Wakefield v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 September 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-307
• Parties: ROBERT WAKEFIELD, Plaintiff, v. ALLSTATE VEHICLE & PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

ROBERT WAKEFIELD, Plaintiff,
v.
ALLSTATE VEHICLE & PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:17-CV-307

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

September 29, 2017

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Pending before the court is Plaintiff Robert Wakefield's ("Wakefield") Motion to Remand and Supporting Brief (#4), wherein he asks the court to remand this action to the state court in which it was originally filed. Having considered the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that remand is warranted.

I. Background

On June 8, 2017, Wakefield filed this case against Defendant Allstate Vehicle & Property Insurance Company ("Allstate") in the 356th Judicial District Court of Hardin County, Texas, alleging that Allstate wrongfully denied his claim for damages under his homeowner's insurance policy (issued by Allstate). According to Wakefield, on March 25, 2017, a windstorm damaged his swimming pool. Allstate denied Wakefield's claim, which prompted Wakefield to file suit in state court, asserting claims for breach of contract, violations of the Texas Insurance Code and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA"), and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The petition states that "actual damages sought are less than $75,000.00." Nonetheless, Wakefield also seeks to recover consequential and incidental damages, special damages in the form

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of lost use of property (both real and personal) and damage to credit, attorney's fees, additional statutory damages, mental anguish, and statutory treble damages.

On July 17, 2017, Allstate removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.¹ In response, Wakefield filed a motion to remand on the basis that the requisite amount in controversy is lacking. Allstate did not file a responsive brief in opposition.

II. Analysis

A. Removal Jurisdiction

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)); accord Hotze v. Burwell, 784 F.3d 984, 999 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1165 (2016); Scarlott v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 771 F.3d 883, 887 (5th Cir. 2014). "They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (citations omitted). The court "must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum." Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir.) (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 993 (2001); accord Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96 (2010); Clayton v. Conoco Phillips Co., 722 F.3d 279, 290 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 906 (2014). In an action that has been removed to federal court, a district court is required to remand the case to state court if, at any time before final judgment, it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 638 (2009); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567,

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571 (2004); Spear Mktg., Inc. v. BancorpSouth Bank, 791 F.3d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2015); African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Lucien, 756 F.3d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 2014).

When considering a motion to remand, "[t]he removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper." Barker v. Hercules Offshore Inc., 713 F.3d 208, 212 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002)); accord African Methodist Episcopal Church, 756 F.3d at 793; Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 719 F.3d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 2013); see 13E CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3602.1 (3d ed. 2013). "This extends not only to demonstrating a jurisdictional basis for removal, but also necessary compliance with the requirements of the removal statute." Roth v. Kiewit Offshore Servs., Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 2d 376, 382 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (quoting Albonetti v. GAF Corp. Chem. Grp., 520 F. Supp. 825, 827 (S.D. Tex. 1981)); accord Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co. v. Stevenson, No. 3:15-CV-0906-B, 2015 WL 3867906, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2015); Crossroads of Tex., L.L.C. v. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 705, 708 (S.D. Tex. 2006). "Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the defendant." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)); see Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 397.

"The removal statute ties the propriety of removal to the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts." Frank v. Bear Stearns & Co., 128 F.3d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1997); see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Camsoft Data Sys., Inc. v. S. Elec. Supply, Inc., 756 F.3d 327, 333 (5th Cir. 2014); Barker, 713 F.3d at 228. Because removal raises significant federalism concerns, the removal statutes are strictly and narrowly construed, with any doubt resolved against removal and in favor

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of remand. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); African Methodist Episcopal Church, 756 F.3d at 793; Barker, 713 F.3d at 212. In short, any "doubts regarding whether removal jurisdiction is proper should be resolved against federal jurisdiction." Vantage Drilling Co. v. Hsin-Chi Su, 741 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000)); accord African Methodist Episcopal Church, 756 F.3d at 793; Barker, 713 F.3d at 212.

B. Diversity Jurisdiction

Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction and are authorized to entertain causes of action only where a question of federal law is involved or where there is diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332; Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006); Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005); Energy Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.3d 255, 258-59 (5th Cir. 2014). In order to determine whether jurisdiction is present in a removed action, the claims set forth in the state court petition are considered as of the date of removal. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 594 (2013); Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 391 (1998); Campbell v. Stone Ins., Inc., 509 F.3d 665, 669 n.2 (5th Cir. 2007); McGowin v. ManPower Int'l, Inc., 363 F.3d 556, 558 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). In removed cases where, as here, there is no suggestion that a federal question is involved, subject matter jurisdiction exists only if there is complete diversity among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Lincoln Prop. Co., 546 U.S. at 89; Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 552; Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).

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The state court petition is usually consulted to determine the amount in controversy, and the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 553 (2014); Danial v. Daniels, 162 F. App'x 288, 290 (5th Cir.) (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 820 (2006); Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723 (citing St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998)). Texas law requires plaintiffs to plead for damages that fall within certain ranges. TEX. R. CIV. P. 47; Mumfrey, 719 F.3d at 398 & n.9 (noting that prior to March 1, 2013, Texas law prohibited plaintiffs from pleading for a specific amount of damages). The lowest range of damages that can be pleaded is "monetary relief of $100,000 or less." TEX. R. CIV. P. 47(c)(1).

In situations such as this one, where the petition alleges only a range of damages ("actual damages sought are less than $75,000.00") and not a specific amount in controversy, removal is proper if the removing party establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. Felton v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 324 F.3d 771, 773 (5th Cir. 2003); Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723; Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 2000). The removing party can satisfy that burden (1) by showing that "it is apparent from the face of the petition that the claims are likely to exceed $75,000.00, or, alternatively, (2) [by setting forth] 'summary judgment type evidence' of facts in controversy that support a finding of the requisite amount." Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723 (citing Simon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 193 F.3d 848, 850 (5th Cir. 1999)); accord Robertson v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 814 F.3d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 2015); Garcia v. Koch Oil Co. of Tex. Inc., 351 F.3d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 2003); Grant v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co. L.P., 309 F.3d 864, 868 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 945 (2003).

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If a defendant satisfies its burden, remand is not warranted...