Wallace v. Conroy
| Decision Date | 12 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95 Civ. 9915 (PKL).,95 Civ. 9915 (PKL). |
| Citation | 945 F.Supp. 628 |
| Parties | Howard WALLACE, Plaintiff, v. Brian CONROY, Warden of A.R.D.C. c-74 of Rikers Island East, Elmhurst, N.Y., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Howard Wallace, Attica, NY, Pro se.
Marilyn Richter, Assistant Corporation Counsel, New York City, for defendant.
Plaintiff pro se Howard Wallace brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights in defendant's failure to complete plaintiff's transfer to state custody within ten to fourteen days of his sentencing. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing (1) that plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in being transferred within a specified period of time; (2) that plaintiff failed to state a valid claim against defendant, sued in his official capacity; and (3) that plaintiff's claim is at most a negligence claim and thus is not cognizable under § 1983.
This Court referred this action to the Honorable Theodore H. Katz, United States Magistrate Judge, for preparation of a report and recommendation on defendant's motion to dismiss. On September 17, 1996, Judge Katz issued a Report and Recommendation (the "Report") that this Court grant defendant's motion and dismiss the complaint with prejudice. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72(b), 6(a) and 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have ten (10) days to file written objections to a report and recommendation after being served with a copy. Plaintiff requested, and was granted, an extension of time to file objections. By an Order of this Court dated October 1, 1996, plaintiff was directed to file objections by November 4, 1996. Plaintiff has failed to file objections within the specified time or to request a further extension. Furthermore, the Court has reviewed the Report and finds that it is legally correct and proper. The Court therefore adopts the Report in its entirety.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated by Judge Katz in the Report, defendant's motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim is HEREBY GRANTED; the complaint is dismissed with prejudice, and therefore leave to amend the complaint is HEREBY DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
This prisoner pro se action was referred to me by your Order of Reference, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), for a Report and Recommendation with respect to defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. For the following reasons, I recommend that defendant's motion be granted and that the action be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff, who had been a pre-trial detainee on Rikers Island ("Rikers"), was sentenced on criminal charges on December 20, 1994 and subsequently incarcerated for two days at the Beacon Correctional Facility on Rikers. On December 22, 1994, he was transferred to another Rikers facility, A.R.D.C. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that on January 11, 1995 an attempt was made to transfer him to Downstate Correctional Facility ("Downstate"), a prison operated by New York State, but that Downstate refused to accept him because of a "technicality": his fingerprints had not been taken at A.R.D.C. (Id.) As a result, plaintiff was returned to A.R.D.C. and was scheduled to have his fingerprints taken the next day. (Id.) According to plaintiff, he was not transferred back to Downstate until twenty days later, on January 31, 1995.
Plaintiff claims that New York City is required to transfer "state-ready" inmates to state facilities within ten to fourteen days of sentencing. (Compl. § IV-A). He further claims that the delay in his transfer caused by A.R.D.C. was unnecessary and in violation of this requirement, and that he is entitled to monetary damages to compensate him for the "stress and humiliation" he suffered as a result of the delay. (Compl. §§ IV-A — V.)
Brian Conroy, the sole defendant in this action, was the Warden of A.R.D.C. at the time plaintiff was incarcerated there. (Compl. § IV). He now moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the Complaint, alleging that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant argues that the Complaint is deficient because (a) plaintiff has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in being transferred from the City prison system into the State prison system within a particular period of time; (b) plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Warden, sued in his official capacity, under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); and (c) plaintiff has pleaded, at most, a negligence claim, which does not state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Defendant's Memorandum of Law, dated May 21, 1996 ("Def.Mem."), at 1-2.) Plaintiff did not file a response to defendant's motion to dismiss.
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must accept all allegations of the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor and may dismiss only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 298 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 961, 113 S.Ct. 1387, 122 L.Ed.2d 762 (1993); Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1118-19 (2d Cir.1990); Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1138 (2d Cir.1986). All pleadings should be construed so as to do substantial justice. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f). In deciding motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court "is not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Festa v. Local 3 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 905 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir.1990).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which a claim is based. All that is required is a "short and plain statement of the claim" giving the defendant notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Conley, 355 U.S. at 47, 78 S.Ct. at 103; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Moreover, pro se complaints, such as the instant one, should be liberally construed by the court. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). They are to be afforded a close and sympathetic reading and are not to be held to as rigorous a standard as formal pleadings prepared by an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (per curiam); Washington, 782 F.2d at 1138; Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 781 F.2d 24, 28-29 (2d Cir.1986). Having applied these standards in this case, I conclude that the Complaint in this action fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted and therefore recommend that defendant's motion to dismiss be granted.
Plaintiff does not specify of which constitutional right he was allegedly deprived as a result of the delay in his transfer from the City prison system to the State prison system, but the Complaint can fairly be read as contending that plaintiff had a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in being transferred to state custody within a specified period of time and that this interest was infringed without due process of law by the twenty-day delay.1 Courts routinely review prison transfer issues under a liberty interest analysis. See, e.g. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (inmate transferred interstate); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (inmate transferred intrastate).
To be successful in a § 1983 action alleging the denial of a liberty interest, plaintiff must show both that the purportedly adverse action that was taken implicates a liberty interest, Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223-24, 96 S.Ct. at 2538, and that the requisite process was not provided before plaintiff was deprived of that interest, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1153-54, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982); Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir.1995). Because I find that the delay in plaintiff's transfer did not deny plaintiff any liberty interest, I need not determine whether the amount of process, if any, afforded to plaintiff was sufficient to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), whether a prison regulation or a statutory provision relating to the administration of the prison system gave rise to a liberty interest was ascertained by examining the language of the particular regulation or statute to determine whether it was mandatory in nature. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472, 103 S.Ct. 864, 871, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). If, in addition to being mandatory, the language placed "substantive limitations on official discretion" in carrying out the goals of the regulation or statute, Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1909, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (quoting Olim, 461 U.S. at 249, 103 S.Ct. at 1747), the combination would result in "a conclusion that the state has created a [protected] liberty interest" under the regulation or statute, Id., 490 U.S. at 463, 109 S.Ct. at 1910 (citing Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472, 103...
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