Wallace v. Department of Revenue of State of Colo., Motor Vehicle Div., 88CA0533

• Decision Date: 24 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88CA0533,88CA0533
• Citation: 787 P.2d 181
• Parties: Robert M. WALLACE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF the STATE OF COLORADO, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Defendant-Appellant. . V
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 181

787 P.2d 181

Robert M. WALLACE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF the STATE OF COLORADO, MOTOR

VEHICLE DIVISION, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 88CA0533.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. V.

Aug. 24, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 21, 1989.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 5, 1990.

J. Scott McComas, Boulder, for plaintiff-appellee.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., and Eric V. Field, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion by Judge RULAND.

The Department of Revenue appeals from a district court judgment reversing an order of the Department which revoked the driver's license of plaintiff, Robert M. Wallace. We reverse and remand with directions.

Following his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol, Wallace submitted to an intoxilyzer test of his breath. The test results showed a blood alcohol content of .189 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. See § 42-2-122.1(4)(a), C.R.S. (1984 Repl.Vol. 17).

At the administrative revocation hearing, the arresting officer testified that he noticed Wallace's vehicle drive from the traveled part of a city street into the gutter and then along the gutter for one block. The officer also observed Wallace drive into the gutter area of the street on two additional occasions, after which he contacted Wallace in a parking lot.

Wallace presented evidence indicating that the criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence were dismissed. The dismissal was based upon a ruling by the county court that the officer "did not have probable cause to stop" Wallace's vehicle. Wallace contended that this ruling was binding upon the Department under the collateral estoppel doctrine.

The hearing officer rejected Wallace's argument and found that his "erratic driving" had provided the arresting officer with "reasonable grounds" to make the initial traffic stop. Accordingly, he revoked Wallace's driver's license pursuant to § 42-2-122.1, C.R.S. (1984 Repl. Vol. 17).

I.

On review, the district court reversed, holding that the county court's ruling in the criminal proceedings was binding on the Department. The Department contends that the district court erred in its application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We agree.

Contrary to the Department's initial argument, questions as to the legality of the initial traffic stop and subsequent arrest for driving under the influence are relevant issues in administrative revocation proceedings under § 42-2-122.1. Sanger v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 736 P.2d 431 (Colo.App.1987); see Nefzger v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 739 P.2d 224 (Colo.1987). Even so, we conclude that, by legislative mandate, the Department's determination of this issue in administrative proceedings is not governed by the resolution of the same issue in any criminal proceeding arising out of the same occurrence. Therefore the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83(4)(b)(1982).

Section 42-2-122.1(1.5)(c), C.R.S. (1988 Cum Supp.) (reenactment of identical previous subsection), provides that:

"The determination of these facts by the department is independent of the determination of the same or similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence. The disposition of those criminal shall not affect any revocation under this section." (emphasis supplied)

We recognize that the phrase "these facts" in the first sentence of the statute refers only to a determination of whether the licensee was driving in this state with a blood alcohol content in excess of the statutory limit. However, the statutory scheme of which this provision is a part must be construed broadly in a manner that gives effect to its purpose of ensuring public safety on the highways. Nefzger v. Colorado Department of Revenue, supra; Stanger v. Colorado Department of Revenue, 780 P.2d 64 (Colo.App.1989). And, the second sentence establishes an intent by the General Assembly to exclude consideration of the disposition of criminal charges for any purpose in the revocation...