. Defendant contests liability on the ground that there was an illicit still in the barn illegally used in the manufacture of liquor, which fact was not disclosed in plaintiff's written application for insurance and was at all times unknown to the defendant company. Plaintiff admits that a still was maintained and actively operated in the barn and that such fact was not disclosed in his application. He contends, however, that defendant, through its agents, knew at the time of the issuance of the policy that the barn contained such a still, and that since defendant had such knowledge, it cannot now assert this fact as a defense. The case was submitted to a jury, who found for plaintiff in the sum of $4,050 under instructions such that they could only so find if they believed that defendant knew when issuing the policy that the barn contained an illegal still. From an order denying its alternative motion for judgment or for a new trial, defendant appeals.
The jury's finding in accordance with the evidence produced by plaintiff that defendant company knew of the existence of the still at the time that it issued the policy is amply supported by the evidence. In fact, there was evidence which, if believed, would show that the president of defendant company had such knowledge. In legal effect, the result is the same therefore as though there had been incorporated in this policy at the time of its issuance a provision that defendant company would insure this barn even though and despite the fact that it housed an actively operated illicit still.
In so far as the company agreed to indemnify plaintiff for loss of the barn and its contents occasioned by fire under this policy as changed by the act of defendant's agents in waiving the provision of the policy respecting the increase in hazard by the installation of an illicit still, we think the policy is pro tanto void as violative of public policy. There can be no question but that defendant could not have insured the illegal still and its component parts as such, knowing that the plaintiff intended using the same to manufacture illicit liquor. Plaintiff does not contest this rule and in fact makes no attempt to recover for the value of the still itself. The law will not permit a person to insure property illegally used and thus to indemnify himself in the event of its loss or confiscation. To do so would be to encourage and further criminals in their illegal actions and transactions. Such a furthering manifestly would contravene public policy.
We approach the case at bar bearing in mind this rule that the law will not in any way further the doing of an illegal act by allowing its perpetrator to be indemnified or made whole from any of the consequences which might or are apt to follow therefrom. Here recovery is sought for the loss of the barn which housed the illegal still. This is but one step removed from an attempt to recover for the loss of, or damage to, the still itself. Plaintiff must have known when operating the still that he was increasing the fire hazard to his barn. The gasoline stove; the lack of a chimney for such stove; the highly inflammable character of the illegal beverage which he was distilling — all are factors which plaintiff knew, or should have known, increased greatly the danger of destruction of the barn by fire. Since plaintiff was aware of the fact that by engaging in this illegal business he was increasing the hazard of fire, the law will not permit him to indemnify himself against any loss which might be caused by the illegal operation of this still. Plaintiff was, by obtaining insurance, seeking to indemnify himself against one of the consequences which might follow his prosecution of this illegal act. This he cannot do. If this court were to allow him so to do, it would to that extent foster and encourage the illicit purpose of the act. The average person, cognizant of the increased fire hazard, is much more apt to erect and operate a still in his barn if he can insure the building housing the same than he is if he cannot.
We are aware of the fact that the question here presented is a new one in this state. So far as we can find, there is no case anywhere on all fours with the one at bar. The fact that this case blazes a new trail should not, we believe, deter us. In the forepart of the case of Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258, 261, 6 L. Ed. 468, appears the following statement which we think correctly states the law in the abstract: Of somewhat more specific application to the case at bar is a quotation from 5 Couch, Cyc. of Ins. Law, § 1114, p. 3927, as follows: ...
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