Walls v. Arizona Dept. of Public Safety

• Decision Date: 19 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. 1,CA-CV,1
• Citation: 170 Ariz. 591,826 P.2d 1217
• Parties: James Dean WALLS and McAllis Walls, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY and Ronnie Singleton, Defendants-Appellees. 90-216.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 1217

826 P.2d 1217

170 Ariz. 591

James Dean WALLS and McAllis Walls, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v.ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY and Ronnie Singleton, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 90-216.

Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 1, Department C.

Dec. 19, 1991.

[170 Ariz. 592] Brandes, Lane & Joffe, P.C. by David A. Joffe and Laurie S. Superfon, Phoenix, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Fritz, Childers & Osborne by James W. Fritz, Mesa, for defendants-appellees.

OPINION

EUBANK, Acting Presiding Judge.

AppellantsJames Dean Walls and McAllis Walls ¹ appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Arizona Department of Public Safety("DPS") and Ronnie Singleton, a police officer ("Singleton"), and from the trial court's denial of their motion to amend their complaint.We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DPS and Officer Singleton and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walls' motion to amend the complaint.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action arose out of a multiple vehicle collision that occurred on I-17.The facts are generally undisputed.On the evening of February 27, 1988, a vehicle driven by Samuel Goldberg("Goldberg") became disabled in the center northbound lane of I-17.Goldberg left his vehicle in that lane and called DPS for assistance.Officer Singleton was summoned to the scene in response to a Code 34 request ("Motorist Needs Help").While Goldberg had left his car unattended, a vehicle driven by Lloyd Cowan came to a stop behind Goldberg's vehicle in order to avoid colliding with it.A vehicle driven by Walls then collided with the rear of Cowan's vehicle, causing the Cowan vehicle to collide with the Goldberg vehicle.

As Officer Singleton approached the area where Goldberg's car was located, he observed a vehicle being driven by Jimmy Chayrez Espinoza("Espinoza") weaving or drifting towards the right lane on I-17.Based upon his observations, Singleton suspected that Espinoza was driving under the influence of alcohol and concluded that he had probable cause to make an investigatory stop of the Espinoza vehicle.Before Singleton activated his emergency lights and stopped Espinoza, the vehicle driven by Espinoza collided into the rear of the Walls vehicle.Walls was injured in the collision.Espinoza was arrested following the collision, and his blood alcohol level was determined to be .218.

Walls' complaint against DPS and Officer Singleton sought general damages and alleged Singleton was negligent in failing to stop Espinoza prior to Espinoza's collision with the Walls vehicle.²DPS and Officer Singleton filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there were no facts indicating that the conduct of either Singleton or DPS constituted negligence; that, absent willful intent or gross negligence, A.R.S. § 12-820.02 extends a qualified immunity to DPS officers for acts of negligence committed within the scope of their employment; and that there were no facts to support a finding that Singleton acted with either intent or gross negligence.In support of the motion for summary judgment, DPS and Officer Singleton submitted the affidavit of Singleton.The affidavit stated that when Singleton concluded that he had probable cause to make an investigatory stop of Espinoza's vehicle, he reached for the switch to activate the emergency lights, but before being able to do so, and almost instantaneously, the Espinoza vehicle crashed into the rear of the Walls vehicle.

After DPS and Officer Singleton filed their motion for summary judgment, Walls moved to amend the complaint to add a claim based on gross negligence against Singleton and DPS.In Walls' subsequent response to the motion for summary judgment, the only evidence submitted to controvert appellees' statement of facts was the affidavit of Richard Todd("Todd"), a private investigator who interviewed Singleton on behalf of Walls.Todd stated in his affidavit that Singleton told him that he had noted that the Espinoza vehicle was weaving.Singleton also allegedly told Todd that he had intended to stop the Espinoza vehicle for some period of time, but, due to the fact that barricades in the area restricted traffic, he felt that allowing Espinoza to operate his vehicle until he could have safely stopped him was the more appropriate approach for him to take.

The trial court considered the motion for summary judgment and the motion to amend the complaint at one hearing.It subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of DPS and Officer Singleton and denied Walls' motion to amend.The trial court also denied Walls' motion for reconsideration, and Walls timely filed this appeal.

II.A.R.S. § 12-820.02

Walls argues on appeal that, in granting summary judgment in favor of DPS and Officer Singleton, the trial court improperly applied A.R.S. § 12-820.02 to the case at bar.In their motion for summary judgment, DPS and Singleton argued that they were immune from Walls' claims pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-820.02.That statute creates a qualified immunity for public employees and entities for certain actions.A.R.S. § 12-820.02 provides in pertinent part as follows:

Unless a public employee acting within the scope of his employment intended to cause injury or was grossly negligent, neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for:

1.The failure to make an arrest or the failure to retain an arrested person in custody.

Walls argues that A.R.S. § 12-820.02 does not confer a qualified immunity on DPS and Officer Singleton because Walls' claim is based on Singleton's failure to make an investigatory stop, not on his failure to make an arrest.There are no Arizona cases interpreting the term "arrest" within the context of A.R.S. § 12-820.02(1).However, Walls relies on various fourth amendmentcases distinguishing an arrest from an investigatory stop and claims that A.R.S. § 12-820.02(1) should be interpreted literally to apply only to a claim stemming from a public employee's failure to make an arrest.SeeState v. Lawson, 144 Ariz. 547, 550-53, 698 P.2d 1266, 1269-72(1985)(court discusses and applies different levels required to warrant proper investigatory stop and arrest).

Statutory interpretation is an issue of law, and this court is entitled to draw its own legal conclusions.U.S. Parking Systems v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34(App.1989).Unambiguous statutes should be given their plain meaning unless an absurdity results.Id.In interpreting a statute, "legislative intent is controlling" and "pragmatic construction is required if a technical construction would lead to absurdity."State v. Weible, 142 Ariz. 113, 118, 688 P.2d 1005, 1010(1984)."To arrive at legislative intent, the court looks to the words, context, subject matter, effects and consequences, reason and spirit of the law."State v. Schoner, 121 Ariz. 528, 530, 591 P.2d 1305, 1307(App.1979).

The historical note following A.R.S. § 12-820 describes the legislative purpose and intent behind Arizona's sovereign immunity statutes, including A.R.S. § 12-820.02.That historical note states:

Section 1.Legislative purpose and intent

A.The legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity.On the other hand, the legislature recognizes that, while a private entrepreneur may readily be held liable for negligence within the chosen scope of his activity, the area within which government has the power to act for the public good is almost without limit and therefore government should not have the duty to do everything that might be done.Consequently, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state that public entities are liable for acts and omissions of employees in accordance with the statutes and common law of this state.All of the provisions of this act should be construed with a view to carry out the above legislative purpose.

Although it is clear from the above statement that the legislature intended to limit sovereign immunity to certain specific, enumerated circumstances, it is also clear that the legislature recognized that sovereign immunity is sometimes necessary given the breadth of the government's exercise of power.One specific instance of immunity is the immunity for negligence in the failure to make an arrest.A.R.S. § 12-820.02(1).

As mentioned earlier, Walls' position is that Officer Singleton was negligent in failing to make an investigatory stop of Espinoza sooner than he did, not in failing to arrest Espinoza.However, Singleton's decision to make an investigatory stop of the Espinoza vehicle was merely the first step in arresting Espinoza.Until he made the stop, Singleton could not have known whether he had probable cause to arrest Espinoza.Because the purpose of an investigatory stop is for an officer to determine whether a crime has been committed as well as whether the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity, seeLawson, 144 Ariz. at 552, 698 P.2d at 1271, an investigatory stop will often lead to an arrest.

Although we recognize that in the criminal law context the distinction between an investigatory stop and an arrest may be critical, a distinction should not be made between the two activities for the purpose of determining the applicability of the qualified immunity provided by A.R.S. § 12-820.02(1).The two activities are similar in that both an investigatory stop and an arrest involve a judgment by a police officer and subsequent apprehension and/or detention of a suspect.Walls argues that qualified immunity should apply only when the officer has probable cause to arrest someone, but fails to make an arrest.Further, he argues that qualified immunity should not apply when the officer merely has a reasonable suspicion that a crime may have been or is...