Walker v. State (Ex parte Walker)
Decision Date | 17 January 2014 |
Docket Number | 1121407. |
Citation | 152 So.3d 1247 |
Parties | Ex parte Earnest Lee WALKER (In re Earnest Lee Walker v. State of Alabama). |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Shanon Haack, Montgomery, for petitioner.
Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Megan A. Kirkpatrick, deputy atty. gen., and John J. Davis, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
This Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain Earnest Lee Walker's appeal from the new sentence imposed for his 2006 guilty-plea conviction for second-degree receiving stolen property. The new sentence was imposed after it was determined, following Walker's filing a Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition, that Walker's original sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Walker's appeal by an order, from which Judge Welch dissented. Walker v. State, 127 So.3d 437 (Ala.Crim.App.2012). We reverse and remand.
In June 2006, Walker pleaded guilty to the offense of second-degree receiving stolen property, a violation of § 13A–8–19, Ala.Code 1975. The State established that at the time of sentencing Walker had three prior felony convictions. The trial court, applying the Habitual Felony Offender Act, sentenced Walker to 15 years' imprisonment. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court ordered that the sentence run concurrently with a sentence Walker was serving for a 2004 conviction.
In February 2010, Walker petitioned the circuit court for postconviction relief, pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., from his 15–year sentence for the 2006 conviction for second-degree receiving stolen property. In his petition, he argued that his sentence was illegal because, he said, one of the prior felonies used to enhance his sentence had been vacated since his original sentencing. After the State conceded that Walker's sentence had been improperly enhanced with the use of a felony conviction that had subsequently been vacated and that Walker was entitled to be resentenced, the circuit court granted Walker's request for relief and ordered a new sentencing hearing.
On September 21, 2011, the trial court conducted a new sentencing hearing. According to the record, the trial court stated that in light of the State's withdrawal of its request to proceed under the Habitual Felony Offender Act it would not apply the Habitual Felony Offender Act to Walker's new sentence, and it resentenced Walker to 10 years' imprisonment. During the hearing, the following occurred:
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that it was without jurisdiction to consider Walker's appeal from his new sentence, and it issued an order dismissing Walker's appeal. In reaching its determination, the Court of Criminal Appeals relied on its decision in Hart v. State, 939 So.2d 948, 950 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) ( ).1 Walker then petitioned this Court for certiorari review.
“ ‘This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal cases de novo.’ ” Ex parte Morrow, 915 So.2d 539, 541 (Ala.2004) (quoting Ex parte Key, 890 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Ala.2003) ).
Walker contends, and the State agrees, that the Court of Criminal Appeals had jurisdiction to consider his appeal from the judgment and the new sentence imposed at the sentencing hearing conducted after the circuit court granted Walker's request for postconviction relief, pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., from an illegal sentence.
Before this Court can address the Court of Criminal Appeals' jurisdiction to entertain Walker's appeal from his new sentence, we must consider the meaning of the circuit court's grant of Rule 32 relief in the form of a new sentencing hearing.
Rule 32.1, Ala. R.Crim. P., sets forth the scope of the remedy a circuit court can provide in response to a petition for postconviction relief, stating:
Rule 32.1(b) permits a circuit court to grant a Rule 32 petitioner relief from an illegal sentence by authorizing the circuit court, without disturbing the underlying conviction, to vacate the petitioner's sentence and order a new sentencing hearing. When a Rule 32 court grants a petitioner relief from an illegal sentence by ordering a new sentencing hearing, the Rule 32 court, without disturbing the conviction, returns jurisdiction over the underlying criminal matter to the trial court for the purpose of conducting a new sentencing hearing and pronouncing a new sentence. The Rule 32 court's grant of a new sentencing hearing revives the underlying criminal matter, authorizing the trial court to conduct a sentencing hearing, independent of the Rule 32 action, and to resentence the defendant, if appropriate. Cf. Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 130 S.Ct. 2788, 177 L.Ed.2d 592 (2010) ( ).
Judge Welch dissented from the Court of Criminal Appeals' order dismissing Walker's appeal. This Court has considered the argument made by Judge Welch in his dissent that a circuit court's order granting a Rule 32 petitioner postconviction relief from an illegal sentence and ordering a new sentencing hearing is interlocutory and is not final until after the trial court has conducted the new sentencing hearing and resentenced the petitioner. Judge Welch maintains that, after the petitioner has been resentenced, the order granting Rule 32 relief becomes final, and the petitioner may appeal the decision on the Rule 32 petition and his or her new sentence. The determination to grant or to deny postconviction relief and the propriety of the new sentence, however, are two distinct judicial matters. The petitioner's new sentence is the result of a complete and independent proceeding, and the legality of the new sentence is not the subject of the Rule 32 proceeding in which the new sentencing hearing was granted. Indeed, the grounds with regard to the legality of the new sentence were not pleaded in the Rule 32 petition; therefore, to hold that the grant of postconviction relief is interlocutory and that appellate review of that action is not proper until after the new sentence is pronounced would extend the scope of a decision on a Rule 32 petition and its appellate review beyond the parameters provided in the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Dunaway v. State, [Ms. CR–06–0996, Dec. 18, 2009] ––– So.3d ––––, –––– (Ala.Crim.App.2009)() ; Hooks v. State, 21 So.3d 772, 795 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) () .
Now, this Court must determine the appropriate procedure by which a defendant can appeal the legality of a sentence that is imposed at a sentencing hearing conducted after the circuit court has granted the defendant postconviction relief from an illegal sentence.
A defendant's right to appeal in a criminal case is provided in § 12–22–130, Ala.Code 1975, which states:
“A person convicted of a criminal offense in...
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...required by § 13A-5-6(c). If Bishop wants to appeal his resentencing, he must file a new notice of appeal. See, e.g., Ex parte Walker, 152 So. 3d 1247 (Ala. 2014). No return to remand need be filed.AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.Windom, P.J., and Mitchell, Special Judge,* ......
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...required by § 13A-5-6(c). If Bishop wants to appeal his resentencing, he must file a new notice of appeal. See, e.g., Ex parte Walker, 152 So. 3d 1247 (Ala. 2014). No return to remand need be filed. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. Windom, P.J., and Mitchell, Special Judge,......
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