Walker v. City of Toledo

• Decision Date: 03 February 2017
• Docket Number: No. L-15-1240.,L-15-1240.
• Citation: 84 N.E.3d 216,2017 Ohio 416
• Parties: Bradley L. WALKER, Appellant v. CITY OF TOLEDO, et al., Appellees
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

84 N.E.3d 216

2017 Ohio 416

Bradley L. WALKER, Appellant

v.CITY OF TOLEDO, et al., Appellees

No. L-15-1240.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, Lucas County.

Decided: February 3, 2017

Andrew R. Mayle, Fremont, Jeremiah S. Ray, Lakewood, Ronald J. Mayle, Fremont, and John T. Murray, Sandusky, for appellant.

Adam W. Loukx, Law Director, and Eileen M. Granata, Senior Attorney, for appellee City of Toledo.

Quintin F. Lindsmith, James P. Schuck and Sommer L. Sheely, Columbus, for appellee Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

JENSEN, P.J.

Introduction

{¶ 1} Following an order of remand from the Ohio Supreme Court, the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas granted the motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by the co-defendants, the city of Toledo and Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. The plaintiff-appellant, Bradley L. Walker, appealed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's decision.

Statement of Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} This case returns to us a second time. In 2008, the city of Toledo enacted Toledo Municipal Code 313.12, a so-called "red light camera" law. The ordinance authorizes an automated traffic-law-enforcement system that assesses civil penalties against a vehicle's owner for speeding and red-light violations. The enforcement apparatus includes a camera and a vehicle sensor that automatically produces photos, video, or digital images of vehicles violating these traffic laws. Toledo Municipal Code 313.12(b)(1). Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc., provides the equipment and shares the revenue with Toledo.

{¶ 3} Administration of the program is left to Toledo transportation officials and Toledo's police and law departments. Toledo Municipal Code 313.12(a)(2). When the Redflex equipment records a traffic violation, the city forwards a "notice of liability" to the registered owner of the vehicle, advising the owner that a civil penalty of $120 has been assessed against him or her. Toledo Municipal Code 313.12(a)(3)(B) and 313.12(d)(1) and (2). The notice of liability is not a criminal citation, and it carries no collateral consequences, such as the assignment of points against the owner's driver's license. Toledo Municipal Code 313.12(c)(5) and 313.12(d)(1) and (2).

{¶ 4} The owner must "give notice of appeal or pay the civil penalty" within 21 days of the date listed on the notice. Toledo Municipal Code 313.12(a)(3)(C) and 313.12(d)(4). Failure to file an appeal or pay is deemed a waiver of the right to contest liability and is considered an admission. Toledo Municipal Code 313.12(d)(4). If an owner does appeal, an administrative hearing is held. If the owner offers evidence to show the hearing officer that he or she was not driving the vehicle when the violation occurred, the owner will not be held responsible for the violation. Toledo Municipal Code 313.12(c)(4).

{¶ 5} Pursuant to Toledo Municipal Code 313.12(d)(4), appeals "shall be heard through an administrative process established by the Toledo Police Department." A decision in favor of the city of Toledo may be enforced by means of a civil action or any other means provided by the Ohio Revised Code.

{¶ 6} Walker received a notice of liability for a traffic violation under Toledo Municipal Code 313.12. Walker paid the city $120; he did not file a notice of appeal.

{¶ 7} On February 24, 2011, Walker filed a class-action complaint against Toledo and Redflex for unjust enrichment, seeking their return of all civil penalties collected under the statute. The complaint asserted that Toledo Municipal Code 313.12 is unconstitutional for three reasons: because it usurps the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court, is unconstitutionally vague, and is violative of due process. Toledo and Redflex separately filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

{¶ 8} The trial court granted the motions, and Walker appealed. We reversed, in part.

The Court of Appeals' June 28, 2013 Decision

{¶ 9} As to Walker's claim that Toledo Municipal Code 313.12 invaded the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court, we agreed. We held,

[T]he legislature has vested the municipal court with the jurisdiction to adjudicate the violation of any municipal ordinance, including Toledo Municipal Code 313.12. The plain language of the ordinance also reveals that [Toledo] has attempted to divest the municipal court of some, or all, of its jurisdiction by establishing an administrative alternative without the express approval of the legislature. Such usurpation of jurisdiction violates Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 1, and is therefore a nullity. Walker v. Toledo , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1056, 2013-Ohio-2809 [994 N.E.2d 467], ¶ 36. (" Walker I. ")

{¶ 10} Walker's second claim was that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it delegates adjudicatory authority to the Toledo Police without articulating intelligible governance principles. This court rejected Walker's argument. We held, "The delegation of authority is extremely Spartan, but does not, in our view, rise to the level of constitutional vagueness." Id . at ¶ 38.

{¶ 11} In his third constitutional challenge, Walker claimed that the Toledo Police Department never established any administrative appeal procedures by which a notice of violation could be challenged. We agreed with Walker, finding, "Since at a minimum, due process of law requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, * * * it would seem the absence of any process would be problematic. Thus, this branch of appellant's constitutional argument does not warrant dismissal." (Citation omitted.) Id .

{¶ 12} Thus, this court sustained Walker's exclusive jurisdiction and due process theories of relief; we rejected the vagueness argument. Walker did not appeal; Toledo and Redflex did.

{¶ 13} As described by the Ohio Supreme Court, Toledo and Redflex appealed on the issue of "whether Toledo's civil administrative enforcement of its traffic ordinances violates the Ohio Constitution or R.C. 1901.20." Walker v. Toledo , 143 Ohio St.3d 420, 2014-Ohio-5461, 39 N.E.2d 474, ¶ 12.

Decision by the Ohio Supreme Court

{¶ 14} By decision dated December 18, 2014, the Supreme Court of Ohio held,

[W]e reaffirm our holding in Mendenhall v. Akron , 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, that municipalities have home-rule authority under Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, to impose civil liability on traffic violators through an administrative enforcement system. We also hold that Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 1, which authorizes the legislature to create municipal courts, and R.C. 1901.20, which sets the jurisdiction of municipal courts, do not endow municipal courts with exclusive authority over traffic-ordinance violations. Finally, we hold that Ohio municipalities have home-rule authority to establish administrative proceedings, including administrative hearings, in furtherance of these ordinances, that must be exhausted before offenders or the municipality can pursue judicial remedies. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals with regard to its holding that the ordinance infringes upon the jurisdiction of the municipal court, and we remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Id . at ¶ 29.

The Trial Court's Decision Following Remand

{¶ 15} Following remand, Toledo and Redflex answered the complaint and separately filed motions for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C).

{¶ 16} The trial court found that the complaint "contains no allegations raising a reasonable inference that the Ordinance was invalidly applied to Plaintiff or that Plaintiff was harmed, actually or in theory, by the Police Departments' alleged failure to establish a written administrative appeal process." Walker v. City of Toledo , Lucas C.P. No. CI201101922, 2015 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 4135, *16–20 (Aug. 12, 2015).

{¶ 17} The trial court granted the defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings, and Walker timely appealed, claiming one assignment of error.

Walker's Assignment of Error

The trial court erroneously dismissed Walker's complaint in violation of this court's previous decision in Walker I holding that Walker's complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Standard of Review

{¶ 18} A trial court reviews a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings using the same standard of review as a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. McMullian v. Borean , 167 Ohio App.3d 777, 2006-Ohio-3867, 857 N.E.2d 180, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.). Thus, the trial court "must presume that all factual allegations of the complaint are true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. , 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988).

{¶ 19} In ruling on the motion, a court is permitted to consider both the complaint and the answer as well as any material incorporated by reference or attached as exhibits to those pleadings. Frazier v. Kent , 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2004–P–0077 and 2004-P-0096, 2005-Ohio-5413, 2005 WL 2542940, ¶ 14. "In so doing, the court must construe the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, as true and in favor of the non-moving party. A court granting the motion must find that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle him or her to relief." (Citations omitted.) Id . at ¶ 14.

{¶ 20} Because a Civ.R. 12(C) motion tests the legal basis for the claims asserted in a complaint, our standard of review is de novo. Id . at ¶ 14, citing State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious , 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996).

Law and Analysis

{¶ 21} In support of his assignment of error, Walker makes two arguments. First, he claims, "While the majority of the Supreme Court of Ohio held that municipalities have general authority ‘to...