Walker v. State

• Decision Date: 24 October 1903
• Citation: 45 S.E. 608,118 Ga. 757
• Parties: WALKER. v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

45 S.E. 608

118 Ga. 757

WALKER.

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 24, 1903.

HOMICIDE—EVIDENCE OF ACCOMPLICE—ALIBI —INSTRUCTIONS.

1. The rule of law which requires corroboration of an accomplice before the accused can be convicted of a felony on his testimony has no application to one who, while jointly indicted with the accused, is not shown by the evidence to have been his accomplice, or to have participated in any manner in the crime with which he is charged.

2. Where, on the trial of one indicted for murder, the accused in his statement set up the defense of alibi, but no evidence was introduced in support of such defense, it was not error for the court, in the absence of a written request, to fail to charge the law with reference thereto.

3. There was evidence to support the verdict; it was approved by the trial judge; and this court will not, under such circumstances, set the same aside.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Jefferson County; H. G. Lewis, Judge.

Pink Walker was convicted of murder, and brings error. Affirmed.

Cain & Hardeman and Jas. K. Hines, for plaintiff in error.

B. T. Rawlings, Sol. Gen., Jno. C. Hart, Atty. Gen., and R. L. Gamble, for the State.

CANDLER, J. The accused was tried in the superior court of Jefferson county upon an indictment charging him, with others, with the offense of murder. He was found guilty, and sentenced, upon the recommendation of the jury, to life imprisonment, whereupon he made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted.

1. The only witness who claimed to have been present when the murder was committed was one Almo Timmons, who was also under indictment for the same offense. Coun-sel for the accused, in the argument here, claimed that he was an accomplice in the murder, and that it was therefore necessary for the state to corroborate his testimony in order to convict the accused; and error is assigned upon the refusal of the court to charge this rule of law. It is also claimed that, because of the failure to corroborate the testimony of Timmons, the conviction of the accused was unwarranted. A careful examination of the record, however, fails to show that Timmons was an accomplice of the accused. If the truth of the case is as the state contends, he was at most only an accessory after the fact, and this court has held a number of times that an accessory after the fact is not, under our law, an accomplice. Lowery v. State, 72 Ga. 654; Allen v. State, 74 Ga. 769; Springer v. State, 102 Ga. 452, 30 S. E. 971. It is immaterial, in determining whether or not Timmons was an accomplice, that he was jointly indicted with the accused as a principal in the first degree. Bernhard v. State, 76 Ga. 613. That was a matter that depended upon the evidence offered on the trial. All the evidence bearing upon Timmons' connection with "the crime tended to show that, while he was present at its perpetration, he was not associated in any way with its commission, and did not know that a crime was contemplated until after it had been accomplished. In order to render one an accomplice of another, participation in the criminal acts and in the execution of a common criminal intent is necessary. Springer v. State, 102 Ga. 452, 30 S. E. 971, and citations. "Criminal intent is a necessary ingredient of crime, and is an essential to render one an accomplice. It follows that, where this element is absent, one is not an accomplice." 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. (2d Ed.) 391. The line of the defense in this case was...