Walter L. Lacy Co. v. National Finance Corporation

• Decision Date: 28 January 1935
• Docket Number: No. 18270.,18270.
• Citation: 79 S.W.2d 1078
• Parties: WALTER L. LACY CO. v. NATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

79 S.W.2d 1078

WALTER L. LACY CO. v. NATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION.

No. 18270.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

January 28, 1935.

Rehearing Denied February 18, 1935.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Allen C. Southern, Judge.

"Not to be published in State Reports."

Action by the Walter L. Lacy Company against the National Finance Corporation. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Transferred from the Supreme Court, 73 S.W.(2d) 747.

Affirmed.

Marley & Marley, of Kansas City, for appellant.

James B. Nourse and Milford W. Ryder, both of Kansas City, for respondent.

CAMPBELL, Commissioner.

The plaintiff, Walter L. Lacy Company, a Kentucky corporation, sued the defendant, National Finance Corporation, a corporation organized under the laws of Missouri, in the Jefferson circuit court, common pleas branch, first division, Jefferson county, Ky., and obtained a judgment by default in the sum demanded. In the present action, which is based upon that judgment, the judgment was adverse to the defendant, and it has appealed.

The duly authenticated copy of the judgment of the Kentucky court, which was introduced by the plaintiff, included a copy of the petition, a copy of the summons with the return of the sheriff endorsed thereon, and shows that said court had a judge, clerk, and seal. The sheriff, to whom the summons was directed, by leave of court, amended his original return. The amended return is as follows: "The sheriff amends the return of his summons hereon by stating that he executed the within summons April 18, 1929, upon the National Finance Co., Inc., by delivering a copy of the within summons to S. W. Taliaferro, Managing Agent of said corporation in Jefferson County, Kentucky, he being the chief officer found in this county at this time."

Section 72 of the Code of Civil Practice of Kentucky is as follows: "Excepting the actions mentioned in sections 62 to 66, both inclusive, and in sections 68, 70, 71, 73, 75, and 77, an action against a corporation which has an office or place of business in this State, or a chief officer or agent residing in this State, must be brought in the county in which such office or place of business is situated or in which such officer or agent resides; or, if it be upon a contract, in the above-named county, or in the county in which the contract is made or to be performed; or, if it be for a tort, in the first-named county, or in the county in which the tort is committed."

Section 51 of said Code provides as follows:

"3. Private corporation or railroad. In an action against a private corporation the summons may be served, in any county, upon the defendant's chief officer, or agent, who may be found in this State; or it may be served in the county wherein the action is brought, upon the defendant's chief officer or agent who may be found therein. * * *

"6. Non-resident engaged in business in this state. In actions against an individual residing in another State, or a partnership, association, or joint stock company, the members of which reside in another State, engaged in business in this State, the summons may be served on the manager, or agent of, or person in charge of, such business in this State, in the county where the business is carried on, or in the county where the cause of action occurred."

Section 732, subd. 33, of the Code reads: "The chief officer or agent of a corporation which has any of the officers or agents herein mentioned is: First, its president; second its vice-president; third, its secretary or librarian; fourth, its cashier or treasurer; fifth, its clerk; sixth, its managing agent."

The defendant says there are two questions in the case: (1) Was the defendant "so engaged in doing business in the State of Kentucky as to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the Kentucky courts?" (2) Was the service of summons sufficient to bring the appellant within the jurisdiction of the Kentucky court? In determining these questions, it must be borne in mind that if the judgment is valid in Kentucky, it is equally valid in Missouri (Hudson-Kimberly Pub. Co. v. Young, 90 Mo. App. 505), and that the authenticated copy of the judgment and judgment roll made a prima facie case in plaintiff's behalf (Severson v. Dickinson, 216 Mo. App. 572, 259 S. W. 518; Reis v. Epperson, 143 Mo. App. 90, 122 S. W. 353, 357).

For the defendant, Mr. Kidd, its president, and Mr. Worthington, its secretary-treasurer, gave evidence tending to show that Taliaferro was defendant's employee or sales representative, and in no sense its managing agent in Kentucky. It...