Wade v. State
| Decision Date | 20 September 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 2000-KA-00565-SCT.,2000-KA-00565-SCT. |
| Citation | 802 So.2d 1023 |
| Parties | Deanna WADE v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Robert B. McDuff, Jackson, for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Charles W. Maris, Jr., for Appellee.
Before PITTMAN, C.J., DIAZ and EASLEY, JJ.
EASLEY, Justice, for the Court:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. Deanna Wade ("Wade") was previously convicted on February 4, 1997, in the Circuit Court of Claiborne County, Honorable Lamar Pickard, Circuit Court Judge, presiding, of the murder of Ralph Simpson ("Simpson") and sentenced to serve a term of life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Wade appealed to the Mississippi Court of Appeals which found the evidence of murder lacking, but it affirmed the conviction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. Wade v. State, 724 So.2d 1007 (Miss.Ct. App.1998). The motions for rehearing were denied by the Mississippi Court of Appeals. Id. This Court granted the writ of certiorari. On October 21, 1999, this Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Court of Appeals' reversal of the murder conviction and imposing the conviction of manslaughter with remand to the Circuit Court of Claiborne County for resentencing for manslaughter. Wade v. State, 748 So.2d 771 (Miss.1999). Wade's motion for rehearing was denied by this Court.
¶ 2. On February 17, 2000, the trial court held the resentencing hearing on the manslaughter conviction. The trial court sentenced Wade to serve eight years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections for the offense of manslaughter. Wade now appeals to this Court.
FACTS
¶ 3. Simpson was Wade's boyfriend and business partner. Wade and Simpson were co-owners of a night club and lived together in a house next to the night club. Simpson was a cruel and vicious man made worse when he was intoxicated. Their relationship was one marked by brutality with prior occasions of violence.
¶ 4. In the early hours of the morning, approximately 3:00 a.m., on October 6, 1996, Wade and two of her female employees were standing outside the night club. Simpson had been drinking straight whiskey all night. His autopsy revealed a blood-alcohol level of 0.27. Simpson was behind the bar serving patrons. Simpson inquired about where the girls had gone. Simpson fired a pistol, striking the back of the building. Wade and the other two women came running into the club.
¶ 5. Wade and Simpson began arguing. Wade threw a bar stool at Simpson and missed. Simpson attacked Wade and slammed her head against a pool table. The beating was severe. Two patrons managed to separate Wade and Simpson and disarm Simpson, but the two were still trying to get to each other.
¶ 6. Wade managed to get away from Simpson and left the club with one of her waitresses. Wade went next door to where Wade and Simpson lived together. Wade tried to use the telephone in the house, but the telephone was off the hook in the bar. Wade acquired a gun and went back to the night club.
¶ 7. Simpson was back behind the bar when Wade entered the club. Wade stated something to the effect of "[y]ou ain't gonna hit on me no more." As Simpson moved toward Wade with a smile on his face, Wade shot him once, resulting in his death.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
¶ 8. Wade argues that issues two, three, four, five, six and seven were raised on the prior appeal to the Mississippi Court of Appeals and then by writ of certiorari to this Court but never resolved by either appellate court. These issues were previously considered by the appellate courts and are wholly without merit on appeal.
¶ 9. The Court of Appeals specifically listed in its opinion all eight issues raised by Wade on appeal. Wade, 724 So.2d at 1007. The Court of Appeals chose to address Wade's second argument of error of whether the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for murder beyond a reasonable doubt and, at most, supported a conviction of manslaughter. Id. at 1009. In discussing whether the evidence supported a conviction for murder or manslaughter, the Court of Appeals also addressed the first assignment of error of whether the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Wade did not act in self-defense. Id. The Court of Appeals stated that:
While Wade's second assignment of error is outcome determinative, our analysis will also include discussion of her first assignment of error concerning self defense.
¶ 10. The case came before this Court on writ of certiorari from the Court of Appeals. Wade, 748 So.2d at 773. In Skinner v. State, 700 So.2d 1183, 1184 (Miss.1997), this Court relying on Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure 17(f) stated:
After the Court of Appeals has decided a case, the litigants have a single opportunity to have this Court address possible errors which are amendable to certiorari review. Our decision to grant or deny certiorari is not subject to rehearing or reconsideration.
M.R.A.P. 17(f) reads as follows:
(f) Reconsideration Not Permitted. Neither an acceptance nor a rejection or a petition for certiorari shall be subject to further pleading by a party for rehearing or reconsideration. Prior to final disposition, the Supreme Court may, on its own motion find that the petition for certiorari was improvidently granted and may dismiss the certiorari proceeding.
This Court stated that "[a]fter a review of this record and careful consideration of the issues, we find that the Court of Appeals decision is correct." 748 So.2d at 773.
¶ 11. The doctrine of res judicata is a doctrine of public policy designed to avoid the expense of multiplicity of litigation and foster reliance on judicial action by "minimizing possibilities of inconsistent decisions." Little v. V. & G Welding Supply, Inc., 704 So.2d 1336, 1337 (Miss.1997)(quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973-74, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979)).
¶ 12. For the doctrine of res judicata to generally be applicable to a proceeding, four (4) identities must be present to prevent relitigation of all issues tried in the prior lawsuit, as well as, all matter which should have been litigated and decided in the initial suit. Dunaway v. W.H. Hopper & Associates, Inc., 422 So.2d 749, 751 (Miss.1982); Pray v. Hewitt, 254 Miss. 20, 179 So.2d 842 (1965); Golden v. Golden, 246 Miss. 562, 151 So.2d 598 (1963).
¶ 13. The four identities are as follows:
Dunaway, 422 So.2d at 751; Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 394 So.2d 299 (Miss.1981); Cowan v. Gulf City Fisheries, Inc., 381 So.2d 158 (Miss.1980); Standard Oil Co. v. Howell, 360 So.2d 1200 (Miss.1978).
¶ 14. Under the principle of law denominated as the doctrine of res judicata, Wade may not relitigate these issues. See, e.g., Holland v. State, 705 So.2d 307, 325 (Miss.1997)("We hold that because of the finding of guilt by the prior jury, Holland is barred by res judicata from relitigating the prior jury verdict of guilt and is collaterally estopped in these proceedings from attacking his guilt."); Jones v. State, 517 So.2d 1295, 1297 (Miss. 1987)( ), vacated on other grounds, 487 U.S. 1230, 108 S.Ct. 2891, 101 L.Ed.2d 925 (1988).
¶ 15. The only viable issue that is now properly before this Court for consideration is Wade's first designated issue of whether her eight-year sentence in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections imposed by the trial court on resentencing on remand for the conviction of manslaughter is excessive and violative of Wade's constitutional rights. That issue will now be addressed.
I. Sentence for Manslaughter
¶ 16. Wade effectively argues three (3) distinct positions in support of her contention that the trial court erred in sentencing Wade to serve an eight-year sentence. The three (3) arguments presented by Wade are as follows:
¶ 17. Each of these arguments will be addressed individually for purposes of clarification.
¶ 18. Wade argues that the trial court is bound not to impose a sentence over...
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