Voss v. Goode

• Decision Date: 24 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-20167,19-20167
• Citation: 954 F.3d 234
• Parties: Monica VOSS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Gregory G. GOODE; Fort Bend County, Texas, Defendants-Appellees
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

954 F.3d 234

Monica VOSS, Plaintiff-Appellant

v.Gregory G. GOODE; Fort Bend County, Texas, Defendants-Appellees

No. 19-20167

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED March 24, 2020

Randall Lee Kallinen, Esq., Law Office of Randall L. Kallinen, P.L.L.C., Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Justin Carl Pfeiffer, County Attorney's Office for the County of Fort Bend, Richmond, TX, Salvatore Philip LoPiccolo, II, Assistant County Attorney, County Attorney's Office for the County of Fort Bend, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before CLEMENT, HIGGINSON, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Monica Voss appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her claim of false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Gregory Goode, a deputy of the Fort Bend County Sheriff’s Office. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I.

Slightly before midnight on June 20, 2016, Goode responded to a welfare check from Texas Child Protective Services (CPS) at Voss’s house. Voss’s fourteen-year-old daughter K.V. had allegedly reported suicidal thoughts to an adult friend. Deputy Philip McGuigan was also dispatched to Voss’s house as backup.

Goode approached Voss’s house, knocked on her front door, and announced himself. Voss, a retired detective, answered the door and identified herself as Monica. Goode explained that he was there at the request of CPS to perform a welfare check on K.V. because of a report that K.V. was contemplating suicide. Voss called K.V. downstairs to speak with Goode and woke her husband, who also came down. K.V. denied being depressed or suicidal. Voss’s husband went to bed. Goode then interviewed K.V. outside, away from her parents, at Voss’s suggestion and with her consent. During this interview, K.V. confirmed to Goode that she had reported suicidal ideation. She also told Goode that she was in a mental health crisis, was depressed and wanted to "end her misery," and that her parents had acted abusively toward her. She stated that Voss had previously thrown hard or sharp objects at her, including a telephone and a pair of scissors. K.V. said that she was afraid of Voss because Voss acted like she was going to throw something at her, and because Voss had access to guns under her bed. K.V. did not have any visible injuries, but she reported that her home environment led her to thoughts of drowning herself in the family’s pool or hanging herself. Goode determined that further investigation was warranted based on K.V.’s statements.

Voss came outside after 20 to 30 minutes. Goode told Voss that he needed to contact Texana Crisis Center to request an assessment by a mental health professional and that K.V. would wait in his squad car until the counselor arrived. Voss protested and demanded that she take K.V. to the hospital herself instead. Voss told K.V. to get in her car rather than the patrol car. She threatened to lock K.V. out of the house if Goode put her in the squad car. At this point, Goode explained to Voss that he had placed K.V. under his protective custody and that Voss could not leave the scene with K.V. in her car. Goode also warned Voss that she was getting close to being arrested for interfering with his investigation. Voss’s declaration states that she went inside for a few minutes "to sort the confusing situation out." When she came out a few minutes later, Goode ordered Voss to provide identifying information.

Voss told Goode that she did not have an ID on her person and that it was in the house. Voss refused to go in the house and retrieve it.

Goode then arrested Voss. The reason Goode gave for the arrest at the time was "failure to identify to a police officer." McGuigan placed Voss in Goode’s patrol car. After a short period of time in the parked car, Voss asked to get out, which Goode permitted her to do. Goode then agreed to remove her handcuffs. Voss asked Goode to call his supervisor. Sergeant Jerome Ellis arrived and allegedly told Voss that the events leading to her arrest had been "a big misunderstanding that had gotten out of hand." Shortly thereafter, a Texana counselor arrived and conducted an evaluation of K.V. K.V. was released into her mother’s custody. The state did not press charges against Voss.

Voss filed a complaint in the Southern District of Texas on May 6, 2017. Voss asserted claims against Goode under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for allegedly detaining and arresting her without probable cause. She also asserted a municipal-liability claim against Fort Bend County, alleging that the County was the moving force behind Goode’s unconstitutional actions. The district court dismissed all claims against the County and all of Voss’s claims against Goode—except for the Fourth Amendment false arrest claim—for failure to state a claim. On April 17, 2018, Goode filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on the last remaining claim. On February 20, 2019, the district court granted the motion and entered judgment against Voss. Voss timely appealed.

II.

We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court. Hyatt v. Thomas , 843 F.3d 172, 176–77 (5th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A genuine dispute of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Romero v. City of Grapevine , 888 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). To decide if the non-movant has raised a genuine dispute of material fact, we view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to her and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Hanks v. Rogers , 853 F.3d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Griggs v. Brewer , 841 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2016) ). "Summary judgment must be affirmed if it is sustainable on any legal ground in the record, and it may be affirmed on grounds rejected or not stated by the district court." S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA , 315 F.3d 533, 537–38 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

III.

Voss makes two arguments on appeal as to why Goode is not entitled to qualified immunity.¹ First, she asserts that Goode cannot prevail on the theory that he had probable cause to arrest her for interfering with his investigation when he told her at the time that she was being arrested for failure to identify. Second, she argues that, even if Goode can use a new crime to justify her arrest, he did not have probable cause to arrest her for any crime.

"The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Mullenix v. Luna , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ). "A good-faith assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense is not available." Melton v. Phillips , 875 F.3d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting King v. Handorf , 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016) ). A plaintiff must make a two-part showing to overcome a qualified immunity defense. First, a plaintiff must show that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right; second, she must show that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. Id. The order in which to address the two prongs rests in the reviewing court’s discretion. Pearson , 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808.

Voss argues that, because Goode originally told her that she was being arrested for failure to identify, he is not entitled to qualified immunity if it was clearly established at the time of her arrest that no probable cause existed for that particular offense . A person commits failure to identify if he or she "intentionally refuses to give his [or her] name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the information." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(a). Goode concedes that he did not have probable cause to arrest Voss for failure to identify, because the offense applies only to someone who has already been "lawfully arrested" for another crime. Id. Goode instead seeks to show that he had probable cause to arrest Voss for a different crime: interference with public duties. See id . § 38.15(a)(1).

Despite Voss’s assertions to the contrary, Goode may justify the arrest by showing probable cause for any crime. See Devenpeck v. Alford , 543 U.S. 146, 153, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004) (holding that because "an arresting officer’s state of mind ... is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause," there is "no basis in precedent or reason" to require an officer to justify an arrest with reasons given at the scene); see also Sam v. Richard , 887 F.3d 710, 715–16 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that justifying an arrest by pointing to probable cause for the misdemeanor of crossing an interstate highway was permissible even if it was "only an after-the-fact justification for the arrest"). Goode is therefore entitled to qualified immunity unless it was clearly established that no probable cause existed to arrest Voss for interference with public duties or any other crime at the time of arrest. Probable cause exists when an officer is aware of "reasonably trustworthy facts which, given the totality of the circumstances, are sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe" that a crime has been or will be committed. Kohler v. Englade , 470 F.3d 1104, 1109 (5th Cir. 2006).

Voss’s second argument is that Goode is not...