Vrabel v. Vrabel

• Decision Date: 24 March 1983
• Parties: , 9 O.B.R. 477 VRABEL, Appellant, v. VRABEL, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 263

9 Ohio App.3d 263

459 N.E.2d 1298, 9 O.B.R. 477

VRABEL, Appellant, v. VRABEL, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

March 24, 1983.

Syllabus by the Court

1. R.C. 2305.29, barring remedies for amatory causes of action, is a constitutional exercise of the state police power. It violates neither Sections 2 and 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution nor the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2. R.C. 2305.29 is a bar to liability in contract or tort where the claim is, in its essence, based upon a promise of marriage or upon an obligation dependent upon, or growing out of, a contract of marriage.

3. Dismissal of a complaint under Civ.R. 52 without explanation does not violate the due process and due course of law provisions of the federal and state Constitutions.

Sanford J. Berger and Robert M. Fertel, Cleveland, for appellant.

Hyman, Hyman & Carlson and Frank S. Carlson, Elyria, for appellee.

DAY, Presiding Judge.

This is a suit founded on theories of contract and tort. It stems from conditions which developed following the parties' divorce. The complaint of the plaintiff-appellant ex-wife, Lana Vrabel (plaintiff), was dismissed by the trial court on motion. In issue is the constitutionality of Ohio's "heart balm" statute.

The judgment is affirmed.

I

The parties were divorced in January 1979. Later that year, the plaintiff moved with her four children to Maumee, Ohio. Her ex-husband, defendant-appellee, William Vrabel (defendant), continued living in the Cleveland area. The plaintiff purchased real estate and a new home and found employment at $290 per week.

Although divorced, the parties continued to see each other on a casual basis. Then, the plaintiff alleged:

"[D]uring December, 1980, and January, 1981, the defendant commenced an intensive campaign by telephone, letter and visitation to persuade the plaintiff to move, with her children, from the Maumee area to the Cleveland area so that they could be re-united in a reconciliated relationship."

She asserted that these "inducing representations" were false:

"[They were] * * * made with the intent of motivating the plaintiff to return to the Cleveland area to her detriment, embarrassment and expense, as the actions of the defendant were actuated in fraud and deceit, were wantonly conceived, and mendaciously calculated to exact revenge upon the plaintiff for divorcing him, and to derive the self-satisfaction of knowing he could have her back."

Believing her ex-husband, the plaintiff left her job and returned to Cleveland with her children in January 1981. After five months, on July 2, 1981, the defendant "married another."

Count One of the complaint sounded in tort. Plaintiff claimed $25,000 in damages caused by the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation of his intent to marry. Count Two incorporated the facts alleged in the first count and sought recovery also of $25,000 on a contract theory.

The latter count was based on the parties' separation agreement which contained this provision:

"Husband and Wife shall hereafter live separately and apart from the other and each shall go his or her own way without direction, control or molestation from the other the same as though unmarried, and each further agrees not to annoy or interfere with the other in any manner whatsoever."

The plaintiff alleged that the same facts which made out her first cause of action also constituted "molestation" and breach of this contractual provision.

No answer was filed. Rather, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the second count.

On October 6, 1981, the motion to dismiss was granted with prejudice. By timely notice, this appeal was then brought.

The plaintiff assigns three errors:

Assignment of Error No. I

"Ohio Revised Code Sec. 2305.29, which abolished three common law causes of action, is unconstitutional and void as being violative of Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, in that it denies equal protection and benefit of the law to the people of this state by its grant of a special privilege and immunity to a class committing breach of contract, fraud, and moral interference and injury to the sanctity of marital and familial relationships; is violative of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, in that it closes the courts and denies a remedy by due course of law to some, but not all, of the people of this state, who have been injured in their land, goods, person, or reputation; and is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it denies due process of law and the equal protection of the laws to the people of this state."

Assignment of Error No. II

"Ohio Revised Code Sec. 2305.29, which abolished certain common law causes of action for civil damages, did not by implication abolish any other civil actions not specifically set forth therein; and to so expand the specific words of the statute would be violative of the 'due course of law' provision of Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, prohibiting the taking of property without due course of law, and the 'Due Process' Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."

Assignment of Error No. III

"A 'chose in action' is a valuable property right, which may not be taken from a citizen without due course of law, and the fourth paragraph of Civ.R. 52, which permits such a taking without explanation or justification, is unconstitutional as being violative of Sections 1, 11 and 16 [, Article I ] of the Ohio Constitution, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."

For reasons adduced below, none of the assignments of error is well-taken. ¹

II

A

The question raised by the first assignment of error is, broadly, whether the Ohio "heart balm" statute, R.C. 2305.29, denies due process and/or equal protection under the United States Constitution and due course of law and equal protection ² under the Ohio Constitution by abolishing specified common-law causes of action. This, it is claimed, effectually extends a special immunity to a class of fraudulent persons allowing them to breach contracts, commit fraud, and inflict injury without recourse by the injured. The first concern is whether the abolition of amatory actions blocks the claims raised here.

The statute provides:

"No person shall be liable in civil damages for any breach of a promise to marry, alienation of affections, or criminal conversation, and no person shall be liable in civil damages for seduction of any person eighteen years of age or older who is not incompetent, as defined in section 2111.01 of the Revised Code."

To avoid the effect of R.C. 2305.29, the plaintiff claims there was no offer of marriage involved--only one of a "reconciled relationship." But the complaint must be read as a whole. Kennard v. Palmer (1944), 143 Ohio St. 1, 6, 53 N.E.2d 908 . The precipitating event giving rise to the action here was the defendant's marriage to another woman. If, in fact, "reconciliation" meant only friendship, the defendant's marriage did not cause any injury to the plaintiff. Thus, arguably the plaintiff's complaint can establish injury only if the representations made were promises of marriage.

In its lowest terms then, the dispute under the plaintiff's first count is whether the abolition of civil liability for a breach of promise to marry bars redress in an action for fraud where it is a promise to marry that is alleged to be fraudulent. This is a question of first impression in this state.

Heart balm statutes, though the wording and reach may differ from state to state, were passed to put an end to what were seen as gross abuses of court process arising from romantic relationships or, perhaps more accurately, arising from the acerbity of cooled ones. A brief look at an old Ohio case for breach of promise to marry reveals what depths amatory rancor can reach. In Duvall v. Fuhrman (1887), 3 Ohio C.C. 305, 312, the court remarked:

"The conduct of the defendant below, Duvall, deserves the severest criticism and condemnation. I never knew anything equal to it; I never heard anything equal to it; I never read anything in truth or fiction, that bore any resemblance to it. The conduct of Duvall is simply imfamous [sic ]. His attempts to manufacture evidence for himself, to entrap the plaintiff in the action, his suggestions made to her by persons hired for that purpose, to use forged papers and to sustain her cause by perjury, their endeavors to get her into infamous places, when they might accuse her of lewd acts; his sending his wife, in company with an advanturess [sic ], to the plaintiff, with the story that she too had been the victim of his lust, and who confidingly tried to get from her statements prejudicial to her cause; the testimony he gave on the trial; all these things show a depth of meanness beyond which it would be difficult to go, and the only wonder is that the jury were not overwhelmed with indignation and did not give a verdict for all that was claimed by the plaintiff in her petition ($15,000). We are all perfectly satisfied with the verdict."

Though it is easy to share the indignation at Duvall's infamy, many legislatures apparently came to the conclusion that the courts were not the place for redress.

The preamble to the New York heart balm statute exemplifies the change of view:

" 'The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of actions based upon alleged * * * breach of contract to marry, having been subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the victims of circumstances,...