Walsh v. LG Chem Am.

• Decision Date: 08 November 2021
• Docket Number: CV-18-01545-PHX-SPL
• Parties: Christopher Walsh, Plaintiff, v. LG Chem America, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Christopher Walsh, Plaintiff,
v.
LG Chem America, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-18-01545-PHX-SPL

United States District Court, D. Arizona

November 8, 2021

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Honorable Steven P. Logan, United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims. (Doc. 106). Defendant seeks summary judgment in its favor on all four of Plaintiff's claims against it. (Doc. 106). The Motion has been fully briefed and is ready for review.^[1] (Docs. 106, 116, 127). After reviewing the parties' briefing, the Court issues the following Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a products liability case involving two LG HG2 18650 batteries from a vaping device. (Doc. 30 at 2). Plaintiff Christopher Walsh (“Plaintiff”) purchased the vaping device and batteries from Defendant retail smoke shop Oueis Gas, Inc. (“Defendant”) on October 28, 2015. (Id.). On November 18, 2016, Plaintiff alleges those same batteries reacted with a set of keys in his right pocket and exploded, causing serious

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burns. (Id.). The incident occurred at a restaurant in Scottsdale, Arizona and surveillance video from the restaurant shows the explosion. (Id.). Plaintiff filed a complaint against LG Chem America, LG Chem Ltd., and Oueis Gas, Inc. on May 22, 2018 with four counts: (1) negligent design; (2) negligent failure to warn; (3) strict liability/design defect; and (4) strict liability/information defect. (Id. at 3-4). LG Chem America and LG Chem Ltd. were later dismissed, leaving Oueis Gas as the only remaining defendant. (Docs. 49 & 66).

Following the incident, Plaintiff negligently failed to preserve the batteries and keys as evidence. (Doc. 131 at 5). As a result, Defendant moved for an adverse instruction based on Plaintiff's spoliation of evidence, which this Court granted. (Id. at 6). This Court also granted Defendant's motion excluding the expert testimony of Plaintiff's expert Chester Sandberg. (Doc. 133). The testimony excluded concerned Sandberg's opinions on causation, design defect, and warnings defect. (Id.). Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all four of Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. 106).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Material facts are those facts “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact arises if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual

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dispute and that the fact in contention is material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In other words, the nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, ” and, instead, must “come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must view the factual record and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's Complaint contains four counts: (1) Negligent Design; (2) Negligent Failure to Warn; (3) Strict Liability/Design Defect; and (4) Strict Liability/Information Defect. The Court will first examine the design defects claims. The Court will then examine the claims for negligent failure to warn and for strict liability informational defect.

A. Negligent Design & Strict Liability/Design Defect (Counts I & III)

Plaintiff alleges design defect claims under both negligence and strict liability theories. As to the negligent design claim (Count I), Defendant argues that Plaintiff “cannot prevail . . . against [Defendant] for the simple reason that [Defendant], being a retailer (rather than product designer), does not design the batteries it sells.” (Doc. 106 at 11). Indeed, in negligent design cases under Arizona law, “the plaintiff ‘must prove that the designer acted unreasonably at the time of . . . design of the product.'” Granillo v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CV-19-00529-TUC-CKJ (MSA), 2020 WL 913300, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 12, 2020) (emphasis added) (citing Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 147 Ariz. 242, 247 (1985)). Here, given that Defendant was never involved in the design of the batteries at issue, Defendant cannot be found liable for negligent design. In the Response, Plaintiff concedes and explains that the negligent design claim “was initially intended for another defendant”

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who has since been dismissed from the case and that Plaintiff has no intention of proceeding with a negligent design claim against Defendant. (Doc. 116 at 10). This Court holds that Plaintiff's negligent design claim (Count I) is dismissed.

Turning to the strict liability design defect claim (Count III), this Court first notes that strict products liability “does not rest on traditional concepts of fault” and its plaintiffs do “not have to prove that the defendant was negligent.” St. Clair v. Nellcor Puritan Bennett LLC, No. CV-10-1275-PHX-LOA, 2011 WL 5331674, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2011) (citation omitted). The focus of a strict liability claim is on the quality of the product, not on the conduct of the defendant. Id. at *5 (citing Golonka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 204 Ariz. 575, 581 (Ct. App. 2003)). Thus, unlike in negligence, a retailer may still be held liable for a design defect in strict liability, even if it did not design the product. Id.; Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co. v. Biddulph Oldsmobile, 131 Ariz. 289, 292 (1982) (citing Sullivan v. Green Mfg. Co., 118 Ariz. 181 (Ct. App. 1978)) (“[Strict liability] theory extends liability to manufacturers, . . . as well as the dealer or retail seller of the...