Walden v. Tuten
| Decision Date | 08 June 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 76-736,76-736 |
| Citation | 347 So.2d 129 |
| Parties | R. R. WALDEN, as Property Appraiser of Hillsborough County, Florida, Appellant, v. A. L. TUTEN and Minnie Tuten, his wife, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Brooks P. Hoyt of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellant.
John W. Puffer, III, of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, P. A., Tampa, and Clarence A. Boswell, Sr., of Boswell & Conner, Bartow, for appellees.
This case involves the denial by appellant, as Property Appraiser of Hillsborough County, of a "green belt" assessment for the year 1974 of certain lands occupied by the appellees Tutens as lessees and used by them allegedly as a cattle ranch. The Tutens prevailed in a declaratory decree action in which the court determined that they were entitled to the "green belt" assessment sought and this appeal ensued. We reverse.
The undisputed operative facts are that since 1951 the Tutens had owned and occupied the land in question herein, a tract of approximately 1000 acres. The land had been continuously used by them as a cattle ranch and had been assessed as agricultural land during their ownership.
In January 1973, however, they sold a majority of the tract to the Barnett Bank of Naples as trustee for a group of investors comprising a Florida Land Trust. They retained approximately 100 acres for their current residence; but effective upon the date of the sale, they became lessees of the entire tract sold. 1 The annual rental fee under the lease was a sum "equal to the amount of the taxes levied for that year" ($1,300 for 1973 thus the Tutens' interest in the "green belt" assessment) and the term of the lease has been extended from an original two-year term to 1983, with the provision nevertheless that it may be terminated by either party upon six-months notice. Additionally, the lease provided that it would terminate if the Tutens ceased to use the premises as a cattle ranch.
As of January 1, 1974, the relevant date for the taxable year in question in this case, the Tutens were in fact using the property as a "cattle ranch" operation. But we shall discuss this matter more fully hereinafter.
Most significantly, it is also uncontroverted that the purchase price of the land ($1,000,250) was much more than three times the agricultural assessment previously placed on it. Accordingly, in reliance on Section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1973), the appellant Property Appraiser denied the Tutens' application for an agricultural assessment for the year 1974. That section provides as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Most importantly, however, "bona fide agricultural purposes" as used therein is defined by a preceding subsection of Section 193.461, supra, i. e., subsection (3)(b), as "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land."
Additionally, this latter subsection (3)(b) further provides:
". . . In determining whether the use of the land for agricultural purposes is bona fide, the following factors may be taken into consideration:
(1) The length of time the land has been so utilized;
(2) Whether the use has been continuous;
(3) The purchase price paid;
(4) Size, as it relates to specific agricultural use;
(5) Whether an indicated effort has been made to care sufficiently and adequately for the land in accordance with accepted commercial agricultural practices, including, without limitation, fertilizing, liming, tilling, mowing, reforesting, and other accepted agricultural practices;
(6) Whether such land is under lease and, if so, the effective length, terms and conditions of the lease; and
(7) Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable.
Obviously, given the presumption which undisputedly arises because of the high purchase price of the land, the question herein is whether the Tutens rebutted the presumption. Cognizant of Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 2 in which our Supreme Court determined that the aforequoted seven criteria outlined in Section 193.461(3)(b), supra, were relevant on the question of whether the presumption is rebutted, the trial court herein found:
"(1) The land was used by the Tutens for over twenty years as owners, in the same way that they as lessees were using it January 1, 1974;
(2) The use has been continuous;
(3) The tract is certainly of a size to make it acceptable for this use;
(4) The land has continued to be cared for by the lessees in an acceptable manner (5) The land was under lease as of January 1, 1974, for a two year period, terminating at the end of 1974, a lease which could be terminated by the lessor only if the lessees discontinued the use of the land for cattle operation."
He concluded therefrom that the presumption was rebutted.
We have no quarrel, really, with the conclusions of the trial judge insofar as they relate to an agricultural use of the property. In fact, prior to 1972 a bona fide agricultural use was indeed all that was required for entitlement to a "green belt" assessment. 3 But the aforequoted subsection (3)(b) of Section 193.461 was added to the statute by amendment in 1972 4 and, as quoted, now requires a "good faith commercial agricultural use" of the land in question. Where we think the trial judge went astray, therefore, was in his failure to determine whether the continuous agricultural use he found was a good faith commercial agricultural use as distinguished from a mere agricultural use; and, in truth, Straughn, supra, strongly suggests this distinction, though the point was not squarely before the court, when it commented: 5
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