Walker v. Superior Court In and For County of Navajo
| Decision Date | 16 April 1998 |
| Docket Number | CA-SA,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 956 P.2d 1246,191 Ariz. 424 |
| Parties | , 267 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 17 Lawrence WALKER, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF NAVAJO, the Honorable Carolyn Holliday, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge, STATE of Arizona, Real Party in Interest. 97-0234. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
¶1 A police officer stopped Petitioner's vehicle for expired plates. When Petitioner could not produce a driver's license, the officer asked for his name and social security number, and Petitioner complied. When the officer learned from his dispatcher that no license information existed for the given name and number, the officer accused Petitioner of lying. Petitioner then stated his true name and number. For this, the Navajo County Attorney is prosecuting Petitioner for obstructing criminal investigations, a class 5 felony, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") section 13-2409 (1989).
¶2 Petitioner told the officer that he had at first lied because his license was suspended. Petitioner had other problems as well: He appeared to have been drinking, he admitted as much, he failed the sobriety tests, and he registered a blood alcohol content over .10. Counts I and II of the indictment charge Petitioner with aggravated driving under the influence and with aggravated driving under the influence with BAC of .10 or more. These pending class four felonies are unaffected by this special action, which involves only the obstruction count.
¶3 Petitioner filed a motion to remand the obstruction count to the grand jury and a motion to dismiss it. After the motions were denied, Petitioner obtained a stay of trial and filed this special action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Constitution, article 6, section 9, Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, and A.R.S. section 12-120.21 (1992).
¶4 We accept jurisdiction and grant relief because the State instructed the grand jury on only an inapplicable law, and it thus denied Petitioner a substantial procedural right in the grand jury, namely, the due process right to have the grand jury instructed on applicable law. Crimmins v. Superior Court, 137 Ariz. 39, 42, 668 P.2d 882, 885 (1983) (); Trebus v. Davis in and for County of Pima, 189 Ariz. 621, 623, 944 P.2d 1235, 1237 (1997) ().
¶5 As we explain shortly, the obstruction statute is inapplicable to the facts of this case because that statute requires three people: a defendant, an officer (or other specified official), and another (a prospective informant or witness). This case has no "another." The State, therefore, obtained an indictment on a charge that is inapplicable as a matter of law. (The parties agree that an applicable statute--if the State elects to use it--is A.R.S. section 13-2907.01, false reporting to law enforcement agencies, a class 1 misdemeanor.)
¶6 A.R.S. section 13-2409 (1989) provides as follows:
Obstructing criminal investigations or prosecutions; classification
A person who knowingly attempts by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation or force or threats of force to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or testimony relating to a violation of any criminal statute to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury or who knowingly injures another in his person or property on account of the giving by the latter or by any other person of any such information or testimony to a peace officer, magistrate, prosecutor or grand jury is guilty of a class 5 felony.
¶7 Section 13-2409 derives from former section 13-541.01(A), 1 which derived from federal law, namely, from Title 18, section 1510(a) of the United States Code, which provides:
Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
¶8 More than twenty years ago, in interpreting section 13-541.01(A), this court stated that "[o]ur Legislature ... clearly indicated that for communication to be criminal it must be ... uttered to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or testimony relating to the violation of a criminal statute to a police officer...." State v. Snodgrass, 117 Ariz. 107, 114, 570 P.2d 1280, 1287 (App.1977). The Snodgrass court also observed that the obstruction statute does not criminalize "false unsworn statements relating to one's own allegedly criminal conduct...." Id. Although the obstruction statute has been amended since Snodgrass was decided, the focus of the statute has not changed, and the Snodgrass interpretation of it remains valid.
¶9 In obstruction statutes, such as section 13-2409, "[t]he primary subject of protection ... is the transmission of the words of a prospective informant or witness; it is the giving of information for which security is sought." 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 9 (1978).
¶10 This prosecution is based on "misrepresentation" in the first part of section 13-2409, which criminalizes the use of "bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation or force or threats of force to obstruct, delay or prevent the communication of information or testimony...." With the exception of "misrepresentation," the conduct specified in the obstruction statute is something a person can do only to someone other than the investigating officer. In theory, perhaps, a defendant could bribe, intimidate, force, or threaten the officer to obstruct, delay, or prevent defendant from communicating information to the officer, but such theory is nonsense.
¶11 The obstruction statute makes complete sense, however, if it is viewed as criminalizing conduct that defendant directs at "another." The word "misrepresentation" also has meaning in this context. "The [obstruction] statute is violated whenever an individual induces or attempts to induce another person to make a material misrepresentation to a criminal investigator," or whenever an individual makes "a misrepresentation to persons being contacted for information by investigators as to the significance and importance of the information relating to the matter which is the subject of that inquiry." 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 9 (1978).
¶12 We hold that "misrepresentation" in the obstruction statute refers to what defendant says or does to a prospective informant or witness; it does not refer to what defendant says or does to an officer who is investigating defendant. Arizona has numerous laws that criminalize false statements to the government officials specified in section 13-2409: peace officers, magistrates, prosecutors, and grand jurors. Arizona also has numerous laws that criminalize attempts to bribe, intimidate, threaten, or injure those persons. Section 13-2409 is not redundant to those other laws; its singular purpose is to address third-party concerns that those other laws do not reach.
¶13 Section 13-2409 is a one-sentence statute with two parts, and the second part expressly mentions "another"; it punishes a defendant who "knowingly injures another in his person or property on account of the giving by the latter or by any other person of any such information...." The two parts of the obstruction statute therefore form a coherent before-and-after protection plan for informants and witnesses: The first part of the statute punishes the defendant who attempts to obstruct, delay, or prevent another from communicating specified information to law enforcement; the second part punishes the defendant who injures another for having communicated that information. What Petitioner said to the officer was a false statement by Petitioner, but it was not an obstruction by Petitioner of communication by another.
¶14 Numerous laws exist to punish those who lie to government officials during traffic stops and elsewhere. We have already mentioned A.R.S. section 13-2907.01, false reporting to law enforcement agencies. Granted, this class 1 misdemeanor is less severe than the obstruction statute, which is a class 5 felony, but perhaps the legislature decided that a class 1 misdemeanor is sufficient penalty for a misrepresentation like the one told by Petitioner. Many motorists make misrepresentations when not under oath, and we have no indication that the legislature considers such persons guilty of a class 5 felony and subject to a fine of $150,000, a 60% surcharge, loss of civil rights, and a prison term of 2.5 years. See A.R.S. sections 12-116.01, 12-116.02, 13-702, 13-702.01, and 13-801 (). The Arizona false statement statutes do not provide such a severe penalty for unsworn falsification, or even for some kinds of sworn falsification.
¶15 A.R.S. section 13-2704 provides as follows:
A. A person commits unsworn falsification by knowingly:
1. Making any statement which he believes to be false, in regard to a material issue, to a public servant in connection with an application for any benefit, privilege, or license.
2. Making any statement which he believes to be false in regard to a material issue to a public servant in connection with any official proceeding as defined in § 13-2801 [...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Parada v. Parada
... ... No. CV-97-0520-PR ... Supreme Court" of Arizona, En Banc ... April 19, 2000 ... \xC2" ... during all of the time he worked for Santa Cruz County. That employment qualified him for benefits under the ... and Guillermina were divorced in the Pima County Superior Court. Each spouse was awarded "50% of the retirement ... ...
-
State v. Carrasco
...worker for the purpose of thwarting this investigation.3 ¶ 7 Moreover, we disagree with Carrasco that in Walker v. Superior Court, 191 Ariz. 424, 956 P.2d 1246 (App.1998), which the trial court relied on in granting Carrasco's renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, Division One made "it ......
-
State v. Wise
...the denial of his motion challenging the grand jury proceedings, we note that appellate review has been waived. See Walker v. Superior Court, 191 Ariz. 424, 428, ¶ 22 (App. 1998) ("A special action petition prior to trial is a defendant's only avenue for relief for review of the trial court......
-
State v. Fields
...right in the jury's being properly instructed on the law, and a court must determine whether that has taken place. See Walker v. Superior Court, 191 Ariz. 424, ¶ 4, 956 P.2d 1246, 1247–48 (App.1998). And Chase agreed at oral argument before this court that the trial court erred insofar as i......