Waller v. Tripett

• Decision Date: 28 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 01-71225.,01-71225.
• Citation: 179 F.Supp.2d 724
• Parties: Eric WALLER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Doris Taylor, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. David TRIPETT, Individually, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

179 F.Supp.2d 724

Eric WALLER, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Doris Taylor, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. David TRIPETT, Individually, Defendant.

No. 01-71225.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

September 28, 2001.

Reconsideration Denied November 28, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kelly A. Pruse, Norbert B. Leonard, Leonard Kruse, Bloomfield Hills, MI, P.C., for Plaintiff.

Mark Matus, C. Adam Purnell, Lansing, MI, for Defendant.

ORDER

JULIAN ABELE COOK, Jr., District Judge.

In the case at bar, the Plaintiff, Eric Waller, acting in his capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of Doris Taylor, has charged the Defendant, David Tripett with promoting employment policies which caused his mother's death.

On April 5, 2001, Tripett filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that (1) the law does not support any cause of action against him, and (2) he is shielded from liability on the basis of the doctrine of qualified immunity. The two primary issues that are raised by this motion are reasonably straightforward. First, did Tripett violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Second, if there was a constitutional violation, is he entitled to immunity for his actions? For the reasons that are set forth below, the Court will grant in part, and deny in part Tripett's motion.

I

At the time of her death, Taylor was working as a food service steward at the Thumb Correctional Facility in Michigan (TCF), where she had been employed for more than ten years.¹ During all of the times that are relevant to this controversy, TCF was under the direction of Tripett, who served as its warden and as Taylor's ultimate supervisor.

On May 17, 1998, Gerald Barnes and other inmates were assigned to routine kitchen duties at TCF. Barnes had been imprisoned after having been convicted of committing a criminal sexual assault with a knife.

According to the Complaint, Taylor advised an unnamed party that she did not want Barnes to come near her because of his alleged history of knife related assaults. Nevertheless, Barnes was given access to knives in the kitchen while Taylor was there.² Using one of these implements, he followed her out of the kitchen and into an unsecured hallway where she was stabbed. Taylor died a few hours later.

Here, the Plaintiff maintains that Tripett had instituted several institutional policies and practices, all of which contributed to his mother's untimely death, in that Tripett (1) permitted felons to possess dangerous knives without providing adequate supervision and security precautions; (2) allowed inmates to handle deadly weapons without adequate background reviews; (3) failed to install sufficient emergency measures, such as a safety transceiver in the hallway where Taylor was murdered; and (4) neglected to maintain adequate medical staff and facilities.

II

In his motion, Tripett contends that Waller has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may present such a request to test whether a cause of action has been adequately pled in the Complaint.³ The Court must accept Waller's allegations as true and will construe them liberally in his favor. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir.1987); Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir.1976). At the same time, any legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences need not be assumed. See Morgan, 829 F.2d at 12; Westlake, 537 F.2d at 858.

Importantly, the Court will not dismiss a pleading merely because it does not state all the elements which give rise to a legal basis of recovery or because the aggrieved party has misconceived the proper theory if relief can be granted under any theory. See Myers v. United States, 636 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir.1981). Instead, a dismissal should only be permitted "if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Allard v. Weitzman (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir.1993).

III

The question of whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment⁴ provides a right, which was allegedly infringed by Tripett in the fulfillment of his duties as a warden, appears to be an open one. The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the rights of the public against a State in relation to those injuries that are caused by people who are within its custody.⁵ Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not had an opportunity to officially address a set of analogous circumstances.⁶

On the one hand, it is clear that when the State actively takes and holds a person without consent — as in the case of a prisoner or an involuntarily committed mental patient — there is "a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). Thus, an inmate has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause to receive certain protections of the State. On the other hand, it is equally well established that, in the absence of a State action which contributes to the claimed injury, the Fourteenth Amendment offers no substantive rights. See id.; see generally United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966) ("`The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals.'") (quoting United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 92, 71 S.Ct. 581, 95 L.Ed. 758 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). If neither the aggressor nor the victim is in the State's custody, the Due Process Clause does not provide any relief to a person who suffers grave harms at the hands of another even if the danger is or should be evident to governmental officials. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. 998. Since the State, in such circumstances, has neither aided the aggressor in the violent act nor prevented the victim from responding, it owes no constitutional duty to thwart the acts of violence.

However, the instant case falls somewhere between these two poles since the aggressor was in custody but the victim was not under similar institutional constraints.⁷ If (1) the State placed an individual in custody, (2) its officials knew or should have known that the inmate presented a particular kind of danger to other persons, and (3) the policies and practices of its officials gave the prisoner an opportunity, as well as the means, with which to continue his violent modus operandi, did the failure of the State to protect foreseeable victims constitute a deprivation of their lives or liberties without due process of law?

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, among other things, that a State shall not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 cl. 3. At its core, the clause protects the public against arbitrary action by the State. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998); 1 Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 8-1, at 1335 (3d ed.2000). As such, it serves to "`prevent the government from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression,'" DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196, 109 S.Ct. 998 (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986)), quoted in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992), and it prohibits "the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842, 118 S.Ct. 1708.

In furtherance of these aims, the clause dictates a baseline⁸ of acceptable governmental conduct.⁹ Through its substantive component, it "protects individual liberty against `certain governmental actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.'"¹⁰ Collins, 503 U.S. at 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061; see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). With respect to executive actions, the litmus test for determining if the government abuses its power and infringes upon personal freedom is whether the contested act shocks the judicial conscience. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47, 861 n. 2, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (the "shocks-the-conscience" test has been applied not only in connection with executive acts, but also with respect to at least one legislative action);¹¹ Collins, 503 U.S. at 128, 112 S.Ct. 1061; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952).

Despite the potential breadth of these words, the Court uses caution in interpreting them in order to shun a slide into utter subjectivity. The Due Process Clause, which ostensibly guards against arbitrariness, must not itself become arbitrary in its application. Years of precedent have provided some guidelines as to how to conduct the inquiry. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 858, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). When emergency circumstances are presented, an official's action will not shock the judicial conscience unless it evinces malice or an intent to inflict harm. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853-54, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (discussing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)). By contrast, if an official has the opportunity to deliberate over a matter, the judiciary will not be shocked unless an official acts in a way that exhibits deliberate indifference to others' rights. Id. at 851-53, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (discussing well settled standards controlling the creation of prison policy); but see id. at 855-56, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (Rehnquist, J.,...