W.A. Snow Iron Works, Inc. v. Chadwick

• Decision Date: 11 June 1917
• Parties: W. A. SNOW IRON WORKS, Inc., v. CHADWICK et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

227 Mass. 382

116 N.E. 801

W. A. SNOW IRON WORKS, Inc.,

v.CHADWICK et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 11, 1917.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Charles F. Jenney, Judge.

Suit by the W. A. Snow Iron Works, Incorporated, against Leonard B. Chadwick and others. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.Frederick W. Mansfield and Edmund R. Mansfield, both of Boston, for appellants.

Elder & Whitman, of Boston, for appellee.

BRALEY, J.

The master's elaborate and exhaustive report states the relations of the parties as well as the economic and industrial conditions from which the present suit originated. It appears that the plaintiff being engaged in the manufacture and installation of all kinds of wrought ornamental and other iron work, and in the employment of labor at its factory conducts ‘what is commonly known as an open shop, which while it means strictly that inquiries are not made of its employés as to whether they are members of a union nevertheless under present day conditions results in all the employés being nonunion men.’ But in performance of the contract with one Crane, into which it entered as described in the bill, the plaintiff having been on friendly terms with the union, and in accordance with its custom for several years to employ ‘union men on certain of its outside jobs so that about one-half of its outside help has in fact been done by union men at least for the last three years, such men being members' of the defendants' unincorporated organization, hired the defendants Swanson, Gustafson, McDonough, Grant, Husband, Crane, Muldoon, and Brennan who formed part of its working force of 20 men. While the work was proceeding satisfactorily and without any complaint from the union employés as to the rate and time of payment of wages, the number of hours of labor required, or that nonunion men also had been employed and retained, the union having by vote instructed its secretary ‘to send out new proposed agreements to all the contractors in their line, * * *’ passed a further vote instructing its business agent that ‘no member be allowed to work for unfair firms until they had been signed up by the business agent.’ A conference shortly after followed between the plaintiff and the union's business agent, the defendant Chadwick, when the plaintiff declined to sign the agreement, and no settlement was reached. The master reports that while other provisions appeared, the agreement ‘was intended to mean and would have meant that the employer signing it agreed not to employ nonunion labor on any of his outside jobs during the period of the agreement. It had no reference to the inside or shop work.’ What followed is thus stated in the report:

‘While the matter was * * * under discussion and with no specific notice * * * that the plaintiff's men would be interfered with, * * * or that they would themselves cease work, I find that * * * the eight defendants * * * without warning or notice to the plaintiff * * * left the work,’ which was ‘about two-thirds completed.’

It is found that:

‘This leaving of these eight defendants * * * was and was by them and the union intended as a strike; that it was in consequence of the vote of the union and the advice and suggestions of Chadwick, in which advice or suggestions I find that he was carrying out the wishes or suggestions of the union.’

If the right of the employés to cease work of their own volition is unquestioned, the object or motive for which the strike was precipitated is a question of fact. If the master's subsidiary findings only were to be considered, it is settled that a strike would not be unlawful if, upon ascertaining that they could not have all, they declined to take part of, the work. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753,6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1067, 116 Am. St. Rep. 272,7 Ann. Cas. 638. But these findings as they appear in the report are made subordinate to the express findings:

‘That the purposes of this strike were primarily to compel the plaintiff to sign the agreement * * * which among other things would have required it to unionize its outside work,’ and ‘the reason that the plaintiff was singled out as the first point of attack in the efforts of the union to induce open shop contractors to sign the agreement was chiefly that the work upon which the plaintiff was engaged was easily the best and most notorious in Boston at that time. I find that, if the plaintiff could be compelled to sign this agreement, it would bring many of the other 40 open shop contractors into line. It is also probably true that the plaintiff was thus singled out because it was one of the two open shop contractors who had definitely refused to sign the agreement. I do not find that the purpose of the union was to injure the plaintiff, but I am of the opinion that the union was entirely indifferent as to whether it did or not.’

It is further decided, although the union never sent out any list called an ‘unfair list’:

‘That Chadwick intended the plaintiff to understand that, upon such list as the union was in the habit of sending out, it would be made to appear to architects and contractors that the union did not consider the plaintiff and other contractors as fair contractors unless in the meantime they had signed the agreement.’

The purpose of the strike is restated, and the participation of the union of which Chadwick was the mouthpiece is set forth in these words:

‘I find that if the plaintiff would sign the agreement it would be furnished with all union men necessary for all of its work, but that, unless and until it does so, it is the intention of the union to refuse to let any of their men work on any of its jobs in which intention so far as appears the individual members of the union concur.’

It is now plain that the paramount motive actuating all the proceedings of the defendants and their fellow members was by means of the strike to force the plaintiff to employ only union men on all of its ‘outside work’ under the penalty, if compliance was refused, that full performance of the contract with Crane would be seriously embarrassed if not rendered impossible, while its name would be published by the union in the labor market, and among architects and contractors for its products, as an employer of nonunion labor, making the obtainment of future contracts and the necessary union labor exceedingly precarious if not practically impossible. The right of the plaintiff to the benefit of its contract and to...