Wallace v. Des Moines Community Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 08 August 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-1333.,06-1333.
• Citation: 754 N.W.2d 854
• Parties: Marc A. WALLACE, Gregory A. Wells, Shannon Boswell, Mike Murray, Gayle J. Murray, Kathleen L. Gingerich, HV Tracy Lynch, and Scott D. Neal, Appellants, v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

754 N.W.2d 854

Marc A. WALLACE, Gregory A. Wells, Shannon Boswell, Mike Murray, Gayle J. Murray, Kathleen L. Gingerich, HV Tracy Lynch, and Scott D. Neal, Appellants, v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Appellee.

No. 06-1333.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

August 8, 2008.

Bruce E. Johnson of Cutler Law Firm, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellants.

Andrew J. Bracken of Ahlers & Cooney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

STREIT, Justice.

Several taxpayers filed a certiorari action challenging the Des Moines School Board's decision to close certain schools and reappropriate resources to other needs. The district court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment finding certiorari was not an available remedy to the taxpayers because the Board's action was not judicial or quasi-judicial. We affirm.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

In 1998, the Iowa legislature created Iowa Code chapter 422E, which permitted the imposition of a local option sales tax for school infrastructure improvements upon local voter approval. Shortly after the adoption of this legislation, the various school districts in Polk County, including the Des Moines School District, adopted separate resolutions to submit a local option sales tax referendum to the voters of Polk County. The county held a public referendum in March 1999, but the local option sales tax for schools in Polk County was narrowly defeated.

In July 1999, the Board of Directors for the Des Moines School District ("Board") adopted a resolution requesting the Polk County Board of Supervisors to once again submit a ballot initiative to the voters for the imposition of a local option sales tax for school infrastructure purposes. After obtaining community input, the Board adopted a ten-year plan specifying needed improvements to each facility within the school district with the improvements being funded by revenue from such a tax. The plan noted the cost of improvements exceeded the projected revenue from the local option sales tax and that the plan was subject to modification based on program and demographic changes.

In November 1999, a proposal to impose a 1% local option sales tax was presented to Polk County voters. The measure indicated revenue would be spent on school infrastructure as defined in section 422E.1 and as specified by each infrastructure project plan for each school district located within the county. The proposal passed, and the Board began making improvements to the Des Moines district's facilities with adjustments to the plan.

By 2004, the Board realized the actual revenues from the local option sales tax where short of projections. Additionally, building costs since 1999 had escalated, and the district's allocation of the collected local option sales tax revenues was reduced due to a decline in public school enrollment in Des Moines. Consequently, on July 12, 2005, the Board modified the ten-year plan by deciding to close four elementary schools and sell a central facility that provided advanced secondary education and technical training courses. The modification included additional spending on new facilities that was not part of the original plan. The Board also approved hiring a construction firm to create a management plan in connection with the infrastructure projects. This expense was not specified in the original plan either.

The plaintiffs are Des Moines residents, taxpayers, and parents of children they claim are affected and aggrieved by the Board's July 12 decision ("taxpayers"). In August 2005, the taxpayers filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the Board's decision to modify the original plan for school infrastructure improvements.¹ They claimed the Board acted illegally and asked that the Board's July 12 decision "be annulled and decreed void."

The Board moved for summary judgment. It claimed allocation of resources by a local school board is a legislative decision and not subject to review by certiorari. The Board contended the taxpayers' proper remedy was to appeal to the Iowa Department of Education, which the taxpayers had done.

The district court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment. It determined the Board's actions did not involve judicial functions subject to certiorari review. Alternatively, the district court found even if certiorari was appropriate, the taxpayers failed to prove the Board exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally. The taxpayers appealed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

II. Scope of Review.

We review a district court decision granting or denying a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. 6.4. A matter may be resolved on summary judgment if the record reveals only a conflict concerning the legal consequences of undisputed facts. City of Fairfield v. Harper Drilling Co., 692 N.W.2d 681, 681 (Iowa 2005). The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). An issue of fact is "material" only when the dispute involves facts which might affect the outcome of the suit, given the applicable governing law. Junkins v. Branstad, 421 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Iowa 1988). The requirement of a "genuine" issue of fact means the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. In a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party enjoys the benefit of "every legitimate inference that [could] be reasonably deduced from the record." Phillips v. Covenant Clinic, 625 N.W.2d 714, 718 (Iowa 2001).

III. Merits.

The issue before us is whether the taxpayers may challenge the Board's actions in a certiorari action. Certiorari is an "extraordinary remedy." Hohl v. Bd. of Educ., 250 Iowa 502, 509, 94 N.W.2d 787, 791 (1959). It "is the method for bringing the record of an inferior tribunal before the court for the purpose of ascertaining whether the inferior tribunal or body had jurisdiction and whether its proceedings were authorized." Id. at 508, 94 N.W.2d at 791; see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1403 (stating "relief by way of certiorari shall be strictly limited to questions of jurisdiction or illegality of the act complained of, unless otherwise specially provided by statute"). Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1401 describes when a writ of certiorari may issue:

A writ of certiorari shall only be granted when specifically authorized by statute; or where an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, is alleged to have exceeded proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally.

The taxpayers do not allege any statutory authorization for the issuance of a writ in the instant case. Thus, their claim can only survive if the Board was exercising "judicial functions" when it voted to amend its ten-year plan on July 12.

We do not construe "judicial functions" in a strict or technical sense. Hoefer v. Sioux City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 375 N.W.2d 222, 224 (Iowa 1985). Therefore, the action of the Board need only be quasi-judicial to support a certiorari proceeding. Id. We consider three factors to determine whether an action is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature: (1) whether "`the questioned act involves a proceeding in which notice and an opportunity to be heard are required;'" (2) whether "`a determination of rights of parties is made which requires the exercise of discretion in finding facts and applying the law thereto;'" or (3) whether "`the challenged act goes to the determination of some right the protection of which is the peculiar office of the courts.'" Id. at 224-25 (quoting Buechele v. Ray, 219 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Iowa 1974)). "`[Q]uasi ordinarily means superficially resembling but intrinsically different. Therefore, when an activity appears to be judicial in nature, but in reality is not, it is termed quasi-judicial.'" Id. at 225 (quoting Buechele, 219 N.W.2d at 681). However, "`the mere exercise of judgment or discretion is not alone sufficient to characterize an act as quasi-judicial.'" Id. (quoting Buechele, 219 N.W.2d at 681).

There is a tendency to broaden the scope of the writ where no other form of redress is provided and "substantial justice will not be done" unless such relief is granted. Hohl, 250 Iowa at 509, 94 N.W.2d at 791-92; see also Dunphy v. City Council, 256 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Iowa 1977) (stating certiorari "`is especially applicable in cases where inferior boards, officers, or tribunals exceed their authority and no method of appeal has been provided by statute.'" (quoting Bremer County v. Walstead, 130 Iowa 164, 169, 106 N.W. 352, 354 (1906))). However, a "writ shall not be denied or annulled because plaintiff has another plain, speedy, or adequate remedy." Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1403. With these principles in mind, we determine whether the Board's action in this case is judicial or quasi-judicial.

A. Notice and Opportunity to be Heard. The taxpayers do not identify any entitlement to notice or an opportunity to be heard. They are challenging a decision of the Board as to how to appropriate the local option sales tax revenues and more specifically, the decision to close certain schools. The only source of "notice and opportunity to be heard" comes from section 281-19 of the Iowa Administrative Code. There, the Iowa Department of Education created rules a school district must follow to involve the public in decisions to close a school. While school boards have the discretion to determine the number of schools it shall operate within their districts, they are required to provide "public notice" and encourage "public consideration" and "public involvement" in any decision to close a school. Iowa Admin. Code § 281-19.1. When making such a decision, the board is required to inform the community "in a manner reasonably calculated to apprise the public...