Waddail v. Vassar
Decision Date | 11 May 1916 |
Docket Number | 6 Div. 157 |
Citation | 196 Ala. 184,72 So. 14 |
Parties | WADDAIL v. VASSAR et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Chancery Court, Jefferson County; A.H. Benners Chancellor.
Suit by Mary L. Waddail against Robert Vassar and others. From a decree for defendants, complainant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
London & Fitts, of Birmingham, for appellant.
J.B Aird and F.E. Blackburn, both of Birmingham, for appellees.
This bill, filed by the appellant against the appellees Vassar among others, seeks to have declared and made effective resulting trusts in several city lots. The demurrers of the Vassars were sustained, on the single ground that complainant's asserted equities have become barred by laches. It has been well decided that mere delay that has wrought no disadvantage to another, or that has not operated to introduce changes of conditions and circumstances in consequence of which "there can be no longer a safe determination of the controversy," will not serve to bar a complainant's right or remedy. Snodgrass v Snodgrass, 185 Ala. 155, 163, 164, 64 So. 594; Hauser v. Foley, 190 Ala. 437, 67 So. 252; Lucas v. Skinner, 70 So. 88. Where the question of laches in the assertion of a right is presented, the facts and circumstances of each case will govern the court in the exercise of the sound discretion thereby invoked for the determination of the inquiry. Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, supra, Lucas v. Skinner, supra. Statutes of limitation do not bind courts of equity in such cases, unless there has been an adverse possession within the law's contemplation. Shorter v. Smith, 56 Ala. 208, 210, 211; Lucas v. Skinner, supra; Scruggs v. Decatur Land Co., 86 Ala. 173, 5 So. 440.
Where the purchase money of land is paid by a parent or husband, the title being taken in the name of the child or wife, "the presumption of intention" on the part of the parent or husband "to become the owner of the property arising from the payment of the purchase is rebutted by the stronger counter presumption of an intention to make an advancement to the child or wife." Hence the presumption of a resulting trust does not arise from the mere fact that the purchase money is supplied by a parent or husband, the title is taken in the name of the child or wife. Long v. King, 117 Ala. 423, 430, 431, 23 So. 534.
It appears from the bill that Robert Vassar, in whose name the title to the several lots in question was respectively taken during the years 1902, 1904, and 1908, was reared as a son by the complainant from the time he, a "motherless infant," came under her care; that each regarded and treated the relation as that of parent and child; that after attaining his majority Vassar and his family lived upon the bounty of the complainant, and he served as the clerk and confidential adviser and assistant of the complainant in a retail business conducted by her, and was not called to any accounting; that this close relation existed during the time the complainant furnished the funds with which to purchase the lots in question; and that these purchases were made at his instance, and the funds of complainant were given to him, upon his suggestion, to purchase "for her" the lots involved. Notwithstanding the familiar rule which requires a pleading, when assailed by demurrer, to be most strongly construed against the pleader, we think the allegations entirely sufficient to overcome the stated presumption, raised by the relation (practically speaking) of parent and child existing at the time between complainant and Vassar, that complainant intended to make advancements to Vassar. Our opinion is that he could not and did not, in fact, purchase the lots "for her" when he took the titles thereto in his own name. It would be a strained and wholly unreasonable interpretation of the...
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...Where, however, one pays the purchase price, and the legal title to the property is taken in another, a resulting trust arises (Waddail's Case, 72 So. 14); that is, if it was intended for a donation to the grantee of the conveyance. Thus, when the purchase price is paid by a parent or a hus......
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