Walker v. Taylor

• Citation: 88 S.E. 300,104 S.C. 1
• Decision Date: 13 March 1916
• Docket Number: 9329.
• Parties: WALKER v. TAYLOR ET AL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

88 S.E. 300

104 S.C. 1

WALKER v. TAYLOR ET AL.

No. 9329.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 13, 1916

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Greenwood County; Ernest Moore, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Annie B. Walker against George H. Taylor and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

The decree of the trial court is as follows:

The facts upon which this action is brought are clearly established by the testimony to be as follows:

The plaintiff is a daughter of Joseph Benson, who died many years ago and left as his heirs at law and distributees his widow, Mrs. Harriet Benson, and the plaintiff. At the time of his death, James Benson was possessed of some personal estate, the amount of which is not shown. His widow, Mrs Benson, without administration took charge of this personal property and invested it in a house and lot in New Market and afterwards sold the house and lot and reinvested the proceeds in the 66 acres of land, which is the subject of this action. When this second investment was made, Mrs Benson had married a Mr. Wilkinson, and she is therefore spoken of in the record as Mrs. Harriet Wilkinson. At the time of her father's death, the plaintiff, Mrs. Walker was a very small child. On reaching her majority, the plaintiff raised some question with her mother, Mrs Wilkinson, about the appropriation of her father's estate, and the difference between them was on the 5th day of March, 1899, referred to a board of arbitrators. The agreement to arbitrate was in the form of a bond executed by Mrs. Wilkinson to abide by the decision of the board. The arbitrators rendered the following decision in writing: " That at the death of the said Mrs. Harriet Wilkinson one-third of the 60 acres of land now in possession of Mrs. Wilkinson and said to have been purchased in part with funds belonging to the estate of Joseph Benson, be given to Mrs. Annie Walker as her interest in the said estate of Joseph F. Benson." The bond and decision of the arbitrators were filed for record with the clerk of the court for Abbeville county, where the land was then situate, on the 11th day of March, 1899, and was recorded in mortgage Book F, at page 129. The lands referred to in the decision of the arbitrators are the lands which are the subject of action. Thus far the facts are not in dispute.

On the 12th day of March, 1900, Mrs. Wilkinson conveyed the lands to the defendant George H. Taylor. Testimony shows that Mrs. Walker with her husband came to Greenwood and negotiations were had between her husband, Mrs. Wilkinson, and Mr. Taylor about the settlement of her claim in the land. Mr. Taylor admits that on this occasion there was some dispute between Mrs. Wilkinson and Mrs. Walker about a division of the money which Mrs. Wilkinson was to get from the sale of the land, for he says: "Q. Don't you know they were talking about the claim of Mrs. Walker? A. If they were talking about it, I do not know. I understood there was some trouble about getting the money. Q. You understood there was some trouble between Mrs. Wilkinson and Mrs. Walker about dividing the money you were to pay for this land? A. There was some contest about the paper. Q. You know they were about here two or three hours and do you mean to testify that you did not know the nature of that claim? A. I do. Q. You did know it was a claim? A. I knew it was some contest between Mrs. Wilkinson and Mrs. Walker." Again, speaking of the same transaction, he says: "Q. That was in the morning? A. No, it was not. It was 10 o'clock when we met there. They were first in one place and then in another. I went to Mrs. Wilkinson a time or two, and she said that she and Mrs. Walker could not come to an agreement. Q. That was before you signed the deed? A. Yes. Q. With that information you did not take the trouble to find out what the claim was? A. That was nothing to me."

The testimony of plaintiff is full and clear to the point that Mrs. Walker came to Greenwood for the purpose of having her interest in the lands fixed and paid over to her, that no agreement could be reached, that Mr. Taylor knew of plaintiff's claim, and that he actually withheld part of the purchase price to protect himself against the same. This is not only evident from the plaintiff's testimony, but is borne out by the fact that Mr. Taylor actually took possession of the original arbitration agreement which was turned over on this occasion as one of his muniments of title by Mrs. Wilkinson; and by the testimony of his codefendant, who at first denies all knowledge of the claim of Mrs. Walker, but on cross-examination says: "Q. You came with Mr. McKellar before this suit was started, and did you tell Mr. McKellar that you did not wish to go on with the trade, and he told you he would make you safe? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember telling him further that Mr. Taylor told you that he had retained the Walker interest and that they could not agree on a trade and she would not make it? A. I have heard him say that lots of times." And again he says: "Q. Did he say how much he would pay her? A. He did not say. Q. When did you last say that he wanted to make a settlement? A. After Mrs. Wilkinson died. Q. He did not tell you how much he owed her, did he? A. I never did know."

There can be little doubt, then, that both Taylor and Harvley took the lands with full knowledge of Mrs. Walker's claim in the same. If there were no other testimony than their own admissions, her claim was patent; and they were certainly possessed of such knowledge as would have required of them further inquiry, which could not be terminated in any other way than full knowledge of the facts, for

the paper was on record and Mrs. Walker actually present trying to effect a settlement of the differences between herself and Mrs. Wilkinson. Mr. Giles states that a part of the purchase price was withheld. This, however, he now seeks to correct, saying that the stenographer incorrectly reported his testimony. If this be conceded, it does not at all alter the conditions, for he says Mr. Graydon handled the matter and so far as he knows advised about the arbitration. It certainly cannot be assumed that Mr. Graydon over-looked what the record plainly disclosed. Mr. Giles says: "Q. Was this arbitration recorded in Abbeville? A. I suppose so. Q. Now, Mr. Giles, as I understood it, you made no examination of the record as to the rights of the parties? A. Mr. Graydon may have done that. Q. Who handled the transaction? A. Mr. Graydon. Q. So Mr. Graydon might have advised about this matter? A. I do not know. Q. Were you in the office with Mr. Graydon? A. I do not know; I think I was in the office the whole time. I recall that Mr. Walker was in the office."

When plaintiff's testimony is taken into consideration, it is full, clear, and convincing that both Taylor and Harvley were fully advised as to the situation and took the lands subject to Mrs. Walker's claim. The weight of the testimony establishes the fact that Taylor actually retained part of the purchase price. The testimony of plaintiff is clear as to this. Harvley's admission that he had heard Taylor so state many times, and the consideration paid, all support such finding against Taylor's denial.

On the question of notice, the law is well fixed that, where a party has such information as would be sufficient to require of him further inquiry, he will be held to have knowledge of such facts as the inquiry would reveal to him.

"These facts show that plaintiff had expressed and explicit notice of the existence of the deeds. If they had been duly recorded and inspected by plaintiff, he would have had no more information, for the recording would not have established the delivery. He in point of fact had more information than he could have derived from an inspection of the record, if they had been recorded, for Evander Byrd had admitted to him the existence of the deeds and recognized their efficiency by asking him to pay taxes upon the land listed in the name of the grantees. The plain dictates of common prudence required the plaintiff, under these circumstances, to ascertain the actual state of facts, or be bound by them as they were. City Council v. Page, Speers, Eq. 212; Wallace v. Craps, 3 Strob. 268; Farr v. Sims, Rich. Eq. Cas. 122, 24 Am. Dec. 396; Black v. Childs, 14 S.C. 321; Carrigan v. Byrd, 23 S.C. 94, 95.

'The deed to Ford was not recorded, Ford's deed to plaintiff was; the circuit judge did not err in charging the jury that express notice, or such facts as should put a party upon inquiry which would lead to notice, would answer the same purpose as recording.' "

"Where circumstances are sufficient to put a party upon inquiry, he is chargeable with constructive notice of every fact which such inquiry will certainly disclose."

Mrs. Wilkinson died on the 15th day of July, 1913, and in a short while this action was commenced, asking, among other things, that the title to a one-third undivided interest in the lands be declared to be in Mrs. Walker, the plaintiff, and that a partition of the lands be decreed.

What relief, if any, should be granted under the facts as above stated? Upon the death of Mr. Benson, the plaintiff unquestionably had a two-thirds interest in his estate. When Mrs. Benson appropriated this estate and invested it in the lands in question, the law created trust in favor of the child, and it could have been enforced against the lands in her possession. Among the many cases announcing this doctrine, that of Brazel v. Fair, 26 S.C. 387, 2 S.E. 300, adopting the language of the court in Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. Div., 696, is appropriate to the facts of this case: "He may have bought land with it for instance, or he may have bought chattels with it. Now, what is the position of the

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