Vuyyuru v. Virginia Board of Medicine, Record No. 0610-07-2 (Va. App. 1/15/2008)
| Decision Date | 15 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 0610-07-2. |
| Parties | LOKESH BABU VUYYURU, M.D. v. VIRGINIA BOARD OF MEDICINE |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County, Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge.
Thomas H. Roberts for appellant.
Ishneila I.G. Moore, Assistnat Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General; David E. Johnson, Deputy Attorney General; Jane D. Hickey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Senior Judge Bumgardner.
In this appeal from an agency decision, appellant, Lokesh Babu Vuyyuru, M.D. seeks reversal of the Virginia Board of Medicine's ("the Board") revocation of his medical license. While Vuyyuru raises twenty-six questions on appeal, his argument, taken as a whole, addresses only two: whether the Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence, and whether Vuyyuru was afforded due process before the Board.1 For the reasons stated below, we hold the Board did not err, and we affirm the revocation of Vuyyuru's license to practice medicine.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Board, the party prevailing below. Hilliards v. Jackson, 28 Va. App. 475, 479, 506 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1998). We also "take due account of the presumption of official regularity, the experience and specialized competence of the agency, and the purposes of the basic law under which the agency has acted." Crutchfield v. State Water Control Bd., Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 45 Va. App. 546, 555, 612 S.E.2d 249, 254 (2005) (citing Code § 2.2-4027).
After receiving several complaints, the Board summarily suspended Vuyyuru's license to practice medicine, based upon its finding that his continued practice of medicine could be a substantial danger to the public health and safety, pursuant to Code § 54.1-2408.1. The Board also instituted proceedings for a formal hearing regarding the revocation of Vuyyuru's license. Following a formal hearing and after considering evidence and testimony from both the Attorney General and Vuyyuru, the Board revoked Vuyyuru's medical license. The Board based its action on several findings of fact. Specifically, the Board found that Vuyyuru's misconduct led to the performance of unnecessary medical procedures, physical harm to patients, and, in one case, a patient's death. The Board also found that Vuyyuru violated several regulations relating to the administration of conscious sedation and recordkeeping regarding controlled substances. Moreover, the Board determined that he had refused to provide copies of requested records to investigators from the Department of Health Professions.
Accordingly, the Board revoked Vuyyuru's medical license. The Chesterfield County Circuit Court affirmed the Board's decision. This appeal followed.
We begin with the applicable limitations upon our review of this case. In appeals of administrative decisions, in accordance with settled legal precedents, "the burden is upon the appealing party to demonstrate error." Carter v. Gordon, 28 Va. App. 133, 141, 502 S.E.2d 697, 700-01 (1998). Moreover, our review is limited to determining "whether the agency acted in accordance with law," "whether the agency made a procedural error which was not harmless error," and "whether the agency had sufficient evidential support for its findings of fact." Crutchfield, 45 Va. App. at 553, 612 S.E.2d at 253; see also Johnston-Willis, Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 242, 369 S.E.2d 1, 7 (1998).
Vuyyuru argues that the Board's factual determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. In reviewing an agency decision, we give deference to an administrative agency's factual determinations, and review them only to ascertain whether they are supported by substantial evidence. Code § 2.2-4027. Our Supreme Court has explained that Virginia Real Estate Com'n v. Bias, 226 Va. 264, 269, 308 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1983) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (emphasis added)). Thus, "[u]nder this standard . . . the court may reject the agency's findings of fact `only if, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would necessarily come to a different conclusion.'" Id. (quoting B. Mezines, Administrative Law § 51.01 (1981)) (emphasis in original).
Here, the record contains an abundance of relevant evidence supporting the Board's factual findings. The Board conducted a formal hearing and listened to the testimony of numerous witnesses, including the testimony of expert witnesses who testified that Vuyyuru's actions violated the applicable standards of care. Moreover, the Board reviewed profuse medical records and other documentary evidence involving the care of several specific patients as well as information arising from inspections of Vuyyuru's medical office. Because we are unable to say upon a review of this evidence that a reasonable mind would necessarily come to a different conclusion than that reached by the Board, we will not disturb the Board's factual findings on review.
Vuyyuru argues that the Board did not afford him due process in the revocation proceeding. "[T]he minimum requirements of constitutional due process which must attend administrative hearings [are] timely and adequate notice, the right to confront adverse witnesses and present one's own evidence, the right to the assistance of retained counsel, and an impartial decision maker." Hladys v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 145, 147, 336 S.E.2d 98, 99 (1988) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)).
Our standard for reviewing the application of due process standards in an administrative setting is well settled. Although we generally give great deference to an agency decision, "[i]f the issue falls outside the area generally entrusted to the agency, and is one in which the courts have a special competence, i.e., the common law or constitutional law, there is little reason for the judiciary to defer to an administrative interpretation." Johnston-Willis, 6 Va. App. at 243-44, 369 S.E.2d at 8. Accordingly, when a litigant contends that he was deprived of due process during an administrative proceeding, we review the administrative proceedings de novo, giving no deference to the judgment below. See id.; see also Dep't of Prof'l & Occupational Regulation v. Abateco Servs., 33 Va. App. 473, 479, 534 S.E.2d 352, 355 (2000).
Specifically, Vuyyuru contends that the Board violated his due process rights because (1) the amended statement of particulars, which notified him of the charges against him, was inadequate because it "consisted of compound charges in a conclusory factual accusatory fashion"; (2) the Board permitted non-board members to attend a closed session; (3) the Board was represented by an attorney from the Attorney General's office; (4) the proceedings were tainted by the pre-hearing distribution of evidence; and (5) Board members who were part of the decision to suspend Vuyyuru's license also took part in the revocation hearing. We discuss each in order.
According to the United States Supreme Court, "[p]rocedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty or property." Carey v. Piphus, 443 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). In furtherance of that goal, procedural due process rules exist to "guarantee[] that a person shall have reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before any binding order can be made affecting the person's rights to liberty or property." McManama v. Plunk, 250 Va. 27, 34, 458 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1995).
Code § 2.2-4020(B) codifies the due process notice requirement in administrative hearings. Pursuant to Code § 2.2-4020(B)(iii) the Board was required to give Vuyyuru "reasonable notice of the . . . matters of fact and law asserted or questioned by the [Board]." Vuyyuru argues that the Board failed to give him reasonable notice of the charges against him because, he alleges, the Board's findings were "at fatal variance with the charges alleged against" him and that the charges as stated in the Board's amended statement of particulars were vague and overbroad.
An accused, whether in a criminal or civil context, "is entitled to have stated in plain and unequivocal terms" the charges against him. Casper v. City of Danville, 160 Va. 929, 932, 169 S.E. 734, 735 (1933). In order to fulfill that requirement, the statement or bill of particulars "should be directed at those charges to which the [Board] expects to introduce supporting testimony." Id. at 933, 169 S.E. at 735.
Here, the Board fulfilled that requirement because its amended statement of particulars referenced particular incidents regarding specific patients or detailed instances of recordkeeping violations and stated exactly what statutes or regulations the Board believed Vuyyuru may have violated. Moreover, there was no variance between the statement of particulars and the Board's findings. Instead, the Board determined the Vuyyuru had violated the same provisions that were listed in the amended statement of particulars. Simply put, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Vuyyuru did not have sufficient reasonable notice to prepare his defense and answer to the Board's allegations at the formal hearing.
Vuyyuru also argues that the Board's decision to allow people who were not members of the Board of Medicine to attend the Board's closed session violated his due process right to a neutral decision-maker. Vuyyuru relies on Virginia...
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