Wade v. State, 48671
| Decision Date | 02 July 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 48671,48671 |
| Citation | 511 S.W.2d 7 |
| Parties | William WADE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Don Gladden and Marvin L. Collins, Fort Worth (Court-appointed), for appellant.
Tim Curry, Dist. Atty., T. J. Haire, Jr., R. W. Crampton, Asst. Dist. Attys, Fort Worth and Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
DAVIS, Commissioner.
Appeal is taken from a conviction for robbery. A plea of guilty was entered before the court and punishment was assessed at life.
Appellant contends that the court's admonishment to determine the voluntariness of the plea was not in compliance with Article 26.13, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P.
After appellant entered a plea of guilty, the record reflects the following colloquy:
In the recent case of Ex parte Scott, Tex.Cr.App., 505 S.W.2d 602, where petitioner sought relief in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding, this Court was faced with the same defect in the trial court's lack of compliance with Article 26.13, supra, as confronts us in the instant case. In Scott, this Court said:
'The part of Article 26.13, supra, in question is that a plea of guilty should not be received unless that one '. . . is uninfluenced by any consideration of fear, or by persuasion. . . ."
The Court then distinguished Mitchell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 174 and Espinosa v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 172, cases relied on by the State herein and concluded, 'Because the trial court did not ascertain from the applicant if he entered his plea by reason of fear or persuasion, the conviction must be set aside.'
In Cameron v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 508 S.W.2d 618, the concurring opinion stated:
In the instant case the court's admonishment does not include language from which it 'plainly appears' that the plea of guilty was 'uninfluenced by any consideration of fear or by persuasion.'
We conclude that the trial court's admonishment was not in compliance with Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P., and that such error requires reversal.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Opinion approved by the Court.
I concur in the opinion of the majority that reversal is required in this case because the record does not contain sufficient language to show that it did in fact plainly appear to the trial court that appellant in pleading guilty was uninfluenced by any consideration of fear. See my concurring opinion in Cameron v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 508 S.W.2d 618, 619.
The dissent would find the single general question 'Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty and for no other reason?' sufficient to determine whether a defendant is uninfluenced by any consideration of fear or by persuasion or delusive hope of pardon. 1 Clearly this single general question cannot in one sweep make the absence of all such elements plainly appear.
Mitchell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 174, and Espinosa v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 172, were properly decided and the reasoning expressed therein remains sound. On the total set of facts as stated in those cases, this Court found support for the conclusion that the requisites for accepting a guilty plea plainly appeared to the trial court. True, this Court therein noted that no magic words are required to comply with Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P. The dissent asserts that 'Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty and for no other reason?' are the magic words which show compliance. It is the total factual situation as reflected in the record, and not some elaborate Or shorthand magic formula, that must be considered before determining whether the record contains sufficient language to show the requisites did, in fact, plainly appear.
The dissenting opinion's effort to distinguish Ex parte Scott, Tex.Cr.App., 505 S.W.2d 602, is not convincing. Scott was reversed Not upon the absence of the single general question urged by the dissent as controlling here, but upon the failure of the trial court to 'determine if the pleas were voluntarily made uninfluenced by fear, persuasion, or promises,' after examination of the entire record. This Court in Scott made no suggestion whatsoever that the single question formula urged by the dissent would have been sufficient had it been asked. Scott, like the instant case, did not reflect sufficient inquiry by the trial court to justify the conclusion that the stated conditions plainly appeared.
The majority reverses this conviction for the failure of the trial court to properly admonish appellant under Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P. In doing so, part of the language in Ex parte Scott, Tex.Cr.App., 505 S.W.2d 602, is quoted as follows:
'The part of Article 26.13, supra, in question is that a plea of guilty should not be received unless that one '. . . is...
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