Wagers v. Nichol
| Decision Date | 30 December 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 139,No. 10351,139,10351 |
| Parties | Leonard D. WAGERS, Marlin Paine, Bruce C. Bartlett, james G. Nafsinger and Donald Newbill, as Trustees of School District, and individually as residents and taxpayers of Canyon County, Idaho, Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, v. Fred K. NICHOL, C. M. Van Slyke and ira L. Craven, individually, and as the Commissioners of Canyon County, Idaho, and Board of Equalization of Canyon County, Idaho, Defendants-Respondents and Cross-appellants, v. AMALGAMATED SUGAR COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-intervenor and Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Smith, Miller & Weston, Caldwell, for plaintiffs-appellants and cross-respondents.
Earl E. Reed, Nampa, and Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for defendantintervenor and cross-appellant, Amalgamated Sugar Co.
C. Robert Yost, Pros. Atty., Caldwell, for defendants-respondents and cross-appellants.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court denying petitioners' (appellants') petition for an alternative writ of mandate which sought to compel the Canyon County Board of Commissioners, sitting as the Board of Equalization, to include upon the 1966 personal property tax rolls certain personal property owned by the Amalgamated Sugar Company and valued at more than $700,000.
The pertinent facts surrounding this appeal are as follows:
In 1965, the Idaho State Legislature passed a statute, I.C. § 63-105V, exempting certain personal property from taxation which is commonly known as the 'freeport On January 9, 1968, the Trustees of School District No. 139 (petitioners-appellants) filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the Canyon County Board of Equalization (defendants-respondents) to include upon the personal property tax rolls of Canyon County for 1966, personal property of the Amalgamated Sugar Company in the sum of $478,650. The school district was deprived of $35,000 in tax revenues as the result of the reduction in assessment. The district court determined, however, in Conclusion of Law No. 5 that the
legislation.' In order to take advantage of the new legislation, the Amalgamated Sugar Company (intervenor-defendant, respondent and cross-appellant), filed documentary proof with the Canyon County Assessor to support a reduction in the assessed valuation of its inventory for 1966. The Canyon County Board of Equalization then entered its order reducing the assessment.
The Trustees of School District No. 139 have appealed to the Supreme Court from the judgment of the district court denying their petition for an alternative writ of mandate.
The first question presented by this appeal is raised by respondent on its cross appeal and is whether a petition for an alternative writ of mandate is the proper procedure by which to question the action taken by the Canyon County Board of Equalization; i. e., removal of personal property from the tax rolls.
'Whenever the law gives power to, or imposes an obligation on, a particular person to do some particular act or duty, and provides no other specific legal remedy for its performance, this writ will issue.' Merrill, Law of Mandamus, § 13, pp. 7, 8 (1892).
The County Boards of Equalization are charged by statute with the duty of classifying and assessing all property within the county. I.C. § 63-402. This duty is not discretionary 2 but rather is required, and indeed is the sole purpose and function of the County Board of Equalization. I.C. § 63-401 et seq.
Although the legislature in 1957 enacted a statute, I.C. § 63-2210, 3 prescribing The essential question to be decided by this appeal is whether the petitioners (Trustees of School District No. 139) have presented sufficient proof to entitle them to the relief requested. Before a party can successfully maintain an action for an alternative writ of mandate, he must establish (1) that he has a clear legal right to have the act done, and (2) that it is the clear legal duty of the officer to act. Freeman v. McQuade, 80 Idaho 387, 331 P.2d 263 (1958); Brooks v. Edgington, 40 Idaho 432, 233 P. 514 (1925). A strong presumption of correctness attaches itself to official decisions of administrative bodies. See Cole-Collister Fire Protection District v. Boise City, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d 290 (1970); Faulkner et al. v. California Toll Bridge Authority, 40 Cal.2d 317, 253 P.2d 659 (1953); 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies § 205, pp. 556-558. To overcome this presumption, the appellants must have introduced evidence in the district court probative of the legal conclusion that the determination to exempt the property in question owned by the Amalgamated Sugar Company was incorrect. Since the appellants failed to submit any evidence whatsoever tending to show that the determination by the Board of Equalization In answer to appellants' contention that the Canyon County Board of Equalization's granting of an exemption to the Amalgamated Sugar Company was not based upon 'sufficient documentary evidence' this Court is of the opinion that since the Canyon County Board of Equalization is an administrative agency which possesses expertise in the matter of the taxation of personal property the determination of what constitutes sufficient documentary evidence is left to the discretion of the Board and such evidence need not necessarily comply with all the technical rules of legal evidence.
the method of appeal to be taken by a taxpayer or aggrieved party when he is dissatisfied with a determination made by the Board of Equalization in the months of June or July, there was no statutory procedure which would have entitled the petitioners (appellants), who are the aggrieved parties, to institute an appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals from decisions of the Board of Equalization made by them in the month of December which related to exemptions. I.C. § 63-1904 provides that the Board of County Commissioners, sitting as a Board of Equalization, shall meet the first Monday in December of each year to hear complaints in regard to assessments and allowing or disallowing exemptions. Thus it appears that the only recourse available to the Trustees of the School District was a petition for an alternative writ of mandate and thus mandamus was a proper procedure under ...
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Carpenter v. Twin Falls County
...I.C. § 67-5215(g)(6); Mason v. State, Dept. of Law Enforcement, 103 Idaho 748, 653 P.2d 803 (Idaho App.1982); Wagers v. Nichol, 94 Idaho 6, 479 P.2d 775 (1970). Therefore, I question whether Mr. Carpenter has shown indigency, even aside from the question of his I respectfully dissent. 1 I.C......