Wallis v. State, 51736

• Decision Date: 30 January 1976
• Docket Number: No. 3,No. 51736,51736,3
• Citation: 137 Ga.App. 457,224 S.E.2d 91
• Parties: R. T. WALLIS v. The STATE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 91

224 S.E.2d 91

137 Ga.App. 457

R. T. WALLIS v. The STATE.

No. 51736.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 3.

Jan. 30, 1976.

King, Phipps & Associates, C. B. King, Herbert E. Phipps, Carl A. Bryant, Albany, for appellant.

Walter S. Chew, Jr., Sol., Montezuma, for appellee.

DEEN, Presiding Judge.

Code § 81-1413 provides for a continuance in case of the absence of counsel for providential cause if the unrepresented party will swear that he cannot safely go to trial without the services of his absent counsel, that he expects his services at the next term and that the application is not made for delay only. There is language in older cases to the effect that mere absence of an attorney without the consent of the client, is not a sufficient ground for a continuance. Allen v. State, 10 Ga. 85(1); Long v. State, 38 Ga. 491(4); Giles v. State, 66 Ga. 344(1). It goes without saying that these cases were decided long before the United States Supreme Court began to examine and broaden the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, as represented by the opinions, inter alia, of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed.2d 158; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530. Yet even before this 'revolution' in the interpretation of the federal Sixth Amendment, our own Supreme Court began to back away from the rigid rule that mere unexcused absence of counsel is not a ground for continuance. In Delk v. State, 100 Ga. 61(1), 27 S.E. 152 it was held: 'The provision in the (Georgia) 'bill of rights' declaring that 'every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel,' confers upon every person indicted for crime a most valuable and important constitutional right, and entitles him to be defended by counsel of his own selection whenever he is able and willing to employ an attorney and uses reasonable diligence to obtain his services. No person meeting these requirements should be deprived of his right to be represented by counsel chosen by himself, or forced to trial with the assistance only of counsel appointed for him by the court.' The Supreme Court there reversed a denial of a continuance where the defendant's retained counsel was absent without excuse though in the good faith belief that case would not be reached when in fact it was. 'We recognize the difficulties which the State may encounter in assembling witnesses on numerous occasions, only to have trial of a case postponed to a later date, and we also recognize the commendable desire of the trial court to expedite the final disposition of a criminal case, but the constitutional mandate of this State is clear, as interpreted by the Supreme Court . . . that every defendant charged with a crime in this State is entitled to be defended by counsel of his own selection whenever he is able and willing to employ one, and uses reasonable diligence to obtain his services, and that where this appears he should not be deprived of representation by the counsel which he chose, or forced to trial with the assistance of counsel appointed by the court.' Long v. State, 119 Ga.App. 82, 84, 166 S.E.2d 365, 367. 'We need not determine whether the defendant received adequate and effective representation by this attorney, or whether the absence of chosen counsel is excusable, for it is clear that the defendant was denied the right of representation by counsel of his own choice for reasons beyond his control, and that the trial court erred in refusing to delay the trial at least sufficiently to determine whether it could be held with representation by selected counsel and without undue delay.' Id. at 85, 166 S.E.2d at 367. (Emphasis supplied.)

We believe that the Long decision represents the true rule as to when a continuance may or may not be denied when retained counsel is absent without excuse when the trial is called. In such a situation there must be a determination of whether the absence is the result of reasons beyond the control of the defendant. Thus if the defendant were negligent in failing to promptly employ counsel, a continuance may be denied within the trial judge's discretion. McLendon v. State, 123 Ga.App. 290(2a), 180 S.E.2d 567. Likewise if the defendant is using the right to continue his trial for purposes of delay. Willingham v. State, 134 Ga.App. 144, 213 S.E.2d 516. But...