Wallace v. Balint

• Decision Date: 06 February 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-1572.,00-1572.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Parties: WALLACE, ADMR., ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES, v. BALINT; STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT.

94 Ohio St.3d 182

761 NE 2d 598

WALLACE, ADMR., ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES, v. BALINT; STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT.

No. 00-1572.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted September 18, 2001.

Decided February 6, 2002.

Don C. Her Co., L.P.A., and Don C. Her, for appellants and cross-appellees. Davis & Young and Henry A. Hentemann, for appellees and cross-appellants.

Elk & Elk Co., L.P.A. and Todd O. Rosenberg, for amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, in support of appellants and cross-appellees.

DOUGLAS, J.

James Wallace, Jr., died as a result of injuries sustained when his motorcycle collided with an automobile driven by Dennis Balint. Balint's negligence was allegedly the cause of the accident.

Subsequently, appellants and cross-appellees, James Wallace, Sr., decedent's father, individually and as administrator of the estate of decedent, decedent's mother, Wanda Wallace, decedent's brother, Christopher Wallace, and decedent's sister, Katrina Wallace, filed an action in the court of common pleas for personal injury and, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2125, wrongful death against Balint and appellee and cross-appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.

At the time of the accident, Balint was insured under a policy of liability insurance through State Farm with liability limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. Decedent was the named insured under two policies of liability insurance with State Farm, each providing uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident.

James Wallace, Sr. and Wanda Wallace together were the named insured on four other policies of insurance with State Farm, and each policy provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. Christopher Wallace was the named insured on his own separate policy of insurance with State Farm that provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. Katrina Wallace was the named insured on her own separate policy of insurance, also with State Farm, that provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. Each of these policies was for a different vehicle. At the time of the accident, the Wallaces resided in the same household. As family members living in the same household, each of the Wallaces qualified as insureds under each of their eight State Farm policies.

In their complaint, the Wallaces sought, under the terms of their eight underinsured motorist policies with State Farm, a total recovery of $800,000. This amount represents the combined total of the per-accident limits of the Wallaces' eight policies in addition to Balint's $50,000 liability coverage.

While the case was pending before the court of common pleas, State Farm agreed to pay the estate of James Wallace, Jr., $25,000, the per-person limits of Balint's liability policy. State Farm paid the estate an additional $25,000, thereby exhausting the $50,000 underinsured motorist coverage limit on one of the two underinsured motorist policies of decedent.

State Farm filed two motions for summary judgment. State Farm first moved for summary judgment as the provider of underinsured motorist coverage, arguing that the Wallaces were attempting to stack the coverage of each of the remaining seven policies and that each of the policies included a provision, pursuant to the authority granted in former R.C. 3937.18(G)(2), precluding intrafamily stacking. (See 1994 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 211-212. The authorization is now at R.C. 3937.18[F][2].) Thus, State Farm argued, the Wallaces were not entitled to stack their separate underinsured motorist coverages on top of the underinsured motorist coverage that had already been paid pursuant to one of the decedent's policies. State Farm also argued that the Wallaces were not entitled to the per-accident limits of any of the underinsured motorist policies in question but were limited to a single claim subject to the per-person limit, since only one person had been physically injured. In a second motion for summary judgment, State Farm argued that coverage under Balint's liability policy was limited the same way.

Thus, it was State Farm's contention (1) that pursuant to the antistacking policy provision and former R.C. 3937.18(G)(2), the Wallaces were not entitled to coverage under their other policies, (2) that if the Wallaces are entitled to anything under their policies they are limited by the policies and former R.C. 3937.18(H) to the per-person limit, and (3) that the Wallaces are limited by their policies and R.C. 3937.44 to a single claim subject to the per-person limit of Balint's liability policy. (See R.C. 3937.18[G], similar to former R.C. 3937.18[H], 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 212.)

As indicated, former R.C. 3937.18(G)(2) permits insurers to provide antistacking language in their policies. State Farm did so. Former R.C. 3937.18(H) permits insurers to treat all claims against uninsured motorist coverage as a single claim to the per-person limit where only one person suffers bodily injury in an accident. State Farm did so. R.C. 3937.44 permits insurers to treat all claims under a liability policy as a single claim subject to the per-person limit where only one person suffers bodily injury. State Farm did so.

The trial court granted summary judgment to State Farm on both of its motions. The Wallaces appealed the trial court's judgment to the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals.

The court of appeals reviewed three issues. The first was whether the antistacking language of each of the policies was unambiguous and valid. The second was whether the Wallaces were limited to a single claim subject to the per-person limits of their underinsured motorist coverage. The third was whether the Wallaces were limited to a single claim subject to the per-person limit of Balint's liability policy. The court of appeals held that the antistacking language of the policies was valid and that the Wallaces were limited to one claim at the per-accident limit of Balint's liability policy. The court of appeals also found, however, that the parents of the decedent could recover up to the peraccident limits of one of their four policies. The Wallaces appealed to this court, and State Farm cross-appealed. In their appeal, the Wallaces contend that the antistacking language of the policies is invalid and that coverage at the peraccident limits of each of the eight policies should be available to them. State Farm contends in its cross-appeal that under the facts of this case there is no circumstance where the per-accident limits of any policy are available to the Wallaces. The case is now before us upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal and cross-appeal. In answering the first issue, the court of appeals determined that pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(G)(2), each State Farm policy contained a valid antistacking provision and that the Wallaces were attempting to impermissibly stack their underinsured motorist coverages. We agree that each of the policies in question did include a valid antistacking provision. We do not agree that the Wallaces were attempting to impermissibly stack their underinsured motorist coverage as to all of their policies.

"Stacking" is defined in former R.C. 3937.18(G). Former R.C. 3937.18(G)(2) provides that intrafamily stacking "is the aggregating of the limits of such coverages purchased by the same person or two or more family members of the same household." (Emphasis added.) "Stacking" is also defined as "the ability of insured, when covered by more than one insurance policy, to obtain benefits from second policy on same claim when recovery from first policy alone would be inadequate." (Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 1403. See Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode (1982), 187 Conn. 386, 388, 446 A.2d 1059, 1060, fn. 2, overruled on other grounds, Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon (1991), 220 Conn. 30, 594 A.2d 977, and Detroit Auto. Inter Ins. Exchange v. McMillan (1980), 97 Mich. App. 687, 296 N.W.2d 147, reversed on other grounds (1983), 417 Mich. 946, 332 N.W.2d 149.

"The concept of `stacking' coverages * * * arises where the same claimant and the same loss are covered under multiple policies, or under multiple coverages contained in a single policy, and the amount available under one policy is inadequate to satisfy the damages alleged or awarded." (Emphasis added.) 12 Couch, Insurance (3 Ed.1998) 169-14 to 169-15, Section 169:4.¹

Unquestionably, the policies at issue herein each include, pursuant to R.C. 3937.18(G)(2), valid antistacking language. But that is not the end of the story.

In Savoie v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 500, 506, 620 N.E.2d 809, 814, we stated, "`Intrafamily' stacking occurs when an individual or an entire family is insured by several separate uninsured/underinsured policies insuring different vehicles. When the individual or a family member is injured by an uninsured or underinsured motorist, he or she will try to combine, or stack, each of the policies' underinsurance limits to compensate the injured individual." (Emphasis added.) As illustrated by Savoie, intrafamily stacking occurs when a single family member attempts to stack multiple coverages of the household.

We agree that decedent's estate is attempting to aggregate the underinsured motorist benefits of decedent's second policy on top of the benefits already paid out of decedent's first policy. Likewise, decedent's parents, James and Wanda, seek to aggregate the underinsured motorist benefits under their four separate policies. What the estate and the decedent's parents seek clearly violates the antistacking language of the policies.

However, given the definition of "stacking" as found in Savoie and in the other sources cited above, and...