Vreeland v. Ferrer
| Decision Date | 06 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2D08-248.,2D08-248. |
| Parties | John K. VREELAND, Administrator ad Litem for the Estate of Jose Martinez, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jose Martinez, Deceased, Appellant, v. Danny FERRER d/b/a Ferrer Aviation; Danny Ferrer; Aerolease of America, Inc., a corporation; Biometric Science Foundation, LLC; and Linda Palas, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Donald Palas, Deceased, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Vaughan & McLaughlin, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.
Shelley H. Leinicke of Wicker, Smith, O'Hara, McCoy & Ford, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee Aerolease of America, Inc.
No appearance for Appellees Danny Ferrer d/b/a Ferrer Aviation; Danny Ferrer; Biometric Science Foundation, LLC; and Linda Palas, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Donald Palas, deceased.
Jose Martinez was a passenger aboard a private airplane that crashed shortly after takeoff. Martinez and the pilot were killed. The administrator ad litem for and personal representative of Martinez's estate, John K. Vreeland, filed a wrongful death action against the owner of the plane, the company to which the owner had leased the plane, and the pilot's estate. This appeal involves only the claims against the owner, Aerolease of America, Inc. The circuit court granted Aerolease a summary judgment on the three counts asserted against it, thereby disposing of the entire case as to that defendant. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(k).
Vreeland challenges the summary judgment on two of the counts. The first alleged that, as the airplane's owner, Aerolease was vicariously liable for the pilot's negligent operation of the airplane, a dangerous instrumentality under Florida law. The second count contended that Aerolease negligently maintained and inspected the aircraft before leasing it and that this negligence was the cause of the accident. As discussed below, we affirm the summary judgment on the first count and reverse the summary judgment on the second count. Vreeland has not taken issue with the summary judgment on the third count, which asserted that Aerolease intentionally published false information about the condition of the aircraft in order to induce a lease. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment on that count without discussion.
In Florida the owner of a "dangerous instrumentality" who has expressly or impliedly consented to its operation by another is vicariously liable for injuries or damages caused by its negligent operation. Orefice v. Albert, 237 So.2d 142, 143-44 (Fla.1970). An airplane is a dangerous instrumentality. Id. As mentioned, Vreeland's first count against Aerolease sought to impose liability under this theory.
Aerolease successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground that a provision of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44112, preempts Florida's dangerous instrumentality law as it relates to owners or lessors of civil aircraft. The pertinent part of that statute reads as follows:
(b) Liability.—A lessor, owner, or secured party is liable for personal injury, death, or property loss or damage on land or water only when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the actual possession or control of the lessor, owner, or secured party, and the personal injury, death, or property loss or damage occurs because of—
(1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or
(2) the flight of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, engine, or propeller.
Vreeland does not dispute that the airplane was not in Aerolease's possession or control at the time of the pilot's alleged negligence. But he maintains that the federal statute was not intended to preempt liability under state law theories such as Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Rather, he argues, the statute's purpose was to make clear that Congress had not intended the federal act to create a cause of action based on vicarious liability. We disagree.
As other courts have recognized, any discussion of this topic must involve an examination of the statute's legislative history. The forerunner of the present statute was 49 U.S.C. § 1404, enacted in 1948.1 House Report No. 80-2091 was issued in conjunction with the 1948 enactment. Contrary to Vreeland's argument, the Report confirmed that the statute was indeed directed to liability under state law. Specifically, the Report documented Congress's concern about a provision of the Uniform Aeronautics Act that had been adopted by a number of states.
Section 4 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act is in force in at least 10 States and Hawaii. That section reads, in part, as follows:
The owner of every aircraft which is operated over the lands or the waters of this State is absolutely liable for injuries to persons or property on the land or water beneath, caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft, or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom, whether such owner was negligent or not, unless the injury is caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured, or of the owner or bailee of the property injured. If the aircraft is leased at the time of the injury to persons or property, both owner and lessee shall be liable, and they may be sued jointly or either or both of them may be sued separately.
1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836 (emphases supplied, footnote omitted). The House Report went on to observe that this provision, as adopted in various states, imposed absolute liability on owners of aircraft even if they held title only as lessors. The report continued:
An owner in possession or control of aircraft, either personally or through an agent, should be liable for damages caused. A security owner not in possession or control of the aircraft, however, should not be liable for such damages. This bill would make it clear that this generally accepted rule applies and assures the security owner or lessee (sic), that he would not be liable when he is not in possession or control of the aircraft.
Id. (emphasis supplied.) We believe these statements show that Congress intended 49 U.S.C. section 1404 to shield an owner or lessor of a civil aircraft from vicarious liability under state law when the aircraft was not in its possession or control.
The current statute was part of a broad recodification of the Federal Aviation Act in 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-272. Subsection 1.(a) of that public law states that "`[c]ertain general and permanent laws of the United States, related to transportation, are revised, codified and enacted by subsections (c)-(e) of this section without substantive change ....'" " Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 2005 WL 3624483 at *2, 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 470 (Conn.Super.Ct. Dec. 7, 2005) (not reported in A.2d) (quoting Pub. L. No. 103-272) (emphases supplied). Congress thus made clear that the substantive effect of 49 U.S.C. § 44112 is the same as its predecessor's.
Whether a federal statute preempts state law is a question of law. Federal preemption "may be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56-57, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990)).
The federal statute at issue here does not expressly preempt state laws imposing vicarious liability on the owners or lessors of civil aircraft, hence the dispute before us. However, preemption is implied when there is a conflict between a federal law and a state law. Talbott v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 934 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). There is a conflict between federal and state law when the dictates of both sets of laws cannot be complied with or where dual compliance may be technically possible but the state law creates an obstacle to fulfilling the federal policy and goals. Id. As reflected both in the language of 49 U.S.C. § 44112 and in the House Report accompanying the enactment of the statute's predecessor, the policy and goal underlying the federal statute is to shield the owner or lessor of a civil aircraft from liability for the negligence of others committed when the aircraft was not in the owner's or lessor's possession or control. To apply Florida's dangerous instrumentality law so as to impose vicarious liability on such an owner or lessor in such circumstances would, to say the least, create an obstacle to fulfilling that policy and goal.
We recognize that the case authorities regarding the preemptive effect of this provision are far from consistent in either their conclusions or their reasoning. See Matei v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 35 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir.1994) (); Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.1970) (); Esheva v. Siberia Airlines, 499 F.Supp.2d 493, 499 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (); In re Lawrence...
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In re Air Crash Near Rio Grande Puerto Rico on December 3, 2008, CASE NO. 11-md-02246-KAM
...on these allegations alone,the motion to dismiss will be denied. Nonetheless, in moving to dismiss, Ramo relies on Vreeland v. Ferrer, 28 So. 3d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) in its initial briefs. That case held that "49 U.S.C. § 44112 preempts Florida's dangerous instrumentality law inso......