Wall v. Board of Elections of Chatham County

Decision Date21 November 1978
Docket Number34038,Nos. 34037,s. 34037
Citation242 Ga. 566,250 S.E.2d 408
PartiesWALL et al. v. BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF CHATHAM COUNTY et al. McDOWELL v. BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF CHATHAM COUNTY et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Killorin & Schroder, Edward W. Killorin, Atlanta, for appellants (Case No. 34037).

Eugene McCracken, Savannah, for appellants (Case No. 34037) and for appellees (Case No. 34038).

Stanley M. Karsman, Savannah, for appellees (Case No. 34037) and for appellant (Case No. 34038).

James B. Blackburn, Anton F. Solms, Jr., Gordon B. Smith, for appellees in both cases.

MARSHALL, Justice.

The present case presents challenges to the constitutionality of a local annexation statute for the City of Savannah. Ga.L.1978, p. 3998 (referred to hereinafter as the annexation statute or the Act).

Under Section 1 of the Act, the Board of Aldermen of the City of Savannah is enlarged from six members to eight members. However, the present method for electing the mayor remains unchanged. The six members of the aldermanic board had previously been elected on an at-large basis. Section 1 provides that two of the members of the new eight-member board are to be elected at large; the remaining six members are to be elected from six single-member aldermanic districts, as established in Section 1.

Section 2 of the Act provides that the present city limits of Savannah shall be extended to include certain designated areas. Section 6 of the Act provides that after the Act is approved by the Governor or otherwise becomes law, it shall be the duty of the Board of Elections of Chatham County to issue the call for an election for the purpose of submitting this Act to the voters residing within the present city limits and the area proposed to be annexed. If more than one half of the total number of votes cast is for approval of the Act, it shall become of full force and effect at the times specified by Section 8 of the Act; otherwise, it shall be void.

The Act was approved by the Governor on March 17, 1978. The Board of Elections of Chatham County scheduled the annexation referendum to be held on April 19, 1978. Ben and Alice Wall, who are residents, taxpayers, and electors within the original city limits of Savannah, brought suit in Chatham Superior Court on April 10, 1978, arguing that the Act is unconstitutional and requesting that the referendum be enjoined. On April 14, 1978, Henry W. McDowell, a resident of the area proposed to be annexed, sought to intervene. McDowell's primary argument was that the proposed annexation would result in changes in the municipal electoral process that would substantially dilute the voting strength of black voters within the presently incorporated area of Savannah. McDowell requested that the referendum be enjoined because, among other reasons, the implementation of the Act had not been submitted for approval to the Attorney General of the United States or a three-judge United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.A., Section 1973c, as amended).

On April 17, 1978, the Chatham Superior Court denied the parties' requests for a temporary restraining order to restrain the holding of the referendum. The referendum was held as scheduled on April 19, 1978, and a majority of those voting voted to approve the Act. The superior court entered an order on June 8, 1978, upholding the constitutionality of the Act. However, the superior court did grant a supersedeas pending this appeal enjoining the Board of Elections of Chatham County from certifying as elected the candidates in connection with the Savannah city election scheduled for July 11, 1978.

In Case No. 34037, Ben and Alice Wall appeal. In Case No. 34038, Henry W. McDowell appeals. The questions raised in each appeal are identical, and, therefore, the appeals have been consolidated for decision.

1. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits the implementation of any change in a voting standard, practice or procedure in states or political subdivisions thereof which are within the coverage of the Act, unless the change has been submitted to either the Attorney General of the United States or to a three-judge District Court for the District of Columbia for prior approval. The constitutionality of this far-reaching law was sustained in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769) (1966).

Section 5 requires the federal authorities to examine submitted changes in voting practices to determine whether they have the purpose or will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a minority group. It is significant to note that the concern of Section 5 in a case such as the present one is with the changes in voting which proceed from the annexation, and not with the validity of the annexation itself.

However, changing boundary lines by annexations which enlarge the city's number of eligible voters constitutes the change in a standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 91 S.Ct. 431, 27 L.Ed.2d 476 (1971). Where the proportion of blacks in the annexed area is appreciably less than the proportion of blacks living within the city's old boundaries, a change from an at-large to a single-district electoral system has been found necessary so that the post-annexation electoral system would fairly recognize the minority's political strength. See City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F.Supp. 1021 (D.C.1972), affd. 410 U.S. 962, 93 S.Ct. 1441, 35 L.Ed.2d 698 (1973); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 95 S.Ct. 2296, 45 L.Ed.2d 245 (1975).

Following the annexation of unincorporated areas of Chatham County into the City of Savannah, blacks will constitute a lesser percentage of the population of the city than before annexation. It can thus be seen that the purpose of changing the method for electing the aldermanic board was so that the political strength of black voters would not be unnecessarily diluted in violation of federal law.

The Attorney General initially interposed an objection to the implementation of this annexation because of the at-large feature of the new plan for electing members of the aldermanic board by district. However, based on newly acquired information showing that blacks would constitute a voter majority in three rather than two of the newly created aldermanic districts, the Attorney General withdrew the objection.

Accordingly, the appellants' argument that the annexation referendum should not have been held since federal approval had not been obtained is now moot.

2. Whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to enjoin the annexation referendum is also a moot question, since the referendum itself has already been held. Bruck v. City of Temple, 240 Ga. 411(2), 240 S.E.2d 876 (1977); Richmond County Business Assn. v. Richmond County, 222 Ga. 772, 152 S.E.2d 738 (1966).

3. The appellants argue that the inclusion into one law of the provision for annexation and the provision for changing the aldermanic electoral system violated the section of the State Constitution prohibiting the passage of a law which refers to more than one subject matter. Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. IV of the Georgia Constitution of 1976 (Code Ann. § 2-1304). 1

The laudable purpose behind this constitutional requirement was well stated in Rea v. City of LaFayette, 130 Ga. 771, 772, 61 S.E. 707, 708 (1908): "Each proposition submitted to the voters should stand or fall upon its own merits, without, on the one hand, receiving any adventitious aid from another and perhaps more popular one, or, on the other hand, having to carry the burden of supporting a less meritorious and popular measure. No voter should be compelled, in order to support a measure which he favors, to vote also for a wholly different one which his judgment disapproves, or, in order to vote against the proposition which he desires to defeat, to vote also against the one which commends itself to the approval of his judgment." In Rea v. City of LaFayette, supra, several different, unrelated bond issues were submitted to the voters in one referendum. The court labeled this as "something closely akin to coercion" and as "not at all conducive to a free and untrammelled expression of public sentiment as to the merits of either." 130 Ga. at 772-773, 61 S.E. at 708.

However, questions have been found to be properly consolidated into one law where the initial question was whether something should be done and the additional questions were merely incidental to the accomplishment of it. See Carter v. Burson 230 Ga. 511, 198 S.E.2d 151 (1973). See also Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S.E. 479 (1911). As stated in Carter v. Burson, supra, 230 Ga. at 519, 198 S.E.2d at 156, "The test of whether an Act or a constitutional amendment violates the multiple subject matter rule is whether all of the parts of the Act or of the constitutional amendment are germane to the accomplishment of a single objective."

In Crews v. Cook, 220 Ga. 479, 139 S.E.2d 490 (1964), the question for decision was whether the multiple subject-matter rule permitted the inclusion in one Act of amendments to several Code sections, all of which dealt with and related directly to the subject of wills and estates. The court had no trouble in holding that this was permissible. "(T)he word 'subject matter' as used in the Constitution . . . is to be given a broad and extended meaning so as to allow the legislature authority to include in one act all matters having a logical or natural connection. To constitute plurality of subject-matter, an Act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any logical connection with or relation to each other." 220 Ga. at...

To continue reading

Request your trial
18 cases
  • Lutz v. Foran
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • March 8, 1993
    ...subject matter rule depends on whether all of the bill's provisions seek to accomplish a single objective. Wall v. Board of Elections, 242 Ga. 566, 570, 250 S.E.2d 408 (1978). The Constitution looks to "unity of purpose." Central Railway Co., 104 Ga. at 846, 31 S.E. As used in the Constitut......
  • City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage Dist.
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1992
    ...two or more dissimilar or discordant subjects that have no reasonable relationship to one another); Wall v. Board of Elections of Chatham County, 242 Ga. 566, 250 S.E.2d 408 (1978) (subject matter as used in the Constitution is given a broad and extended meaning to allow the legislature to ......
  • Avery v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 8, 1985
    ...284 S.E.2d 263 (1981) ); voting (United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960); Wall v. Bd. of Elections, Chatham County, 242 Ga. 566, 250 S.E.2d 408 (1978)); and public accommodations (United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1231, 20 L.Ed.2d 132 The lead......
  • American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Webb
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • June 27, 1984
    ...merits." Camp v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, 229 Ga. 35, 38, 189 S.E.2d 56 (1972); see also Wall v. Board of Elections, 242 Ga. 566, 569, 250 S.E.2d 408 (1978). 4 The Court is aware of the possible difficulties in obtaining a construction of the challenged Act in a declara......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT