Walkowski v. Macomb County Sheriff

• Decision Date: 23 September 1975
• Docket Number: Docket No. 20143
• Citation: 236 N.W.2d 516,64 Mich.App. 460
• Parties: Dorothy Dian WALKOWSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MACOMB COUNTY SHERIFF et al., Defendants, and Director, Michigan State Police Department, Defendant-Appellant. 64 Mich.App. 460, 236 N.W.2d 516
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 516

236 N.W.2d 516

Dorothy Dian WALKOWSKI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MACOMB COUNTY SHERIFF et al., Defendants and Director, Michigan State Police Department Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 20143.

64 Mich.App. 460, 236 N.W.2d 516

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Sept. 23, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 1975.

Released for Publication Dec. 18, 1975.

[64 MICHAPP 461] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Patrick A. Aseltyne, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State Police.

Edmund M. Brady, Jr., Detroit, for Sheriff.

Anthony J. Bellanca, Harper Woods, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before QUINN, P.J., and BRONSON and KAUFMAN, JJ.

BRONSON, Judge.

Plaintiff, Dorothy Dian Walkowski, brought suit for battery, assault, faluse arrest, unlawful imprisonment, and defamation against police officers of the Macomb County Sheriff's Department, St. Clair County Sheriff's Department, and the Michigan State Police Department. Appellant here, John R. Plants, was sued in his capacity as Director of the Michigan, State Police Department. Colonel Plants made motions for accelerated judgment and summary judgment, the denial of which he appeals by leave granted.

This cause of action arises out of events occurring on November 1 and 2, 1972. On the night of November 1, plaintiff was stopped by two officers of the Macomb County Sheriff's Department for allegedly running a red light. These two officers [64 MICHAPP 462] ran a warrant check to determine if there were any outstanding warrants for plaintiff's arrest. They directed their inquiry to the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN), a computerized filing system used to store such information. LEIN is maintained by the Michigan State Police Department.

Plaintiff contends that the LEIN system gave forth the false information that plaintiff was wanted on an outstanding warrant for perjury committed in St. Clair County. Defendant agrees that no such warrant was ever in existence. Plaintiff alleges that this false information caused her to be conveyed by the state police to the St. Clair County Jail, where she was incarcerated until she was able to post bond at about 4:00 in the afternoon of November 2.

Colonel Plants asserts that the LEIN 'charge code' for perjury and contempt of court was the same at that time. Plaintiff admits that a valid bench warrant for contempt was outstanding against her at this time, resulting from her failure to appear in court for a traffic ticket. Defendant states that the Macomb authorities followed standard procedures and verified the existence of a warrant through the state police, and that all subsequent actions were based upon the valid contempt warrant, with any 'false' information having no effect. It is conceded by defendant, however, the perjury is a felony, while contempt is a quasicriminal misdemeanor. From that fact, plaintiff argues that the police would have not taken her into custody if only the contempt warrant had been involved.

Defendant Plants filed a motion for summary judgment and accelerated judgment Summary judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1) was [64 MICHAPP 463] based upon the claim that Plants' actions were not the proximate cause of defendant's injuries. Accelerated judgment, under GCR 1963, 116.1(1), (2), was based upon: (1) the circuit court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction of this type of claim; and (2) the circuit court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Plants due to his immunity from suit under the doctrine of governmental immunity. Because we hold that defendant John R. Plants is immune from suit, we need reach only that issue.

There is no question that a suit against the Michigan State Police Department by the plaintiff for the wrongs complained of here would be barred by governmental immunity. The new governmental immunity statute, M.C.L.A. § 691.1407; M.S.A. § 3.996(107), was effective as of August 1, 1970, and applies to all injuries occurring after the date, Campbell, v. Detroit, 51 Mich.App. 34, 214 N.W.2d 337 (1973). The statute provides immunity when the agency is engaged in a 'governmental function'. The operations of police departments are governmental functions, Kelley v. East Lansing, 50 Mich.App. 511 213 N.W.2d 557 (1973); Anderson v. Detroit, 54 Mich.App. 496, 221 N.W.2d 168 (1974). The operations of the state police are covered by the doctrine of governmental immunity.

The extent to which public officials are to be given the benefits of governmental immunity was set out in early Michigan law. ¹ As Justice Cooley concisely summarized, the rule draws a distinction [64 MICHAPP 464] between 'discretionary' or 'quasi-judicial' and 'ministerial' acts:

'A ministerial officer has a line of conduct marked out for him, and has nothing to do but to follow it; and he must be held liable for any failure to do so which results in the injury of another. A judicial officer, on the other hand, has certain powers confided to him to be exercised according to his judgment or discretion; and the law would be oppressive which should compel him in every case to decide correctly at his peril. It is accordingly a rule of very great antiquity that no action will lie against a judicial officer for any act done by him in the exercise of his judicial functions, provided the act, though done mistakenly, were within the scope of his jurisdiction: * * *. Nor does the rule depend upon whether the tribunal is a court or not; it is the nature of the duties to be performed that determines its application.' Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 228, 235--236 (1867). (Citations omitted.)

That rule is followed in a majority of the states, Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), § 132, pp. 988--989. The reasons for the rule were further explored in Justice Edwares' dissenting opinion to William v. Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 261--262, 111 N.W.2d 1, 26 (1961):

'In the exercise of discretionary power, governmental duty runs to the benefit of the whole public, rather than to individuals. It is of great importance that this crucial function of democratic decision making be unhampered by litigation. ⁴

[64 MICHAPP 465] In the earlier cases, the rule was directly applied in several situations. It was held that members of city councils are immune from suits arising from their disapproval of the liquor bonds of private citizens, in that those actions are considered 'discretionary', Amperse v. Winslow, 75 Mich. 234, 42 N.W. 823 (1889); Pawlowski v. Jenks, 115 Mich. 275, 73 N.W. 238 (1897). In People for Use of Lapeer County Bank v. O'Connell, 214 Mich. 410, 183 N.W. 195 (1921), the Court held that the acts of the county drain commissioner in issuing partial payments for the construction of a drain were 'ministerial', and that he could be held personally liable for improperly doing so.

Other cases have had some difficulty distinguishing between two different concepts: (1) whether the officer is procedurally protected from suit under the doctrine of governmental immunity and (2) whether the officer is substantively not liable to the plaintiff for his acts in that no duty is owed to this plaintiff. For example, in the case of Raynsford v. Phelps, 43 Mich. 342, 5 N.W. 403 (1880), it was held that seizure of property for delinquent taxes was a ministerial duty, the improper performance[64 MICHAPP 466] of which created liability of the injured party. But the Court even then mentioned the related concept of substantive liability:

'(A) public officer having ministerial duties to perform, In which a private individual has a special and direct interest, is liable to such individual for any injury sustained by him in consequence of the failure to perform such duties.' Raynsford, supra, p. 344, 5 N.W. p. 403 (emphasis added).

That language has been used by later cases to produce some confusing results.

In Rose v. Mackie, 22 Mich.App. 463, 177 N.W.2d 633 (1970), the state highway commissioner was being sued for damages resulting from an automobile accident occurring on a state highway. Two causes of action were pleaded. First, defendant was being sued for negligently performing his general duties to oversee the highways and make sure that they are not unsafe. Secondly, the complaint alleged a negligent design and state of repair with respect to the highway, and that defendant failed to correct his situation after notice to his agents.

The Court had little trouble disposing of the first count on grounds that the commissioner had only discretionary duties in this area. ² They then went [64 MICHAPP 467] on to hold that the second court failed to state a cause of action because the commissioner's duties ran to the public and not the individual plaintiffs. They did Not base this part of the decision on governmental immunity:

'The official in Raynsford had invaded the rights of one person and one person's property. The present situation is much broader in scope, in that the state highway commissioner does not act personally against any single individual in the construction and mainenance of highways. It could in no sense be said that defendant singled out one individual in respect to whom he violated his official duties.' Mackie, supra, p. 467, 177 N.W.2d p. 636.

The test in Michigan for governmental immunity of public officers was not changed. ³

[64 MICHAPP 468] With this background in mind, we come to the case of Nichols v. Zera, 33 Mich.App. 274, 189 N.W.2d 751 (1971). We feel that the Zera Court reached the...